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git/Documentation/git-upload-pack.txt

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git-upload-pack(1)
==================
NAME
----
git-upload-pack - Send objects packed back to git-fetch-pack
SYNOPSIS
--------
[verse]
'git-upload-pack' [--[no-]strict] [--timeout=<n>] [--stateless-rpc]
[--advertise-refs] <directory>
DESCRIPTION
-----------
Invoked by 'git fetch-pack', learns what
objects the other side is missing, and sends them after packing.
This command is usually not invoked directly by the end user.
The UI for the protocol is on the 'git fetch-pack' side, and the
program pair is meant to be used to pull updates from a remote
repository. For push operations, see 'git send-pack'.
OPTIONS
-------
--[no-]strict::
Do not try <directory>/.git/ if <directory> is not a Git directory.
--timeout=<n>::
Interrupt transfer after <n> seconds of inactivity.
--stateless-rpc::
Perform only a single read-write cycle with stdin and stdout.
This fits with the HTTP POST request processing model where
a program may read the request, write a response, and must exit.
--http-backend-info-refs::
Used by linkgit:git-http-backend[1] to serve up
`$GIT_URL/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack` requests. See
"Smart Clients" in linkgit:gitprotocol-http[5] and "HTTP
Transport" in the linkgit:gitprotocol-v2[5]
documentation. Also understood by
linkgit:git-receive-pack[1].
<directory>::
The repository to sync from.
ENVIRONMENT
-----------
`GIT_PROTOCOL`::
Internal variable used for handshaking the wire protocol. Server
admins may need to configure some transports to allow this
variable to be passed. See the discussion in linkgit:git[1].
upload-pack: disable lazy-fetching by default The upload-pack command tries to avoid trusting the repository in which it's run (e.g., by not running any hooks and not using any config that contains arbitrary commands). But if the server side of a fetch or a clone is a partial clone, then either upload-pack or its child pack-objects may run a lazy "git fetch" under the hood. And it is very easy to convince fetch to run arbitrary commands. The "server" side can be a local repository owned by someone else, who would be able to configure commands that are run during a clone with the current user's permissions. This issue has been designated CVE-2024-32004. The fix in this commit's parent helps in this scenario, as well as in related scenarios using SSH to clone, where the untrusted .git directory is owned by a different user id. But if you received one as a zip file, on a USB stick, etc, it may be owned by your user but still untrusted. This has been designated CVE-2024-32465. To mitigate the issue more completely, let's disable lazy fetching entirely during `upload-pack`. While fetching from a partial repository should be relatively rare, it is certainly not an unreasonable workflow. And thus we need to provide an escape hatch. This commit works by respecting a GIT_NO_LAZY_FETCH environment variable (to skip the lazy-fetch), and setting it in upload-pack, but only when the user has not already done so (which gives us the escape hatch). The name of the variable is specifically chosen to match what has already been added in 'master' via e6d5479e7a (git: extend --no-lazy-fetch to work across subprocesses, 2024-02-27). Since we're building this fix as a backport for older versions, we could cherry-pick that patch and its earlier steps. However, we don't really need the niceties (like a "--no-lazy-fetch" option) that it offers. By using the same name, everything should just work when the two are eventually merged, but here are a few notes: - the blocking of the fetch in e6d5479e7a is incomplete! It sets fetch_if_missing to 0 when we setup the repository variable, but that isn't enough. pack-objects in particular will call prefetch_to_pack() even if that variable is 0. This patch by contrast checks the environment variable at the lowest level before we call the lazy fetch, where we can be sure to catch all code paths. Possibly the setting of fetch_if_missing from e6d5479e7a can be reverted, but it may be useful to have. For example, some code may want to use that flag to change behavior before it gets to the point of trying to start the fetch. At any rate, that's all outside the scope of this patch. - there's documentation for GIT_NO_LAZY_FETCH in e6d5479e7a. We can live without that here, because for the most part the user shouldn't need to set it themselves. The exception is if they do want to override upload-pack's default, and that requires a separate documentation section (which is added here) - it would be nice to use the NO_LAZY_FETCH_ENVIRONMENT macro added by e6d5479e7a, but those definitions have moved from cache.h to environment.h between 2.39.3 and master. I just used the raw string literals, and we can replace them with the macro once this topic is merged to master. At least with respect to CVE-2024-32004, this does render this commit's parent commit somewhat redundant. However, it is worth retaining that commit as defense in depth, and because it may help other issues (e.g., symlink/hardlink TOCTOU races, where zip files are not really an interesting attack vector). The tests in t0411 still pass, but now we have _two_ mechanisms ensuring that the evil command is not run. Let's beef up the existing ones to check that they failed for the expected reason, that we refused to run upload-pack at all with an alternate user id. And add two new ones for the same-user case that both the restriction and its escape hatch. Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
2024-04-16 10:35:33 +02:00
`GIT_NO_LAZY_FETCH`::
When cloning or fetching from a partial repository (i.e., one
itself cloned with `--filter`), the server-side `upload-pack`
may need to fetch extra objects from its upstream in order to
complete the request. By default, `upload-pack` will refuse to
perform such a lazy fetch, because `git fetch` may run arbitrary
commands specified in configuration and hooks of the source
repository (and `upload-pack` tries to be safe to run even in
untrusted `.git` directories).
+
This is implemented by having `upload-pack` internally set the
`GIT_NO_LAZY_FETCH` variable to `1`. If you want to override it
(because you are fetching from a partial clone, and you are sure
you trust it), you can explicitly set `GIT_NO_LAZY_FETCH` to
`0`.
SECURITY
--------
Most Git commands should not be run in an untrusted `.git` directory
(see the section `SECURITY` in linkgit:git[1]). `upload-pack` tries to
avoid any dangerous configuration options or hooks from the repository
it's serving, making it safe to clone an untrusted directory and run
commands on the resulting clone.
For an extra level of safety, you may be able to run `upload-pack` as an
alternate user. The details will be platform dependent, but on many
systems you can run:
git clone --no-local --upload-pack='sudo -u nobody git-upload-pack' ...
SEE ALSO
--------
linkgit:gitnamespaces[7]
GIT
---
Part of the linkgit:git[1] suite