transport: add a protocol-whitelist environment variable
If we are cloning an untrusted remote repository into a
sandbox, we may also want to fetch remote submodules in
order to get the complete view as intended by the other
side. However, that opens us up to attacks where a malicious
user gets us to clone something they would not otherwise
have access to (this is not necessarily a problem by itself,
but we may then act on the cloned contents in a way that
exposes them to the attacker).
Ideally such a setup would sandbox git entirely away from
high-value items, but this is not always practical or easy
to set up (e.g., OS network controls may block multiple
protocols, and we would want to enable some but not others).
We can help this case by providing a way to restrict
particular protocols. We use a whitelist in the environment.
This is more annoying to set up than a blacklist, but
defaults to safety if the set of protocols git supports
grows). If no whitelist is specified, we continue to default
to allowing all protocols (this is an "unsafe" default, but
since the minority of users will want this sandboxing
effect, it is the only sensible one).
A note on the tests: ideally these would all be in a single
test file, but the git-daemon and httpd test infrastructure
is an all-or-nothing proposition rather than a test-by-test
prerequisite. By putting them all together, we would be
unable to test the file-local code on machines without
apache.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2015-09-16 19:12:52 +02:00
|
|
|
# Test routines for checking protocol disabling.
|
|
|
|
|
|
2016-12-14 23:39:52 +01:00
|
|
|
# Test clone/fetch/push with GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL whitelist
|
|
|
|
|
test_whitelist () {
|
transport: add a protocol-whitelist environment variable
If we are cloning an untrusted remote repository into a
sandbox, we may also want to fetch remote submodules in
order to get the complete view as intended by the other
side. However, that opens us up to attacks where a malicious
user gets us to clone something they would not otherwise
have access to (this is not necessarily a problem by itself,
but we may then act on the cloned contents in a way that
exposes them to the attacker).
Ideally such a setup would sandbox git entirely away from
high-value items, but this is not always practical or easy
to set up (e.g., OS network controls may block multiple
protocols, and we would want to enable some but not others).
We can help this case by providing a way to restrict
particular protocols. We use a whitelist in the environment.
This is more annoying to set up than a blacklist, but
defaults to safety if the set of protocols git supports
grows). If no whitelist is specified, we continue to default
to allowing all protocols (this is an "unsafe" default, but
since the minority of users will want this sandboxing
effect, it is the only sensible one).
A note on the tests: ideally these would all be in a single
test file, but the git-daemon and httpd test infrastructure
is an all-or-nothing proposition rather than a test-by-test
prerequisite. By putting them all together, we would be
unable to test the file-local code on machines without
apache.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2015-09-16 19:12:52 +02:00
|
|
|
desc=$1
|
|
|
|
|
proto=$2
|
|
|
|
|
url=$3
|
|
|
|
|
|
2016-12-14 23:39:50 +01:00
|
|
|
test_expect_success "clone $desc (enabled)" '
|
transport: add a protocol-whitelist environment variable
If we are cloning an untrusted remote repository into a
sandbox, we may also want to fetch remote submodules in
order to get the complete view as intended by the other
side. However, that opens us up to attacks where a malicious
user gets us to clone something they would not otherwise
have access to (this is not necessarily a problem by itself,
but we may then act on the cloned contents in a way that
exposes them to the attacker).
Ideally such a setup would sandbox git entirely away from
high-value items, but this is not always practical or easy
to set up (e.g., OS network controls may block multiple
protocols, and we would want to enable some but not others).
We can help this case by providing a way to restrict
particular protocols. We use a whitelist in the environment.
This is more annoying to set up than a blacklist, but
defaults to safety if the set of protocols git supports
grows). If no whitelist is specified, we continue to default
to allowing all protocols (this is an "unsafe" default, but
since the minority of users will want this sandboxing
effect, it is the only sensible one).
A note on the tests: ideally these would all be in a single
test file, but the git-daemon and httpd test infrastructure
is an all-or-nothing proposition rather than a test-by-test
prerequisite. By putting them all together, we would be
unable to test the file-local code on machines without
apache.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2015-09-16 19:12:52 +02:00
|
|
|
rm -rf tmp.git &&
|
|
|
|
|
(
|
|
|
|
|
GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL=$proto &&
|
|
|
|
|
export GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL &&
|
|
|
|
|
git clone --bare "$url" tmp.git
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
'
|
|
|
|
|
|
2016-12-14 23:39:50 +01:00
|
|
|
test_expect_success "fetch $desc (enabled)" '
|
transport: add a protocol-whitelist environment variable
If we are cloning an untrusted remote repository into a
sandbox, we may also want to fetch remote submodules in
order to get the complete view as intended by the other
side. However, that opens us up to attacks where a malicious
user gets us to clone something they would not otherwise
have access to (this is not necessarily a problem by itself,
but we may then act on the cloned contents in a way that
exposes them to the attacker).
Ideally such a setup would sandbox git entirely away from
high-value items, but this is not always practical or easy
to set up (e.g., OS network controls may block multiple
protocols, and we would want to enable some but not others).
We can help this case by providing a way to restrict
particular protocols. We use a whitelist in the environment.
This is more annoying to set up than a blacklist, but
defaults to safety if the set of protocols git supports
grows). If no whitelist is specified, we continue to default
to allowing all protocols (this is an "unsafe" default, but
since the minority of users will want this sandboxing
effect, it is the only sensible one).
A note on the tests: ideally these would all be in a single
test file, but the git-daemon and httpd test infrastructure
is an all-or-nothing proposition rather than a test-by-test
prerequisite. By putting them all together, we would be
unable to test the file-local code on machines without
apache.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2015-09-16 19:12:52 +02:00
|
|
|
(
|
|
|
|
|
cd tmp.git &&
|
|
|
|
|
GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL=$proto &&
|
|
|
|
|
export GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL &&
|
|
|
|
|
git fetch
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
'
|
|
|
|
|
|
2016-12-14 23:39:50 +01:00
|
|
|
test_expect_success "push $desc (enabled)" '
|
transport: add a protocol-whitelist environment variable
If we are cloning an untrusted remote repository into a
sandbox, we may also want to fetch remote submodules in
order to get the complete view as intended by the other
side. However, that opens us up to attacks where a malicious
user gets us to clone something they would not otherwise
have access to (this is not necessarily a problem by itself,
but we may then act on the cloned contents in a way that
exposes them to the attacker).
Ideally such a setup would sandbox git entirely away from
high-value items, but this is not always practical or easy
to set up (e.g., OS network controls may block multiple
protocols, and we would want to enable some but not others).
We can help this case by providing a way to restrict
particular protocols. We use a whitelist in the environment.
This is more annoying to set up than a blacklist, but
defaults to safety if the set of protocols git supports
grows). If no whitelist is specified, we continue to default
to allowing all protocols (this is an "unsafe" default, but
since the minority of users will want this sandboxing
effect, it is the only sensible one).
A note on the tests: ideally these would all be in a single
test file, but the git-daemon and httpd test infrastructure
is an all-or-nothing proposition rather than a test-by-test
prerequisite. By putting them all together, we would be
unable to test the file-local code on machines without
apache.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2015-09-16 19:12:52 +02:00
|
|
|
(
|
|
|
|
|
cd tmp.git &&
|
|
|
|
|
GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL=$proto &&
|
|
|
|
|
export GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL &&
|
|
|
|
|
git push origin HEAD:pushed
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
'
|
|
|
|
|
|
2016-12-14 23:39:50 +01:00
|
|
|
test_expect_success "push $desc (disabled)" '
|
transport: add a protocol-whitelist environment variable
If we are cloning an untrusted remote repository into a
sandbox, we may also want to fetch remote submodules in
order to get the complete view as intended by the other
side. However, that opens us up to attacks where a malicious
user gets us to clone something they would not otherwise
have access to (this is not necessarily a problem by itself,
but we may then act on the cloned contents in a way that
exposes them to the attacker).
Ideally such a setup would sandbox git entirely away from
high-value items, but this is not always practical or easy
to set up (e.g., OS network controls may block multiple
protocols, and we would want to enable some but not others).
We can help this case by providing a way to restrict
particular protocols. We use a whitelist in the environment.
This is more annoying to set up than a blacklist, but
defaults to safety if the set of protocols git supports
grows). If no whitelist is specified, we continue to default
to allowing all protocols (this is an "unsafe" default, but
since the minority of users will want this sandboxing
effect, it is the only sensible one).
A note on the tests: ideally these would all be in a single
test file, but the git-daemon and httpd test infrastructure
is an all-or-nothing proposition rather than a test-by-test
prerequisite. By putting them all together, we would be
unable to test the file-local code on machines without
apache.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2015-09-16 19:12:52 +02:00
|
|
|
(
|
|
|
|
|
cd tmp.git &&
|
|
|
|
|
GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL=none &&
|
|
|
|
|
export GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL &&
|
|
|
|
|
test_must_fail git push origin HEAD:pushed
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
'
|
|
|
|
|
|
2016-12-14 23:39:50 +01:00
|
|
|
test_expect_success "fetch $desc (disabled)" '
|
transport: add a protocol-whitelist environment variable
If we are cloning an untrusted remote repository into a
sandbox, we may also want to fetch remote submodules in
order to get the complete view as intended by the other
side. However, that opens us up to attacks where a malicious
user gets us to clone something they would not otherwise
have access to (this is not necessarily a problem by itself,
but we may then act on the cloned contents in a way that
exposes them to the attacker).
Ideally such a setup would sandbox git entirely away from
high-value items, but this is not always practical or easy
to set up (e.g., OS network controls may block multiple
protocols, and we would want to enable some but not others).
We can help this case by providing a way to restrict
particular protocols. We use a whitelist in the environment.
This is more annoying to set up than a blacklist, but
defaults to safety if the set of protocols git supports
grows). If no whitelist is specified, we continue to default
to allowing all protocols (this is an "unsafe" default, but
since the minority of users will want this sandboxing
effect, it is the only sensible one).
A note on the tests: ideally these would all be in a single
test file, but the git-daemon and httpd test infrastructure
is an all-or-nothing proposition rather than a test-by-test
prerequisite. By putting them all together, we would be
unable to test the file-local code on machines without
apache.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2015-09-16 19:12:52 +02:00
|
|
|
(
|
|
|
|
|
cd tmp.git &&
|
|
|
|
|
GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL=none &&
|
|
|
|
|
export GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL &&
|
|
|
|
|
test_must_fail git fetch
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
'
|
|
|
|
|
|
2016-12-14 23:39:50 +01:00
|
|
|
test_expect_success "clone $desc (disabled)" '
|
transport: add a protocol-whitelist environment variable
If we are cloning an untrusted remote repository into a
sandbox, we may also want to fetch remote submodules in
order to get the complete view as intended by the other
side. However, that opens us up to attacks where a malicious
user gets us to clone something they would not otherwise
have access to (this is not necessarily a problem by itself,
but we may then act on the cloned contents in a way that
exposes them to the attacker).
Ideally such a setup would sandbox git entirely away from
high-value items, but this is not always practical or easy
to set up (e.g., OS network controls may block multiple
protocols, and we would want to enable some but not others).
We can help this case by providing a way to restrict
particular protocols. We use a whitelist in the environment.
This is more annoying to set up than a blacklist, but
defaults to safety if the set of protocols git supports
grows). If no whitelist is specified, we continue to default
to allowing all protocols (this is an "unsafe" default, but
since the minority of users will want this sandboxing
effect, it is the only sensible one).
A note on the tests: ideally these would all be in a single
test file, but the git-daemon and httpd test infrastructure
is an all-or-nothing proposition rather than a test-by-test
prerequisite. By putting them all together, we would be
unable to test the file-local code on machines without
apache.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2015-09-16 19:12:52 +02:00
|
|
|
rm -rf tmp.git &&
|
|
|
|
|
(
|
|
|
|
|
GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL=none &&
|
|
|
|
|
export GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL &&
|
|
|
|
|
test_must_fail git clone --bare "$url" tmp.git
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
'
|
2016-12-14 23:39:52 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
test_expect_success "clone $desc (env var has precedence)" '
|
|
|
|
|
rm -rf tmp.git &&
|
|
|
|
|
(
|
|
|
|
|
GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL=none &&
|
|
|
|
|
export GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL &&
|
|
|
|
|
test_must_fail git -c protocol.allow=always clone --bare "$url" tmp.git &&
|
|
|
|
|
test_must_fail git -c protocol.$proto.allow=always clone --bare "$url" tmp.git
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
'
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
test_config () {
|
|
|
|
|
desc=$1
|
|
|
|
|
proto=$2
|
|
|
|
|
url=$3
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Test clone/fetch/push with protocol.<type>.allow config
|
|
|
|
|
test_expect_success "clone $desc (enabled with config)" '
|
|
|
|
|
rm -rf tmp.git &&
|
|
|
|
|
git -c protocol.$proto.allow=always clone --bare "$url" tmp.git
|
|
|
|
|
'
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
test_expect_success "fetch $desc (enabled)" '
|
|
|
|
|
git -C tmp.git -c protocol.$proto.allow=always fetch
|
|
|
|
|
'
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
test_expect_success "push $desc (enabled)" '
|
|
|
|
|
git -C tmp.git -c protocol.$proto.allow=always push origin HEAD:pushed
|
|
|
|
|
'
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
test_expect_success "push $desc (disabled)" '
|
|
|
|
|
test_must_fail git -C tmp.git -c protocol.$proto.allow=never push origin HEAD:pushed
|
|
|
|
|
'
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
test_expect_success "fetch $desc (disabled)" '
|
|
|
|
|
test_must_fail git -C tmp.git -c protocol.$proto.allow=never fetch
|
|
|
|
|
'
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
test_expect_success "clone $desc (disabled)" '
|
|
|
|
|
rm -rf tmp.git &&
|
|
|
|
|
test_must_fail git -c protocol.$proto.allow=never clone --bare "$url" tmp.git
|
|
|
|
|
'
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Test clone/fetch/push with protocol.user.allow and its env var
|
|
|
|
|
test_expect_success "clone $desc (enabled)" '
|
|
|
|
|
rm -rf tmp.git &&
|
|
|
|
|
git -c protocol.$proto.allow=user clone --bare "$url" tmp.git
|
|
|
|
|
'
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
test_expect_success "fetch $desc (enabled)" '
|
|
|
|
|
git -C tmp.git -c protocol.$proto.allow=user fetch
|
|
|
|
|
'
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
test_expect_success "push $desc (enabled)" '
|
|
|
|
|
git -C tmp.git -c protocol.$proto.allow=user push origin HEAD:pushed
|
|
|
|
|
'
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
test_expect_success "push $desc (disabled)" '
|
|
|
|
|
(
|
|
|
|
|
cd tmp.git &&
|
|
|
|
|
GIT_PROTOCOL_FROM_USER=0 &&
|
|
|
|
|
export GIT_PROTOCOL_FROM_USER &&
|
|
|
|
|
test_must_fail git -c protocol.$proto.allow=user push origin HEAD:pushed
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
'
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
test_expect_success "fetch $desc (disabled)" '
|
|
|
|
|
(
|
|
|
|
|
cd tmp.git &&
|
|
|
|
|
GIT_PROTOCOL_FROM_USER=0 &&
|
|
|
|
|
export GIT_PROTOCOL_FROM_USER &&
|
|
|
|
|
test_must_fail git -c protocol.$proto.allow=user fetch
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
'
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
test_expect_success "clone $desc (disabled)" '
|
|
|
|
|
rm -rf tmp.git &&
|
|
|
|
|
(
|
|
|
|
|
GIT_PROTOCOL_FROM_USER=0 &&
|
|
|
|
|
export GIT_PROTOCOL_FROM_USER &&
|
|
|
|
|
test_must_fail git -c protocol.$proto.allow=user clone --bare "$url" tmp.git
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
'
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Test clone/fetch/push with protocol.allow user defined default
|
|
|
|
|
test_expect_success "clone $desc (enabled)" '
|
|
|
|
|
rm -rf tmp.git &&
|
2017-07-28 23:47:48 +02:00
|
|
|
test_config_global protocol.allow always &&
|
2016-12-14 23:39:52 +01:00
|
|
|
git clone --bare "$url" tmp.git
|
|
|
|
|
'
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
test_expect_success "fetch $desc (enabled)" '
|
2017-07-28 23:47:48 +02:00
|
|
|
test_config_global protocol.allow always &&
|
2016-12-14 23:39:52 +01:00
|
|
|
git -C tmp.git fetch
|
|
|
|
|
'
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
test_expect_success "push $desc (enabled)" '
|
2017-07-28 23:47:48 +02:00
|
|
|
test_config_global protocol.allow always &&
|
2016-12-14 23:39:52 +01:00
|
|
|
git -C tmp.git push origin HEAD:pushed
|
|
|
|
|
'
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
test_expect_success "push $desc (disabled)" '
|
2017-07-28 23:47:48 +02:00
|
|
|
test_config_global protocol.allow never &&
|
2016-12-14 23:39:52 +01:00
|
|
|
test_must_fail git -C tmp.git push origin HEAD:pushed
|
|
|
|
|
'
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
test_expect_success "fetch $desc (disabled)" '
|
2017-07-28 23:47:48 +02:00
|
|
|
test_config_global protocol.allow never &&
|
2016-12-14 23:39:52 +01:00
|
|
|
test_must_fail git -C tmp.git fetch
|
|
|
|
|
'
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
test_expect_success "clone $desc (disabled)" '
|
|
|
|
|
rm -rf tmp.git &&
|
2017-07-28 23:47:48 +02:00
|
|
|
test_config_global protocol.allow never &&
|
2016-12-14 23:39:52 +01:00
|
|
|
test_must_fail git clone --bare "$url" tmp.git
|
|
|
|
|
'
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# test cloning a particular protocol
|
|
|
|
|
# $1 - description of the protocol
|
|
|
|
|
# $2 - machine-readable name of the protocol
|
|
|
|
|
# $3 - the URL to try cloning
|
|
|
|
|
test_proto () {
|
|
|
|
|
test_whitelist "$@"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
test_config "$@"
|
transport: add a protocol-whitelist environment variable
If we are cloning an untrusted remote repository into a
sandbox, we may also want to fetch remote submodules in
order to get the complete view as intended by the other
side. However, that opens us up to attacks where a malicious
user gets us to clone something they would not otherwise
have access to (this is not necessarily a problem by itself,
but we may then act on the cloned contents in a way that
exposes them to the attacker).
Ideally such a setup would sandbox git entirely away from
high-value items, but this is not always practical or easy
to set up (e.g., OS network controls may block multiple
protocols, and we would want to enable some but not others).
We can help this case by providing a way to restrict
particular protocols. We use a whitelist in the environment.
This is more annoying to set up than a blacklist, but
defaults to safety if the set of protocols git supports
grows). If no whitelist is specified, we continue to default
to allowing all protocols (this is an "unsafe" default, but
since the minority of users will want this sandboxing
effect, it is the only sensible one).
A note on the tests: ideally these would all be in a single
test file, but the git-daemon and httpd test infrastructure
is an all-or-nothing proposition rather than a test-by-test
prerequisite. By putting them all together, we would be
unable to test the file-local code on machines without
apache.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2015-09-16 19:12:52 +02:00
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}
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# set up an ssh wrapper that will access $host/$repo in the
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# trash directory, and enable it for subsequent tests.
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setup_ssh_wrapper () {
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test_expect_success 'setup ssh wrapper' '
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write_script ssh-wrapper <<-\EOF &&
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echo >&2 "ssh: $*"
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host=$1; shift
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cd "$TRASH_DIRECTORY/$host" &&
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eval "$*"
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EOF
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GIT_SSH="$PWD/ssh-wrapper" &&
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export GIT_SSH &&
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export TRASH_DIRECTORY
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'
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}
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# set up a wrapper that can be used with remote-ext to
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# access repositories in the "remote" directory of trash-dir,
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# like "ext::fake-remote %S repo.git"
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setup_ext_wrapper () {
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test_expect_success 'setup ext wrapper' '
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write_script fake-remote <<-\EOF &&
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|
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echo >&2 "fake-remote: $*"
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cd "$TRASH_DIRECTORY/remote" &&
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eval "$*"
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EOF
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PATH=$TRASH_DIRECTORY:$PATH &&
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export TRASH_DIRECTORY
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'
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}
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