2007-10-30 03:03:39 +01:00
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#ifndef SEND_PACK_H
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#define SEND_PACK_H
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struct send_pack_args {
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2014-08-23 03:15:24 +02:00
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const char *url;
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2007-10-30 03:03:39 +01:00
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unsigned verbose:1,
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2009-08-05 22:22:36 +02:00
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quiet:1,
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2010-02-27 05:52:15 +01:00
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porcelain:1,
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2010-10-16 20:37:03 +02:00
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progress:1,
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2007-11-10 00:32:10 +01:00
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send_mirror:1,
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2007-10-30 03:03:39 +01:00
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force_update:1,
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use_thin_pack:1,
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2009-05-01 22:56:47 +02:00
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use_ofs_delta:1,
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2009-10-31 01:47:41 +01:00
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dry_run:1,
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push: the beginning of "git push --signed"
While signed tags and commits assert that the objects thusly signed
came from you, who signed these objects, there is not a good way to
assert that you wanted to have a particular object at the tip of a
particular branch. My signing v2.0.1 tag only means I want to call
the version v2.0.1, and it does not mean I want to push it out to my
'master' branch---it is likely that I only want it in 'maint', so
the signature on the object alone is insufficient.
The only assurance to you that 'maint' points at what I wanted to
place there comes from your trust on the hosting site and my
authentication with it, which cannot easily audited later.
Introduce a mechanism that allows you to sign a "push certificate"
(for the lack of better name) every time you push, asserting that
what object you are pushing to update which ref that used to point
at what other object. Think of it as a cryptographic protection for
ref updates, similar to signed tags/commits but working on an
orthogonal axis.
The basic flow based on this mechanism goes like this:
1. You push out your work with "git push --signed".
2. The sending side learns where the remote refs are as usual,
together with what protocol extension the receiving end
supports. If the receiving end does not advertise the protocol
extension "push-cert", an attempt to "git push --signed" fails.
Otherwise, a text file, that looks like the following, is
prepared in core:
certificate version 0.1
pusher Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> 1315427886 -0700
7339ca65... 21580ecb... refs/heads/master
3793ac56... 12850bec... refs/heads/next
The file begins with a few header lines, which may grow as we
gain more experience. The 'pusher' header records the name of
the signer (the value of user.signingkey configuration variable,
falling back to GIT_COMMITTER_{NAME|EMAIL}) and the time of the
certificate generation. After the header, a blank line follows,
followed by a copy of the protocol message lines.
Each line shows the old and the new object name at the tip of
the ref this push tries to update, in the way identical to how
the underlying "git push" protocol exchange tells the ref
updates to the receiving end (by recording the "old" object
name, the push certificate also protects against replaying). It
is expected that new command packet types other than the
old-new-refname kind will be included in push certificate in the
same way as would appear in the plain vanilla command packets in
unsigned pushes.
The user then is asked to sign this push certificate using GPG,
formatted in a way similar to how signed tag objects are signed,
and the result is sent to the other side (i.e. receive-pack).
In the protocol exchange, this step comes immediately before the
sender tells what the result of the push should be, which in
turn comes before it sends the pack data.
3. When the receiving end sees a push certificate, the certificate
is written out as a blob. The pre-receive hook can learn about
the certificate by checking GIT_PUSH_CERT environment variable,
which, if present, tells the object name of this blob, and make
the decision to allow or reject this push. Additionally, the
post-receive hook can also look at the certificate, which may be
a good place to log all the received certificates for later
audits.
Because a push certificate carry the same information as the usual
command packets in the protocol exchange, we can omit the latter
when a push certificate is in use and reduce the protocol overhead.
This however is not included in this patch to make it easier to
review (in other words, the series at this step should never be
released without the remainder of the series, as it implements an
interim protocol that will be incompatible with the final one).
As such, the documentation update for the protocol is left out of
this step.
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2014-09-12 20:17:07 +02:00
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push_cert:1,
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2015-01-08 04:23:22 +01:00
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stateless_rpc:1,
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atomic:1;
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2007-10-30 03:03:39 +01:00
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};
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int send_pack(struct send_pack_args *args,
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2009-03-09 02:06:07 +01:00
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int fd[], struct child_process *conn,
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2013-12-05 14:02:29 +01:00
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struct ref *remote_refs, struct sha1_array *extra_have);
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2007-10-30 03:03:39 +01:00
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#endif
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