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git/sha1_file.c

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/*
* GIT - The information manager from hell
*
* Copyright (C) Linus Torvalds, 2005
*
* This handles basic git sha1 object files - packing, unpacking,
* creation etc.
*/
#include "cache.h"
#include "string-list.h"
#include "lockfile.h"
#include "delta.h"
#include "pack.h"
#include "blob.h"
#include "commit.h"
#include "run-command.h"
#include "tag.h"
#include "tree.h"
#include "tree-walk.h"
#include "refs.h"
#include "pack-revindex.h"
sha1-lookup: more memory efficient search in sorted list of SHA-1 Currently, when looking for a packed object from the pack idx, a simple binary search is used. A conventional binary search loop looks like this: unsigned lo, hi; do { unsigned mi = (lo + hi) / 2; int cmp = "entry pointed at by mi" minus "target"; if (!cmp) return mi; "mi is the wanted one" if (cmp > 0) hi = mi; "mi is larger than target" else lo = mi+1; "mi is smaller than target" } while (lo < hi); "did not find what we wanted" The invariants are: - When entering the loop, 'lo' points at a slot that is never above the target (it could be at the target), 'hi' points at a slot that is guaranteed to be above the target (it can never be at the target). - We find a point 'mi' between 'lo' and 'hi' ('mi' could be the same as 'lo', but never can be as high as 'hi'), and check if 'mi' hits the target. There are three cases: - if it is a hit, we have found what we are looking for; - if it is strictly higher than the target, we set it to 'hi', and repeat the search. - if it is strictly lower than the target, we update 'lo' to one slot after it, because we allow 'lo' to be at the target and 'mi' is known to be below the target. If the loop exits, there is no matching entry. When choosing 'mi', we do not have to take the "middle" but anywhere in between 'lo' and 'hi', as long as lo <= mi < hi is satisfied. When we somehow know that the distance between the target and 'lo' is much shorter than the target and 'hi', we could pick 'mi' that is much closer to 'lo' than (hi+lo)/2, which a conventional binary search would pick. This patch takes advantage of the fact that the SHA-1 is a good hash function, and as long as there are enough entries in the table, we can expect uniform distribution. An entry that begins with for example "deadbeef..." is much likely to appear much later than in the midway of a reasonably populated table. In fact, it can be expected to be near 87% (222/256) from the top of the table. This is a work-in-progress and has switches to allow easier experiments and debugging. Exporting GIT_USE_LOOKUP environment variable enables this code. On my admittedly memory starved machine, with a partial KDE repository (3.0G pack with 95M idx): $ GIT_USE_LOOKUP=t git log -800 --stat HEAD >/dev/null 3.93user 0.16system 0:04.09elapsed 100%CPU (0avgtext+0avgdata 0maxresident)k 0inputs+0outputs (0major+55588minor)pagefaults 0swaps Without the patch, the numbers are: $ git log -800 --stat HEAD >/dev/null 4.00user 0.15system 0:04.17elapsed 99%CPU (0avgtext+0avgdata 0maxresident)k 0inputs+0outputs (0major+60258minor)pagefaults 0swaps In the same repository: $ GIT_USE_LOOKUP=t git log -2000 HEAD >/dev/null 0.12user 0.00system 0:00.12elapsed 97%CPU (0avgtext+0avgdata 0maxresident)k 0inputs+0outputs (0major+4241minor)pagefaults 0swaps Without the patch, the numbers are: $ git log -2000 HEAD >/dev/null 0.05user 0.01system 0:00.07elapsed 100%CPU (0avgtext+0avgdata 0maxresident)k 0inputs+0outputs (0major+8506minor)pagefaults 0swaps There isn't much time difference, but the number of minor faults seems to show that we are touching much smaller number of pages, which is expected. Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2007-12-29 11:05:47 +01:00
#include "sha1-lookup.h"
#include "bulk-checkin.h"
#include "streaming.h"
#include "dir.h"
#ifndef O_NOATIME
#if defined(__linux__) && (defined(__i386__) || defined(__PPC__))
#define O_NOATIME 01000000
#else
#define O_NOATIME 0
#endif
#endif
#define SZ_FMT PRIuMAX
static inline uintmax_t sz_fmt(size_t s) { return s; }
const unsigned char null_sha1[20];
const struct object_id null_oid;
/*
* This is meant to hold a *small* number of objects that you would
* want read_sha1_file() to be able to return, but yet you do not want
* to write them into the object store (e.g. a browse-only
* application).
*/
static struct cached_object {
unsigned char sha1[20];
enum object_type type;
void *buf;
unsigned long size;
} *cached_objects;
static int cached_object_nr, cached_object_alloc;
static struct cached_object empty_tree = {
EMPTY_TREE_SHA1_BIN_LITERAL,
OBJ_TREE,
"",
0
};
/*
* A pointer to the last packed_git in which an object was found.
* When an object is sought, we look in this packfile first, because
* objects that are looked up at similar times are often in the same
* packfile as one another.
*/
static struct packed_git *last_found_pack;
static struct cached_object *find_cached_object(const unsigned char *sha1)
{
int i;
struct cached_object *co = cached_objects;
for (i = 0; i < cached_object_nr; i++, co++) {
if (!hashcmp(co->sha1, sha1))
return co;
}
if (!hashcmp(sha1, empty_tree.sha1))
return &empty_tree;
return NULL;
}
rerere: make sure it works even in a workdir attached to a young repository The git-new-workdir script in contrib/ makes a new work tree by sharing many subdirectories of the .git directory with the original repository. When rerere.enabled is set in the original repository, but the user has not encountered any conflicts yet, the original repository may not yet have .git/rr-cache directory. When rerere wants to run in a new work tree created from such a young original repository, it fails to mkdir(2) .git/rr-cache that is a symlink to a yet-to-be-created directory. There are three possible approaches to this: - A naive solution is not to create a symlink in the git-new-workdir script to a directory the original does not have (yet). This is not a solution, as we tend to lazily create subdirectories of .git/, and having rerere.enabled configuration set is a strong indication that the user _wants_ to have this lazy creation to happen; - We could always create .git/rr-cache upon repository creation. This is tempting but will not help people with existing repositories. - Detect this case by seeing that mkdir(2) failed with EEXIST, checking that the path is a symlink, and try running mkdir(2) on the link target. This patch solves the issue by doing the third one. Strictly speaking, this is incomplete. It does not attempt to handle relative symbolic link that points into the original repository, but this is good enough to help people who use contrib/workdir/git-new-workdir script. Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2011-03-11 01:02:50 +01:00
int mkdir_in_gitdir(const char *path)
{
if (mkdir(path, 0777)) {
int saved_errno = errno;
struct stat st;
struct strbuf sb = STRBUF_INIT;
if (errno != EEXIST)
return -1;
/*
* Are we looking at a path in a symlinked worktree
* whose original repository does not yet have it?
* e.g. .git/rr-cache pointing at its original
* repository in which the user hasn't performed any
* conflict resolution yet?
*/
if (lstat(path, &st) || !S_ISLNK(st.st_mode) ||
strbuf_readlink(&sb, path, st.st_size) ||
!is_absolute_path(sb.buf) ||
mkdir(sb.buf, 0777)) {
strbuf_release(&sb);
errno = saved_errno;
return -1;
}
strbuf_release(&sb);
}
return adjust_shared_perm(path);
}
enum scld_error safe_create_leading_directories(char *path)
{
char *next_component = path + offset_1st_component(path);
enum scld_error ret = SCLD_OK;
while (ret == SCLD_OK && next_component) {
struct stat st;
char *slash = next_component, slash_character;
while (*slash && !is_dir_sep(*slash))
slash++;
if (!*slash)
break;
next_component = slash + 1;
while (is_dir_sep(*next_component))
next_component++;
if (!*next_component)
break;
slash_character = *slash;
*slash = '\0';
if (!stat(path, &st)) {
/* path exists */
if (!S_ISDIR(st.st_mode))
ret = SCLD_EXISTS;
} else if (mkdir(path, 0777)) {
if (errno == EEXIST &&
!stat(path, &st) && S_ISDIR(st.st_mode))
; /* somebody created it since we checked */
else if (errno == ENOENT)
/*
* Either mkdir() failed because
* somebody just pruned the containing
* directory, or stat() failed because
* the file that was in our way was
* just removed. Either way, inform
* the caller that it might be worth
* trying again:
*/
ret = SCLD_VANISHED;
else
ret = SCLD_FAILED;
} else if (adjust_shared_perm(path)) {
ret = SCLD_PERMS;
}
*slash = slash_character;
}
return ret;
}
enum scld_error safe_create_leading_directories_const(const char *path)
{
/* path points to cache entries, so xstrdup before messing with it */
char *buf = xstrdup(path);
enum scld_error result = safe_create_leading_directories(buf);
free(buf);
return result;
}
static void fill_sha1_path(char *pathbuf, const unsigned char *sha1)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 20; i++) {
static char hex[] = "0123456789abcdef";
unsigned int val = sha1[i];
char *pos = pathbuf + i*2 + (i > 0);
*pos++ = hex[val >> 4];
*pos = hex[val & 0xf];
}
}
const char *sha1_file_name(const unsigned char *sha1)
{
static char buf[PATH_MAX];
const char *objdir;
int len;
objdir = get_object_directory();
len = strlen(objdir);
/* '/' + sha1(2) + '/' + sha1(38) + '\0' */
if (len + 43 > PATH_MAX)
die("insanely long object directory %s", objdir);
memcpy(buf, objdir, len);
buf[len] = '/';
buf[len+3] = '/';
buf[len+42] = '\0';
fill_sha1_path(buf + len + 1, sha1);
return buf;
}
/*
* Return the name of the pack or index file with the specified sha1
* in its filename. *base and *name are scratch space that must be
* provided by the caller. which should be "pack" or "idx".
*/
static char *sha1_get_pack_name(const unsigned char *sha1,
struct strbuf *buf,
const char *which)
{
strbuf_reset(buf);
strbuf_addf(buf, "%s/pack/pack-%s.%s", get_object_directory(),
sha1_to_hex(sha1), which);
return buf->buf;
}
char *sha1_pack_name(const unsigned char *sha1)
{
static struct strbuf buf = STRBUF_INIT;
return sha1_get_pack_name(sha1, &buf, "pack");
}
char *sha1_pack_index_name(const unsigned char *sha1)
{
static struct strbuf buf = STRBUF_INIT;
return sha1_get_pack_name(sha1, &buf, "idx");
}
struct alternate_object_database *alt_odb_list;
static struct alternate_object_database **alt_odb_tail;
/*
* Prepare alternate object database registry.
*
* The variable alt_odb_list points at the list of struct
* alternate_object_database. The elements on this list come from
* non-empty elements from colon separated ALTERNATE_DB_ENVIRONMENT
* environment variable, and $GIT_OBJECT_DIRECTORY/info/alternates,
* whose contents is similar to that environment variable but can be
* LF separated. Its base points at a statically allocated buffer that
* contains "/the/directory/corresponding/to/.git/objects/...", while
* its name points just after the slash at the end of ".git/objects/"
* in the example above, and has enough space to hold 40-byte hex
* SHA1, an extra slash for the first level indirection, and the
* terminating NUL.
*/
static int link_alt_odb_entry(const char *entry, const char *relative_base,
int depth, const char *normalized_objdir)
{
struct alternate_object_database *ent;
struct alternate_object_database *alt;
size_t pfxlen, entlen;
struct strbuf pathbuf = STRBUF_INIT;
if (!is_absolute_path(entry) && relative_base) {
strbuf_addstr(&pathbuf, real_path(relative_base));
strbuf_addch(&pathbuf, '/');
}
strbuf_addstr(&pathbuf, entry);
normalize_path_copy(pathbuf.buf, pathbuf.buf);
pfxlen = strlen(pathbuf.buf);
/*
* The trailing slash after the directory name is given by
* this function at the end. Remove duplicates.
*/
while (pfxlen && pathbuf.buf[pfxlen-1] == '/')
pfxlen -= 1;
entlen = st_add(pfxlen, 43); /* '/' + 2 hex + '/' + 38 hex + NUL */
ent = xmalloc(st_add(sizeof(*ent), entlen));
memcpy(ent->base, pathbuf.buf, pfxlen);
strbuf_release(&pathbuf);
ent->name = ent->base + pfxlen + 1;
ent->base[pfxlen + 3] = '/';
ent->base[pfxlen] = ent->base[entlen-1] = 0;
/* Detect cases where alternate disappeared */
if (!is_directory(ent->base)) {
error("object directory %s does not exist; "
"check .git/objects/info/alternates.",
ent->base);
free(ent);
return -1;
}
/* Prevent the common mistake of listing the same
* thing twice, or object directory itself.
*/
for (alt = alt_odb_list; alt; alt = alt->next) {
if (pfxlen == alt->name - alt->base - 1 &&
!memcmp(ent->base, alt->base, pfxlen)) {
free(ent);
return -1;
}
}
if (!strcmp_icase(ent->base, normalized_objdir)) {
free(ent);
return -1;
}
/* add the alternate entry */
*alt_odb_tail = ent;
alt_odb_tail = &(ent->next);
ent->next = NULL;
/* recursively add alternates */
read_info_alternates(ent->base, depth + 1);
ent->base[pfxlen] = '/';
return 0;
}
static void link_alt_odb_entries(const char *alt, int len, int sep,
const char *relative_base, int depth)
{
struct string_list entries = STRING_LIST_INIT_NODUP;
char *alt_copy;
int i;
struct strbuf objdirbuf = STRBUF_INIT;
if (depth > 5) {
error("%s: ignoring alternate object stores, nesting too deep.",
relative_base);
return;
}
strbuf_add_absolute_path(&objdirbuf, get_object_directory());
normalize_path_copy(objdirbuf.buf, objdirbuf.buf);
alt_copy = xmemdupz(alt, len);
string_list_split_in_place(&entries, alt_copy, sep, -1);
for (i = 0; i < entries.nr; i++) {
const char *entry = entries.items[i].string;
if (entry[0] == '\0' || entry[0] == '#')
continue;
if (!is_absolute_path(entry) && depth) {
error("%s: ignoring relative alternate object store %s",
relative_base, entry);
} else {
link_alt_odb_entry(entry, relative_base, depth, objdirbuf.buf);
}
}
string_list_clear(&entries, 0);
free(alt_copy);
strbuf_release(&objdirbuf);
}
void read_info_alternates(const char * relative_base, int depth)
{
char *map;
size_t mapsz;
struct stat st;
char *path;
int fd;
path = xstrfmt("%s/info/alternates", relative_base);
fd = git_open_noatime(path);
free(path);
if (fd < 0)
return;
if (fstat(fd, &st) || (st.st_size == 0)) {
close(fd);
return;
}
mapsz = xsize_t(st.st_size);
map = xmmap(NULL, mapsz, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, fd, 0);
close(fd);
link_alt_odb_entries(map, mapsz, '\n', relative_base, depth);
munmap(map, mapsz);
}
void add_to_alternates_file(const char *reference)
{
struct lock_file *lock = xcalloc(1, sizeof(struct lock_file));
char *alts = git_pathdup("objects/info/alternates");
FILE *in, *out;
hold_lock_file_for_update(lock, alts, LOCK_DIE_ON_ERROR);
out = fdopen_lock_file(lock, "w");
if (!out)
die_errno("unable to fdopen alternates lockfile");
in = fopen(alts, "r");
if (in) {
struct strbuf line = STRBUF_INIT;
int found = 0;
while (strbuf_getline(&line, in) != EOF) {
if (!strcmp(reference, line.buf)) {
found = 1;
break;
}
fprintf_or_die(out, "%s\n", line.buf);
}
strbuf_release(&line);
fclose(in);
if (found) {
rollback_lock_file(lock);
lock = NULL;
}
}
else if (errno != ENOENT)
die_errno("unable to read alternates file");
if (lock) {
fprintf_or_die(out, "%s\n", reference);
if (commit_lock_file(lock))
die_errno("unable to move new alternates file into place");
if (alt_odb_tail)
link_alt_odb_entries(reference, strlen(reference), '\n', NULL, 0);
}
free(alts);
}
int foreach_alt_odb(alt_odb_fn fn, void *cb)
{
struct alternate_object_database *ent;
int r = 0;
prepare_alt_odb();
for (ent = alt_odb_list; ent; ent = ent->next) {
r = fn(ent, cb);
if (r)
break;
}
return r;
}
void prepare_alt_odb(void)
{
const char *alt;
if (alt_odb_tail)
return;
alt = getenv(ALTERNATE_DB_ENVIRONMENT);
if (!alt) alt = "";
alt_odb_tail = &alt_odb_list;
link_alt_odb_entries(alt, strlen(alt), PATH_SEP, NULL, 0);
read_info_alternates(get_object_directory(), 0);
}
/* Returns 1 if we have successfully freshened the file, 0 otherwise. */
static int freshen_file(const char *fn)
{
struct utimbuf t;
t.actime = t.modtime = time(NULL);
return !utime(fn, &t);
}
/*
* All of the check_and_freshen functions return 1 if the file exists and was
* freshened (if freshening was requested), 0 otherwise. If they return
* 0, you should not assume that it is safe to skip a write of the object (it
* either does not exist on disk, or has a stale mtime and may be subject to
* pruning).
*/
static int check_and_freshen_file(const char *fn, int freshen)
{
if (access(fn, F_OK))
return 0;
if (freshen && !freshen_file(fn))
return 0;
return 1;
}
static int check_and_freshen_local(const unsigned char *sha1, int freshen)
{
return check_and_freshen_file(sha1_file_name(sha1), freshen);
}
static int check_and_freshen_nonlocal(const unsigned char *sha1, int freshen)
{
struct alternate_object_database *alt;
prepare_alt_odb();
for (alt = alt_odb_list; alt; alt = alt->next) {
fill_sha1_path(alt->name, sha1);
if (check_and_freshen_file(alt->base, freshen))
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
static int check_and_freshen(const unsigned char *sha1, int freshen)
{
return check_and_freshen_local(sha1, freshen) ||
check_and_freshen_nonlocal(sha1, freshen);
}
int has_loose_object_nonlocal(const unsigned char *sha1)
{
return check_and_freshen_nonlocal(sha1, 0);
}
static int has_loose_object(const unsigned char *sha1)
{
return check_and_freshen(sha1, 0);
}
Fully activate the sliding window pack access. This finally turns on the sliding window behavior for packfile data access by mapping limited size windows and chaining them under the packed_git->windows list. We consider a given byte offset to be within the window only if there would be at least 20 bytes (one hash worth of data) accessible after the requested offset. This range selection relates to the contract that use_pack() makes with its callers, allowing them to access one hash or one object header without needing to call use_pack() for every byte of data obtained. In the worst case scenario we will map the same page of data twice into memory: once at the end of one window and once again at the start of the next window. This duplicate page mapping will happen only when an object header or a delta base reference is spanned over the end of a window and is always limited to just one page of duplication, as no sane operating system will ever have a page size smaller than a hash. I am assuming that the possible wasted page of virtual address space is going to perform faster than the alternatives, which would be to copy the object header or ref delta into a temporary buffer prior to parsing, or to check the window range on every byte during header parsing. We may decide to revisit this decision in the future since this is just a gut instinct decision and has not actually been proven out by experimental testing. Signed-off-by: Shawn O. Pearce <spearce@spearce.org> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
2006-12-23 08:34:28 +01:00
static unsigned int pack_used_ctr;
static unsigned int pack_mmap_calls;
static unsigned int peak_pack_open_windows;
static unsigned int pack_open_windows;
static unsigned int pack_open_fds;
static unsigned int pack_max_fds;
static size_t peak_pack_mapped;
Fully activate the sliding window pack access. This finally turns on the sliding window behavior for packfile data access by mapping limited size windows and chaining them under the packed_git->windows list. We consider a given byte offset to be within the window only if there would be at least 20 bytes (one hash worth of data) accessible after the requested offset. This range selection relates to the contract that use_pack() makes with its callers, allowing them to access one hash or one object header without needing to call use_pack() for every byte of data obtained. In the worst case scenario we will map the same page of data twice into memory: once at the end of one window and once again at the start of the next window. This duplicate page mapping will happen only when an object header or a delta base reference is spanned over the end of a window and is always limited to just one page of duplication, as no sane operating system will ever have a page size smaller than a hash. I am assuming that the possible wasted page of virtual address space is going to perform faster than the alternatives, which would be to copy the object header or ref delta into a temporary buffer prior to parsing, or to check the window range on every byte during header parsing. We may decide to revisit this decision in the future since this is just a gut instinct decision and has not actually been proven out by experimental testing. Signed-off-by: Shawn O. Pearce <spearce@spearce.org> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
2006-12-23 08:34:28 +01:00
static size_t pack_mapped;
struct packed_git *packed_git;
void pack_report(void)
{
fprintf(stderr,
"pack_report: getpagesize() = %10" SZ_FMT "\n"
"pack_report: core.packedGitWindowSize = %10" SZ_FMT "\n"
"pack_report: core.packedGitLimit = %10" SZ_FMT "\n",
sz_fmt(getpagesize()),
sz_fmt(packed_git_window_size),
sz_fmt(packed_git_limit));
fprintf(stderr,
"pack_report: pack_used_ctr = %10u\n"
"pack_report: pack_mmap_calls = %10u\n"
"pack_report: pack_open_windows = %10u / %10u\n"
"pack_report: pack_mapped = "
"%10" SZ_FMT " / %10" SZ_FMT "\n",
pack_used_ctr,
pack_mmap_calls,
pack_open_windows, peak_pack_open_windows,
sz_fmt(pack_mapped), sz_fmt(peak_pack_mapped));
}
/*
* Open and mmap the index file at path, perform a couple of
* consistency checks, then record its information to p. Return 0 on
* success.
*/
static int check_packed_git_idx(const char *path, struct packed_git *p)
{
void *idx_map;
struct pack_idx_header *hdr;
size_t idx_size;
uint32_t version, nr, i, *index;
int fd = git_open_noatime(path);
struct stat st;
if (fd < 0)
return -1;
if (fstat(fd, &st)) {
close(fd);
return -1;
}
idx_size = xsize_t(st.st_size);
if (idx_size < 4 * 256 + 20 + 20) {
close(fd);
return error("index file %s is too small", path);
}
idx_map = xmmap(NULL, idx_size, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, fd, 0);
close(fd);
hdr = idx_map;
if (hdr->idx_signature == htonl(PACK_IDX_SIGNATURE)) {
version = ntohl(hdr->idx_version);
if (version < 2 || version > 2) {
munmap(idx_map, idx_size);
return error("index file %s is version %"PRIu32
" and is not supported by this binary"
" (try upgrading GIT to a newer version)",
path, version);
}
} else
version = 1;
nr = 0;
index = idx_map;
if (version > 1)
index += 2; /* skip index header */
for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
uint32_t n = ntohl(index[i]);
if (n < nr) {
munmap(idx_map, idx_size);
return error("non-monotonic index %s", path);
}
nr = n;
}
if (version == 1) {
/*
* Total size:
* - 256 index entries 4 bytes each
* - 24-byte entries * nr (20-byte sha1 + 4-byte offset)
* - 20-byte SHA1 of the packfile
* - 20-byte SHA1 file checksum
*/
if (idx_size != 4*256 + nr * 24 + 20 + 20) {
munmap(idx_map, idx_size);
return error("wrong index v1 file size in %s", path);
}
} else if (version == 2) {
/*
* Minimum size:
* - 8 bytes of header
* - 256 index entries 4 bytes each
* - 20-byte sha1 entry * nr
* - 4-byte crc entry * nr
* - 4-byte offset entry * nr
* - 20-byte SHA1 of the packfile
* - 20-byte SHA1 file checksum
* And after the 4-byte offset table might be a
* variable sized table containing 8-byte entries
* for offsets larger than 2^31.
*/
unsigned long min_size = 8 + 4*256 + nr*(20 + 4 + 4) + 20 + 20;
unsigned long max_size = min_size;
if (nr)
max_size += (nr - 1)*8;
if (idx_size < min_size || idx_size > max_size) {
munmap(idx_map, idx_size);
return error("wrong index v2 file size in %s", path);
}
if (idx_size != min_size &&
/*
* make sure we can deal with large pack offsets.
* 31-bit signed offset won't be enough, neither
* 32-bit unsigned one will be.
*/
(sizeof(off_t) <= 4)) {
munmap(idx_map, idx_size);
return error("pack too large for current definition of off_t in %s", path);
}
}
p->index_version = version;
p->index_data = idx_map;
p->index_size = idx_size;
p->num_objects = nr;
return 0;
}
int open_pack_index(struct packed_git *p)
{
char *idx_name;
size_t len;
int ret;
if (p->index_data)
return 0;
if (!strip_suffix(p->pack_name, ".pack", &len))
die("BUG: pack_name does not end in .pack");
idx_name = xstrfmt("%.*s.idx", (int)len, p->pack_name);
ret = check_packed_git_idx(idx_name, p);
free(idx_name);
return ret;
}
static void scan_windows(struct packed_git *p,
struct packed_git **lru_p,
struct pack_window **lru_w,
struct pack_window **lru_l)
{
struct pack_window *w, *w_l;
for (w_l = NULL, w = p->windows; w; w = w->next) {
if (!w->inuse_cnt) {
if (!*lru_w || w->last_used < (*lru_w)->last_used) {
*lru_p = p;
*lru_w = w;
*lru_l = w_l;
}
}
w_l = w;
}
}
static int unuse_one_window(struct packed_git *current)
{
struct packed_git *p, *lru_p = NULL;
struct pack_window *lru_w = NULL, *lru_l = NULL;
if (current)
scan_windows(current, &lru_p, &lru_w, &lru_l);
for (p = packed_git; p; p = p->next)
scan_windows(p, &lru_p, &lru_w, &lru_l);
if (lru_p) {
munmap(lru_w->base, lru_w->len);
pack_mapped -= lru_w->len;
if (lru_l)
lru_l->next = lru_w->next;
else
lru_p->windows = lru_w->next;
free(lru_w);
pack_open_windows--;
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
void release_pack_memory(size_t need)
{
size_t cur = pack_mapped;
while (need >= (cur - pack_mapped) && unuse_one_window(NULL))
; /* nothing */
}
static void mmap_limit_check(size_t length)
{
static size_t limit = 0;
if (!limit) {
limit = git_env_ulong("GIT_MMAP_LIMIT", 0);
if (!limit)
limit = SIZE_MAX;
}
if (length > limit)
die("attempting to mmap %"PRIuMAX" over limit %"PRIuMAX,
(uintmax_t)length, (uintmax_t)limit);
}
void *xmmap_gently(void *start, size_t length,
int prot, int flags, int fd, off_t offset)
{
void *ret;
mmap_limit_check(length);
ret = mmap(start, length, prot, flags, fd, offset);
if (ret == MAP_FAILED) {
if (!length)
return NULL;
release_pack_memory(length);
ret = mmap(start, length, prot, flags, fd, offset);
}
return ret;
}
void *xmmap(void *start, size_t length,
int prot, int flags, int fd, off_t offset)
{
void *ret = xmmap_gently(start, length, prot, flags, fd, offset);
if (ret == MAP_FAILED)
die_errno("mmap failed");
return ret;
}
Fix random fast-import errors when compiled with NO_MMAP fast-import was relying on the fact that on most systems mmap() and write() are synchronized by the filesystem's buffer cache. We were relying on the ability to mmap() 20 bytes beyond the current end of the file, then later fill in those bytes with a future write() call, then read them through the previously obtained mmap() address. This isn't always true with some implementations of NFS, but it is especially not true with our NO_MMAP=YesPlease build time option used on some platforms. If fast-import was built with NO_MMAP=YesPlease we used the malloc()+pread() emulation and the subsequent write() call does not update the trailing 20 bytes of a previously obtained "mmap()" (aka malloc'd) address. Under NO_MMAP that behavior causes unpack_entry() in sha1_file.c to be unable to read an object header (or data) that has been unlucky enough to be written to the packfile at a location such that it is in the trailing 20 bytes of a window previously opened on that same packfile. This bug has gone unnoticed for a very long time as it is highly data dependent. Not only does the object have to be placed at the right position, but it also needs to be positioned behind some other object that has been accessed due to a branch cache invalidation. In other words the stars had to align just right, and if you did run into this bug you probably should also have purchased a lottery ticket. Fortunately the workaround is a lot easier than the bug explanation. Before we allow unpack_entry() to read data from a pack window that has also (possibly) been modified through write() we force all existing windows on that packfile to be closed. By closing the windows we ensure that any new access via the emulated mmap() will reread the packfile, updating to the current file content. This comes at a slight performance degredation as we cannot reuse previously cached windows when we update the packfile. But it is a fairly minor difference as the window closes happen at only two points: - When the packfile is finalized and its .idx is generated: At this stage we are getting ready to update the refs and any data access into the packfile is going to be random, and is going after only the branch tips (to ensure they are valid). Our existing windows (if any) are not likely to be positioned at useful locations to access those final tip commits so we probably were closing them before anyway. - When the branch cache missed and we need to reload: At this point fast-import is getting change commands for the next commit and it needs to go re-read a tree object it previously had written out to the packfile. What windows we had (if any) are not likely to cover the tree in question so we probably were closing them before anyway. We do try to avoid unnecessarily closing windows in the second case by checking to see if the packfile size has increased since the last time we called unpack_entry() on that packfile. If the size has not changed then we have not written additional data, and any existing window is still vaild. This nicely handles the cases where fast-import is going through a branch cache reload and needs to read many trees at once. During such an event we are not likely to be updating the packfile so we do not cycle the windows between reads. With this change in place t9301-fast-export.sh (which was broken by c3b0dec509fe136c5417422f31898b5a4e2d5e02) finally works again. Signed-off-by: Shawn O. Pearce <spearce@spearce.org> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2008-01-18 04:57:00 +01:00
void close_pack_windows(struct packed_git *p)
{
while (p->windows) {
struct pack_window *w = p->windows;
if (w->inuse_cnt)
die("pack '%s' still has open windows to it",
p->pack_name);
munmap(w->base, w->len);
pack_mapped -= w->len;
pack_open_windows--;
p->windows = w->next;
free(w);
}
}
static int close_pack_fd(struct packed_git *p)
{
if (p->pack_fd < 0)
return 0;
close(p->pack_fd);
pack_open_fds--;
p->pack_fd = -1;
return 1;
}
static void close_pack(struct packed_git *p)
{
close_pack_windows(p);
close_pack_fd(p);
close_pack_index(p);
}
void close_all_packs(void)
{
struct packed_git *p;
for (p = packed_git; p; p = p->next)
if (p->do_not_close)
die("BUG! Want to close pack marked 'do-not-close'");
else
close_pack(p);
}
sha1_file: introduce close_one_pack() to close packs on fd pressure When the number of open packs exceeds pack_max_fds, unuse_one_window() is called repeatedly to attempt to release the least-recently-used pack windows, which, as a side-effect, will also close a pack file after closing its last open window. If a pack file has been opened, but no windows have been allocated into it, it will never be selected by unuse_one_window() and hence its file descriptor will not be closed. When this happens, git may exceed the number of file descriptors permitted by the system. This latter situation can occur in show-ref or receive-pack during ref advertisement. During ref advertisement, receive-pack will iterate over every ref in the repository and advertise it to the client after ensuring that the ref exists in the local repository. If the ref is located inside a pack, then the pack is opened to ensure that it exists, but since the object is not actually read from the pack, no mmap windows are allocated. When the number of open packs exceeds pack_max_fds, unuse_one_window() will not be able to find any windows to free and will not be able to close any packs. Once the per-process file descriptor limit is exceeded, receive-pack will produce a warning, not an error, for each pack it cannot open, and will then most likely fail with an error to spawn rev-list or index-pack like: error: cannot create standard input pipe for rev-list: Too many open files error: Could not run 'git rev-list' This may also occur during upload-pack when refs are packed (in the packed-refs file) and the number of packs that must be opened to verify that these packed refs exist exceeds the file descriptor limit. If the refs are loose, then upload-pack will read each ref from the object database (if the object is in a pack, allocating one or more mmap windows for it) in order to peel tags and advertise the underlying object. But when the refs are packed and peeled, upload-pack will use the peeled sha1 in the packed-refs file and will not need to read from the pack files, so no mmap windows will be allocated and just like with receive-pack, unuse_one_window() will never select these opened packs to close. When we have file descriptor pressure, we just need to find an open pack to close. We can leave the existing mmap windows open. If additional windows need to be mapped into the pack file, it will be reopened when necessary. If the pack file has been rewritten in the mean time, open_packed_git_1() should notice when it compares the file size or the pack's sha1 checksum to what was previously read from the pack index, and reject it. Let's introduce a new function close_one_pack() designed specifically for this purpose to search for and close the least-recently-used pack, where LRU is defined as (in order of preference): * pack with oldest mtime and no allocated mmap windows * pack with the least-recently-used windows, i.e. the pack with the oldest most-recently-used window, where none of the windows are in use * pack with the least-recently-used windows Signed-off-by: Brandon Casey <drafnel@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2013-08-02 07:36:33 +02:00
/*
* The LRU pack is the one with the oldest MRU window, preferring packs
* with no used windows, or the oldest mtime if it has no windows allocated.
*/
static void find_lru_pack(struct packed_git *p, struct packed_git **lru_p, struct pack_window **mru_w, int *accept_windows_inuse)
{
struct pack_window *w, *this_mru_w;
int has_windows_inuse = 0;
/*
* Reject this pack if it has windows and the previously selected
* one does not. If this pack does not have windows, reject
* it if the pack file is newer than the previously selected one.
*/
if (*lru_p && !*mru_w && (p->windows || p->mtime > (*lru_p)->mtime))
return;
for (w = this_mru_w = p->windows; w; w = w->next) {
/*
* Reject this pack if any of its windows are in use,
* but the previously selected pack did not have any
* inuse windows. Otherwise, record that this pack
* has windows in use.
*/
if (w->inuse_cnt) {
if (*accept_windows_inuse)
has_windows_inuse = 1;
else
return;
}
if (w->last_used > this_mru_w->last_used)
this_mru_w = w;
/*
* Reject this pack if it has windows that have been
* used more recently than the previously selected pack.
* If the previously selected pack had windows inuse and
* we have not encountered a window in this pack that is
* inuse, skip this check since we prefer a pack with no
* inuse windows to one that has inuse windows.
*/
if (*mru_w && *accept_windows_inuse == has_windows_inuse &&
this_mru_w->last_used > (*mru_w)->last_used)
return;
}
/*
* Select this pack.
*/
*mru_w = this_mru_w;
*lru_p = p;
*accept_windows_inuse = has_windows_inuse;
}
static int close_one_pack(void)
{
struct packed_git *p, *lru_p = NULL;
struct pack_window *mru_w = NULL;
int accept_windows_inuse = 1;
for (p = packed_git; p; p = p->next) {
if (p->pack_fd == -1)
continue;
find_lru_pack(p, &lru_p, &mru_w, &accept_windows_inuse);
}
if (lru_p)
return close_pack_fd(lru_p);
sha1_file: introduce close_one_pack() to close packs on fd pressure When the number of open packs exceeds pack_max_fds, unuse_one_window() is called repeatedly to attempt to release the least-recently-used pack windows, which, as a side-effect, will also close a pack file after closing its last open window. If a pack file has been opened, but no windows have been allocated into it, it will never be selected by unuse_one_window() and hence its file descriptor will not be closed. When this happens, git may exceed the number of file descriptors permitted by the system. This latter situation can occur in show-ref or receive-pack during ref advertisement. During ref advertisement, receive-pack will iterate over every ref in the repository and advertise it to the client after ensuring that the ref exists in the local repository. If the ref is located inside a pack, then the pack is opened to ensure that it exists, but since the object is not actually read from the pack, no mmap windows are allocated. When the number of open packs exceeds pack_max_fds, unuse_one_window() will not be able to find any windows to free and will not be able to close any packs. Once the per-process file descriptor limit is exceeded, receive-pack will produce a warning, not an error, for each pack it cannot open, and will then most likely fail with an error to spawn rev-list or index-pack like: error: cannot create standard input pipe for rev-list: Too many open files error: Could not run 'git rev-list' This may also occur during upload-pack when refs are packed (in the packed-refs file) and the number of packs that must be opened to verify that these packed refs exist exceeds the file descriptor limit. If the refs are loose, then upload-pack will read each ref from the object database (if the object is in a pack, allocating one or more mmap windows for it) in order to peel tags and advertise the underlying object. But when the refs are packed and peeled, upload-pack will use the peeled sha1 in the packed-refs file and will not need to read from the pack files, so no mmap windows will be allocated and just like with receive-pack, unuse_one_window() will never select these opened packs to close. When we have file descriptor pressure, we just need to find an open pack to close. We can leave the existing mmap windows open. If additional windows need to be mapped into the pack file, it will be reopened when necessary. If the pack file has been rewritten in the mean time, open_packed_git_1() should notice when it compares the file size or the pack's sha1 checksum to what was previously read from the pack index, and reject it. Let's introduce a new function close_one_pack() designed specifically for this purpose to search for and close the least-recently-used pack, where LRU is defined as (in order of preference): * pack with oldest mtime and no allocated mmap windows * pack with the least-recently-used windows, i.e. the pack with the oldest most-recently-used window, where none of the windows are in use * pack with the least-recently-used windows Signed-off-by: Brandon Casey <drafnel@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2013-08-02 07:36:33 +02:00
return 0;
}
Replace use_packed_git with window cursors. Part of the implementation concept of the sliding mmap window for pack access is to permit multiple windows per pack to be mapped independently. Since the inuse_cnt is associated with the mmap and not with the file, this value is in struct pack_window and needs to be incremented/decremented for each pack_window accessed by any code. To faciliate that implementation we need to replace all uses of use_packed_git() and unuse_packed_git() with a different API that follows struct pack_window objects rather than struct packed_git. The way this works is when we need to start accessing a pack for the first time we should setup a new window 'cursor' by declaring a local and setting it to NULL: struct pack_windows *w_curs = NULL; To obtain the memory region which contains a specific section of the pack file we invoke use_pack(), supplying the address of our current window cursor: unsigned int len; unsigned char *addr = use_pack(p, &w_curs, offset, &len); the returned address `addr` will be the first byte at `offset` within the pack file. The optional variable len will also be updated with the number of bytes remaining following the address. Multiple calls to use_pack() with the same window cursor will update the window cursor, moving it from one window to another when necessary. In this way each window cursor variable maintains only one struct pack_window inuse at a time. Finally before exiting the scope which originally declared the window cursor we must invoke unuse_pack() to unuse the current window (which may be different from the one that was first obtained from use_pack): unuse_pack(&w_curs); This implementation is still not complete with regards to multiple windows, as only one window per pack file is supported right now. Signed-off-by: Shawn O. Pearce <spearce@spearce.org> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
2006-12-23 08:34:08 +01:00
void unuse_pack(struct pack_window **w_cursor)
{
Replace use_packed_git with window cursors. Part of the implementation concept of the sliding mmap window for pack access is to permit multiple windows per pack to be mapped independently. Since the inuse_cnt is associated with the mmap and not with the file, this value is in struct pack_window and needs to be incremented/decremented for each pack_window accessed by any code. To faciliate that implementation we need to replace all uses of use_packed_git() and unuse_packed_git() with a different API that follows struct pack_window objects rather than struct packed_git. The way this works is when we need to start accessing a pack for the first time we should setup a new window 'cursor' by declaring a local and setting it to NULL: struct pack_windows *w_curs = NULL; To obtain the memory region which contains a specific section of the pack file we invoke use_pack(), supplying the address of our current window cursor: unsigned int len; unsigned char *addr = use_pack(p, &w_curs, offset, &len); the returned address `addr` will be the first byte at `offset` within the pack file. The optional variable len will also be updated with the number of bytes remaining following the address. Multiple calls to use_pack() with the same window cursor will update the window cursor, moving it from one window to another when necessary. In this way each window cursor variable maintains only one struct pack_window inuse at a time. Finally before exiting the scope which originally declared the window cursor we must invoke unuse_pack() to unuse the current window (which may be different from the one that was first obtained from use_pack): unuse_pack(&w_curs); This implementation is still not complete with regards to multiple windows, as only one window per pack file is supported right now. Signed-off-by: Shawn O. Pearce <spearce@spearce.org> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
2006-12-23 08:34:08 +01:00
struct pack_window *w = *w_cursor;
if (w) {
w->inuse_cnt--;
*w_cursor = NULL;
}
}
void close_pack_index(struct packed_git *p)
{
if (p->index_data) {
munmap((void *)p->index_data, p->index_size);
p->index_data = NULL;
}
}
/*
* This is used by git-repack in case a newly created pack happens to
* contain the same set of objects as an existing one. In that case
* the resulting file might be different even if its name would be the
* same. It is best to close any reference to the old pack before it is
* replaced on disk. Of course no index pointers or windows for given pack
* must subsist at this point. If ever objects from this pack are requested
* again, the new version of the pack will be reinitialized through
* reprepare_packed_git().
*/
void free_pack_by_name(const char *pack_name)
{
struct packed_git *p, **pp = &packed_git;
while (*pp) {
p = *pp;
if (strcmp(pack_name, p->pack_name) == 0) {
clear_delta_base_cache();
close_pack(p);
free(p->bad_object_sha1);
*pp = p->next;
if (last_found_pack == p)
last_found_pack = NULL;
free(p);
return;
}
pp = &p->next;
}
}
static unsigned int get_max_fd_limit(void)
{
#ifdef RLIMIT_NOFILE
{
struct rlimit lim;
if (!getrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &lim))
return lim.rlim_cur;
}
#endif
#ifdef _SC_OPEN_MAX
{
long open_max = sysconf(_SC_OPEN_MAX);
if (0 < open_max)
return open_max;
/*
* Otherwise, we got -1 for one of the two
* reasons:
*
* (1) sysconf() did not understand _SC_OPEN_MAX
* and signaled an error with -1; or
* (2) sysconf() said there is no limit.
*
* We _could_ clear errno before calling sysconf() to
* tell these two cases apart and return a huge number
* in the latter case to let the caller cap it to a
* value that is not so selfish, but letting the
* fallback OPEN_MAX codepath take care of these cases
* is a lot simpler.
*/
}
#endif
#ifdef OPEN_MAX
return OPEN_MAX;
#else
return 1; /* see the caller ;-) */
#endif
}
/*
* Do not call this directly as this leaks p->pack_fd on error return;
* call open_packed_git() instead.
*/
static int open_packed_git_1(struct packed_git *p)
{
struct stat st;
struct pack_header hdr;
unsigned char sha1[20];
unsigned char *idx_sha1;
long fd_flag;
if (!p->index_data && open_pack_index(p))
return error("packfile %s index unavailable", p->pack_name);
if (!pack_max_fds) {
unsigned int max_fds = get_max_fd_limit();
/* Save 3 for stdin/stdout/stderr, 22 for work */
if (25 < max_fds)
pack_max_fds = max_fds - 25;
else
pack_max_fds = 1;
}
sha1_file: introduce close_one_pack() to close packs on fd pressure When the number of open packs exceeds pack_max_fds, unuse_one_window() is called repeatedly to attempt to release the least-recently-used pack windows, which, as a side-effect, will also close a pack file after closing its last open window. If a pack file has been opened, but no windows have been allocated into it, it will never be selected by unuse_one_window() and hence its file descriptor will not be closed. When this happens, git may exceed the number of file descriptors permitted by the system. This latter situation can occur in show-ref or receive-pack during ref advertisement. During ref advertisement, receive-pack will iterate over every ref in the repository and advertise it to the client after ensuring that the ref exists in the local repository. If the ref is located inside a pack, then the pack is opened to ensure that it exists, but since the object is not actually read from the pack, no mmap windows are allocated. When the number of open packs exceeds pack_max_fds, unuse_one_window() will not be able to find any windows to free and will not be able to close any packs. Once the per-process file descriptor limit is exceeded, receive-pack will produce a warning, not an error, for each pack it cannot open, and will then most likely fail with an error to spawn rev-list or index-pack like: error: cannot create standard input pipe for rev-list: Too many open files error: Could not run 'git rev-list' This may also occur during upload-pack when refs are packed (in the packed-refs file) and the number of packs that must be opened to verify that these packed refs exist exceeds the file descriptor limit. If the refs are loose, then upload-pack will read each ref from the object database (if the object is in a pack, allocating one or more mmap windows for it) in order to peel tags and advertise the underlying object. But when the refs are packed and peeled, upload-pack will use the peeled sha1 in the packed-refs file and will not need to read from the pack files, so no mmap windows will be allocated and just like with receive-pack, unuse_one_window() will never select these opened packs to close. When we have file descriptor pressure, we just need to find an open pack to close. We can leave the existing mmap windows open. If additional windows need to be mapped into the pack file, it will be reopened when necessary. If the pack file has been rewritten in the mean time, open_packed_git_1() should notice when it compares the file size or the pack's sha1 checksum to what was previously read from the pack index, and reject it. Let's introduce a new function close_one_pack() designed specifically for this purpose to search for and close the least-recently-used pack, where LRU is defined as (in order of preference): * pack with oldest mtime and no allocated mmap windows * pack with the least-recently-used windows, i.e. the pack with the oldest most-recently-used window, where none of the windows are in use * pack with the least-recently-used windows Signed-off-by: Brandon Casey <drafnel@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2013-08-02 07:36:33 +02:00
while (pack_max_fds <= pack_open_fds && close_one_pack())
; /* nothing */
p->pack_fd = git_open_noatime(p->pack_name);
if (p->pack_fd < 0 || fstat(p->pack_fd, &st))
return -1;
pack_open_fds++;
/* If we created the struct before we had the pack we lack size. */
if (!p->pack_size) {
if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode))
return error("packfile %s not a regular file", p->pack_name);
p->pack_size = st.st_size;
} else if (p->pack_size != st.st_size)
return error("packfile %s size changed", p->pack_name);
/* We leave these file descriptors open with sliding mmap;
* there is no point keeping them open across exec(), though.
*/
fd_flag = fcntl(p->pack_fd, F_GETFD, 0);
if (fd_flag < 0)
return error("cannot determine file descriptor flags");
fd_flag |= FD_CLOEXEC;
if (fcntl(p->pack_fd, F_SETFD, fd_flag) == -1)
return error("cannot set FD_CLOEXEC");
/* Verify we recognize this pack file format. */
if (read_in_full(p->pack_fd, &hdr, sizeof(hdr)) != sizeof(hdr))
return error("file %s is far too short to be a packfile", p->pack_name);
if (hdr.hdr_signature != htonl(PACK_SIGNATURE))
return error("file %s is not a GIT packfile", p->pack_name);
if (!pack_version_ok(hdr.hdr_version))
return error("packfile %s is version %"PRIu32" and not"
" supported (try upgrading GIT to a newer version)",
p->pack_name, ntohl(hdr.hdr_version));
/* Verify the pack matches its index. */
if (p->num_objects != ntohl(hdr.hdr_entries))
return error("packfile %s claims to have %"PRIu32" objects"
" while index indicates %"PRIu32" objects",
p->pack_name, ntohl(hdr.hdr_entries),
p->num_objects);
if (lseek(p->pack_fd, p->pack_size - sizeof(sha1), SEEK_SET) == -1)
return error("end of packfile %s is unavailable", p->pack_name);
if (read_in_full(p->pack_fd, sha1, sizeof(sha1)) != sizeof(sha1))
return error("packfile %s signature is unavailable", p->pack_name);
idx_sha1 = ((unsigned char *)p->index_data) + p->index_size - 40;
if (hashcmp(sha1, idx_sha1))
return error("packfile %s does not match index", p->pack_name);
return 0;
}
static int open_packed_git(struct packed_git *p)
{
if (!open_packed_git_1(p))
return 0;
close_pack_fd(p);
return -1;
}
static int in_window(struct pack_window *win, off_t offset)
Fully activate the sliding window pack access. This finally turns on the sliding window behavior for packfile data access by mapping limited size windows and chaining them under the packed_git->windows list. We consider a given byte offset to be within the window only if there would be at least 20 bytes (one hash worth of data) accessible after the requested offset. This range selection relates to the contract that use_pack() makes with its callers, allowing them to access one hash or one object header without needing to call use_pack() for every byte of data obtained. In the worst case scenario we will map the same page of data twice into memory: once at the end of one window and once again at the start of the next window. This duplicate page mapping will happen only when an object header or a delta base reference is spanned over the end of a window and is always limited to just one page of duplication, as no sane operating system will ever have a page size smaller than a hash. I am assuming that the possible wasted page of virtual address space is going to perform faster than the alternatives, which would be to copy the object header or ref delta into a temporary buffer prior to parsing, or to check the window range on every byte during header parsing. We may decide to revisit this decision in the future since this is just a gut instinct decision and has not actually been proven out by experimental testing. Signed-off-by: Shawn O. Pearce <spearce@spearce.org> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
2006-12-23 08:34:28 +01:00
{
/* We must promise at least 20 bytes (one hash) after the
* offset is available from this window, otherwise the offset
* is not actually in this window and a different window (which
* has that one hash excess) must be used. This is to support
* the object header and delta base parsing routines below.
*/
off_t win_off = win->offset;
return win_off <= offset
&& (offset + 20) <= (win_off + win->len);
}
unsigned char *use_pack(struct packed_git *p,
Replace use_packed_git with window cursors. Part of the implementation concept of the sliding mmap window for pack access is to permit multiple windows per pack to be mapped independently. Since the inuse_cnt is associated with the mmap and not with the file, this value is in struct pack_window and needs to be incremented/decremented for each pack_window accessed by any code. To faciliate that implementation we need to replace all uses of use_packed_git() and unuse_packed_git() with a different API that follows struct pack_window objects rather than struct packed_git. The way this works is when we need to start accessing a pack for the first time we should setup a new window 'cursor' by declaring a local and setting it to NULL: struct pack_windows *w_curs = NULL; To obtain the memory region which contains a specific section of the pack file we invoke use_pack(), supplying the address of our current window cursor: unsigned int len; unsigned char *addr = use_pack(p, &w_curs, offset, &len); the returned address `addr` will be the first byte at `offset` within the pack file. The optional variable len will also be updated with the number of bytes remaining following the address. Multiple calls to use_pack() with the same window cursor will update the window cursor, moving it from one window to another when necessary. In this way each window cursor variable maintains only one struct pack_window inuse at a time. Finally before exiting the scope which originally declared the window cursor we must invoke unuse_pack() to unuse the current window (which may be different from the one that was first obtained from use_pack): unuse_pack(&w_curs); This implementation is still not complete with regards to multiple windows, as only one window per pack file is supported right now. Signed-off-by: Shawn O. Pearce <spearce@spearce.org> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
2006-12-23 08:34:08 +01:00
struct pack_window **w_cursor,
off_t offset,
2011-06-10 20:52:15 +02:00
unsigned long *left)
{
Fully activate the sliding window pack access. This finally turns on the sliding window behavior for packfile data access by mapping limited size windows and chaining them under the packed_git->windows list. We consider a given byte offset to be within the window only if there would be at least 20 bytes (one hash worth of data) accessible after the requested offset. This range selection relates to the contract that use_pack() makes with its callers, allowing them to access one hash or one object header without needing to call use_pack() for every byte of data obtained. In the worst case scenario we will map the same page of data twice into memory: once at the end of one window and once again at the start of the next window. This duplicate page mapping will happen only when an object header or a delta base reference is spanned over the end of a window and is always limited to just one page of duplication, as no sane operating system will ever have a page size smaller than a hash. I am assuming that the possible wasted page of virtual address space is going to perform faster than the alternatives, which would be to copy the object header or ref delta into a temporary buffer prior to parsing, or to check the window range on every byte during header parsing. We may decide to revisit this decision in the future since this is just a gut instinct decision and has not actually been proven out by experimental testing. Signed-off-by: Shawn O. Pearce <spearce@spearce.org> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
2006-12-23 08:34:28 +01:00
struct pack_window *win = *w_cursor;
Replace use_packed_git with window cursors. Part of the implementation concept of the sliding mmap window for pack access is to permit multiple windows per pack to be mapped independently. Since the inuse_cnt is associated with the mmap and not with the file, this value is in struct pack_window and needs to be incremented/decremented for each pack_window accessed by any code. To faciliate that implementation we need to replace all uses of use_packed_git() and unuse_packed_git() with a different API that follows struct pack_window objects rather than struct packed_git. The way this works is when we need to start accessing a pack for the first time we should setup a new window 'cursor' by declaring a local and setting it to NULL: struct pack_windows *w_curs = NULL; To obtain the memory region which contains a specific section of the pack file we invoke use_pack(), supplying the address of our current window cursor: unsigned int len; unsigned char *addr = use_pack(p, &w_curs, offset, &len); the returned address `addr` will be the first byte at `offset` within the pack file. The optional variable len will also be updated with the number of bytes remaining following the address. Multiple calls to use_pack() with the same window cursor will update the window cursor, moving it from one window to another when necessary. In this way each window cursor variable maintains only one struct pack_window inuse at a time. Finally before exiting the scope which originally declared the window cursor we must invoke unuse_pack() to unuse the current window (which may be different from the one that was first obtained from use_pack): unuse_pack(&w_curs); This implementation is still not complete with regards to multiple windows, as only one window per pack file is supported right now. Signed-off-by: Shawn O. Pearce <spearce@spearce.org> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
2006-12-23 08:34:08 +01:00
/* Since packfiles end in a hash of their content and it's
Fully activate the sliding window pack access. This finally turns on the sliding window behavior for packfile data access by mapping limited size windows and chaining them under the packed_git->windows list. We consider a given byte offset to be within the window only if there would be at least 20 bytes (one hash worth of data) accessible after the requested offset. This range selection relates to the contract that use_pack() makes with its callers, allowing them to access one hash or one object header without needing to call use_pack() for every byte of data obtained. In the worst case scenario we will map the same page of data twice into memory: once at the end of one window and once again at the start of the next window. This duplicate page mapping will happen only when an object header or a delta base reference is spanned over the end of a window and is always limited to just one page of duplication, as no sane operating system will ever have a page size smaller than a hash. I am assuming that the possible wasted page of virtual address space is going to perform faster than the alternatives, which would be to copy the object header or ref delta into a temporary buffer prior to parsing, or to check the window range on every byte during header parsing. We may decide to revisit this decision in the future since this is just a gut instinct decision and has not actually been proven out by experimental testing. Signed-off-by: Shawn O. Pearce <spearce@spearce.org> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
2006-12-23 08:34:28 +01:00
* pointless to ask for an offset into the middle of that
* hash, and the in_window function above wouldn't match
* don't allow an offset too close to the end of the file.
*/
if (!p->pack_size && p->pack_fd == -1 && open_packed_git(p))
die("packfile %s cannot be accessed", p->pack_name);
Fully activate the sliding window pack access. This finally turns on the sliding window behavior for packfile data access by mapping limited size windows and chaining them under the packed_git->windows list. We consider a given byte offset to be within the window only if there would be at least 20 bytes (one hash worth of data) accessible after the requested offset. This range selection relates to the contract that use_pack() makes with its callers, allowing them to access one hash or one object header without needing to call use_pack() for every byte of data obtained. In the worst case scenario we will map the same page of data twice into memory: once at the end of one window and once again at the start of the next window. This duplicate page mapping will happen only when an object header or a delta base reference is spanned over the end of a window and is always limited to just one page of duplication, as no sane operating system will ever have a page size smaller than a hash. I am assuming that the possible wasted page of virtual address space is going to perform faster than the alternatives, which would be to copy the object header or ref delta into a temporary buffer prior to parsing, or to check the window range on every byte during header parsing. We may decide to revisit this decision in the future since this is just a gut instinct decision and has not actually been proven out by experimental testing. Signed-off-by: Shawn O. Pearce <spearce@spearce.org> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
2006-12-23 08:34:28 +01:00
if (offset > (p->pack_size - 20))
die("offset beyond end of packfile (truncated pack?)");
if (offset < 0)
die(_("offset before end of packfile (broken .idx?)"));
Fully activate the sliding window pack access. This finally turns on the sliding window behavior for packfile data access by mapping limited size windows and chaining them under the packed_git->windows list. We consider a given byte offset to be within the window only if there would be at least 20 bytes (one hash worth of data) accessible after the requested offset. This range selection relates to the contract that use_pack() makes with its callers, allowing them to access one hash or one object header without needing to call use_pack() for every byte of data obtained. In the worst case scenario we will map the same page of data twice into memory: once at the end of one window and once again at the start of the next window. This duplicate page mapping will happen only when an object header or a delta base reference is spanned over the end of a window and is always limited to just one page of duplication, as no sane operating system will ever have a page size smaller than a hash. I am assuming that the possible wasted page of virtual address space is going to perform faster than the alternatives, which would be to copy the object header or ref delta into a temporary buffer prior to parsing, or to check the window range on every byte during header parsing. We may decide to revisit this decision in the future since this is just a gut instinct decision and has not actually been proven out by experimental testing. Signed-off-by: Shawn O. Pearce <spearce@spearce.org> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
2006-12-23 08:34:28 +01:00
if (!win || !in_window(win, offset)) {
if (win)
win->inuse_cnt--;
for (win = p->windows; win; win = win->next) {
if (in_window(win, offset))
break;
}
if (!win) {
size_t window_align = packed_git_window_size / 2;
off_t len;
if (p->pack_fd == -1 && open_packed_git(p))
die("packfile %s cannot be accessed", p->pack_name);
Fully activate the sliding window pack access. This finally turns on the sliding window behavior for packfile data access by mapping limited size windows and chaining them under the packed_git->windows list. We consider a given byte offset to be within the window only if there would be at least 20 bytes (one hash worth of data) accessible after the requested offset. This range selection relates to the contract that use_pack() makes with its callers, allowing them to access one hash or one object header without needing to call use_pack() for every byte of data obtained. In the worst case scenario we will map the same page of data twice into memory: once at the end of one window and once again at the start of the next window. This duplicate page mapping will happen only when an object header or a delta base reference is spanned over the end of a window and is always limited to just one page of duplication, as no sane operating system will ever have a page size smaller than a hash. I am assuming that the possible wasted page of virtual address space is going to perform faster than the alternatives, which would be to copy the object header or ref delta into a temporary buffer prior to parsing, or to check the window range on every byte during header parsing. We may decide to revisit this decision in the future since this is just a gut instinct decision and has not actually been proven out by experimental testing. Signed-off-by: Shawn O. Pearce <spearce@spearce.org> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
2006-12-23 08:34:28 +01:00
win = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*win));
win->offset = (offset / window_align) * window_align;
len = p->pack_size - win->offset;
if (len > packed_git_window_size)
len = packed_git_window_size;
win->len = (size_t)len;
Fully activate the sliding window pack access. This finally turns on the sliding window behavior for packfile data access by mapping limited size windows and chaining them under the packed_git->windows list. We consider a given byte offset to be within the window only if there would be at least 20 bytes (one hash worth of data) accessible after the requested offset. This range selection relates to the contract that use_pack() makes with its callers, allowing them to access one hash or one object header without needing to call use_pack() for every byte of data obtained. In the worst case scenario we will map the same page of data twice into memory: once at the end of one window and once again at the start of the next window. This duplicate page mapping will happen only when an object header or a delta base reference is spanned over the end of a window and is always limited to just one page of duplication, as no sane operating system will ever have a page size smaller than a hash. I am assuming that the possible wasted page of virtual address space is going to perform faster than the alternatives, which would be to copy the object header or ref delta into a temporary buffer prior to parsing, or to check the window range on every byte during header parsing. We may decide to revisit this decision in the future since this is just a gut instinct decision and has not actually been proven out by experimental testing. Signed-off-by: Shawn O. Pearce <spearce@spearce.org> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
2006-12-23 08:34:28 +01:00
pack_mapped += win->len;
while (packed_git_limit < pack_mapped
&& unuse_one_window(p))
Fully activate the sliding window pack access. This finally turns on the sliding window behavior for packfile data access by mapping limited size windows and chaining them under the packed_git->windows list. We consider a given byte offset to be within the window only if there would be at least 20 bytes (one hash worth of data) accessible after the requested offset. This range selection relates to the contract that use_pack() makes with its callers, allowing them to access one hash or one object header without needing to call use_pack() for every byte of data obtained. In the worst case scenario we will map the same page of data twice into memory: once at the end of one window and once again at the start of the next window. This duplicate page mapping will happen only when an object header or a delta base reference is spanned over the end of a window and is always limited to just one page of duplication, as no sane operating system will ever have a page size smaller than a hash. I am assuming that the possible wasted page of virtual address space is going to perform faster than the alternatives, which would be to copy the object header or ref delta into a temporary buffer prior to parsing, or to check the window range on every byte during header parsing. We may decide to revisit this decision in the future since this is just a gut instinct decision and has not actually been proven out by experimental testing. Signed-off-by: Shawn O. Pearce <spearce@spearce.org> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
2006-12-23 08:34:28 +01:00
; /* nothing */
win->base = xmmap(NULL, win->len,
Fully activate the sliding window pack access. This finally turns on the sliding window behavior for packfile data access by mapping limited size windows and chaining them under the packed_git->windows list. We consider a given byte offset to be within the window only if there would be at least 20 bytes (one hash worth of data) accessible after the requested offset. This range selection relates to the contract that use_pack() makes with its callers, allowing them to access one hash or one object header without needing to call use_pack() for every byte of data obtained. In the worst case scenario we will map the same page of data twice into memory: once at the end of one window and once again at the start of the next window. This duplicate page mapping will happen only when an object header or a delta base reference is spanned over the end of a window and is always limited to just one page of duplication, as no sane operating system will ever have a page size smaller than a hash. I am assuming that the possible wasted page of virtual address space is going to perform faster than the alternatives, which would be to copy the object header or ref delta into a temporary buffer prior to parsing, or to check the window range on every byte during header parsing. We may decide to revisit this decision in the future since this is just a gut instinct decision and has not actually been proven out by experimental testing. Signed-off-by: Shawn O. Pearce <spearce@spearce.org> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
2006-12-23 08:34:28 +01:00
PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE,
p->pack_fd, win->offset);
if (win->base == MAP_FAILED)
die("packfile %s cannot be mapped: %s",
p->pack_name,
strerror(errno));
if (!win->offset && win->len == p->pack_size
&& !p->do_not_close)
close_pack_fd(p);
pack_mmap_calls++;
pack_open_windows++;
if (pack_mapped > peak_pack_mapped)
peak_pack_mapped = pack_mapped;
if (pack_open_windows > peak_pack_open_windows)
peak_pack_open_windows = pack_open_windows;
Fully activate the sliding window pack access. This finally turns on the sliding window behavior for packfile data access by mapping limited size windows and chaining them under the packed_git->windows list. We consider a given byte offset to be within the window only if there would be at least 20 bytes (one hash worth of data) accessible after the requested offset. This range selection relates to the contract that use_pack() makes with its callers, allowing them to access one hash or one object header without needing to call use_pack() for every byte of data obtained. In the worst case scenario we will map the same page of data twice into memory: once at the end of one window and once again at the start of the next window. This duplicate page mapping will happen only when an object header or a delta base reference is spanned over the end of a window and is always limited to just one page of duplication, as no sane operating system will ever have a page size smaller than a hash. I am assuming that the possible wasted page of virtual address space is going to perform faster than the alternatives, which would be to copy the object header or ref delta into a temporary buffer prior to parsing, or to check the window range on every byte during header parsing. We may decide to revisit this decision in the future since this is just a gut instinct decision and has not actually been proven out by experimental testing. Signed-off-by: Shawn O. Pearce <spearce@spearce.org> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
2006-12-23 08:34:28 +01:00
win->next = p->windows;
p->windows = win;
}
}
Replace use_packed_git with window cursors. Part of the implementation concept of the sliding mmap window for pack access is to permit multiple windows per pack to be mapped independently. Since the inuse_cnt is associated with the mmap and not with the file, this value is in struct pack_window and needs to be incremented/decremented for each pack_window accessed by any code. To faciliate that implementation we need to replace all uses of use_packed_git() and unuse_packed_git() with a different API that follows struct pack_window objects rather than struct packed_git. The way this works is when we need to start accessing a pack for the first time we should setup a new window 'cursor' by declaring a local and setting it to NULL: struct pack_windows *w_curs = NULL; To obtain the memory region which contains a specific section of the pack file we invoke use_pack(), supplying the address of our current window cursor: unsigned int len; unsigned char *addr = use_pack(p, &w_curs, offset, &len); the returned address `addr` will be the first byte at `offset` within the pack file. The optional variable len will also be updated with the number of bytes remaining following the address. Multiple calls to use_pack() with the same window cursor will update the window cursor, moving it from one window to another when necessary. In this way each window cursor variable maintains only one struct pack_window inuse at a time. Finally before exiting the scope which originally declared the window cursor we must invoke unuse_pack() to unuse the current window (which may be different from the one that was first obtained from use_pack): unuse_pack(&w_curs); This implementation is still not complete with regards to multiple windows, as only one window per pack file is supported right now. Signed-off-by: Shawn O. Pearce <spearce@spearce.org> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
2006-12-23 08:34:08 +01:00
if (win != *w_cursor) {
win->last_used = pack_used_ctr++;
win->inuse_cnt++;
*w_cursor = win;
}
Fully activate the sliding window pack access. This finally turns on the sliding window behavior for packfile data access by mapping limited size windows and chaining them under the packed_git->windows list. We consider a given byte offset to be within the window only if there would be at least 20 bytes (one hash worth of data) accessible after the requested offset. This range selection relates to the contract that use_pack() makes with its callers, allowing them to access one hash or one object header without needing to call use_pack() for every byte of data obtained. In the worst case scenario we will map the same page of data twice into memory: once at the end of one window and once again at the start of the next window. This duplicate page mapping will happen only when an object header or a delta base reference is spanned over the end of a window and is always limited to just one page of duplication, as no sane operating system will ever have a page size smaller than a hash. I am assuming that the possible wasted page of virtual address space is going to perform faster than the alternatives, which would be to copy the object header or ref delta into a temporary buffer prior to parsing, or to check the window range on every byte during header parsing. We may decide to revisit this decision in the future since this is just a gut instinct decision and has not actually been proven out by experimental testing. Signed-off-by: Shawn O. Pearce <spearce@spearce.org> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
2006-12-23 08:34:28 +01:00
offset -= win->offset;
Replace use_packed_git with window cursors. Part of the implementation concept of the sliding mmap window for pack access is to permit multiple windows per pack to be mapped independently. Since the inuse_cnt is associated with the mmap and not with the file, this value is in struct pack_window and needs to be incremented/decremented for each pack_window accessed by any code. To faciliate that implementation we need to replace all uses of use_packed_git() and unuse_packed_git() with a different API that follows struct pack_window objects rather than struct packed_git. The way this works is when we need to start accessing a pack for the first time we should setup a new window 'cursor' by declaring a local and setting it to NULL: struct pack_windows *w_curs = NULL; To obtain the memory region which contains a specific section of the pack file we invoke use_pack(), supplying the address of our current window cursor: unsigned int len; unsigned char *addr = use_pack(p, &w_curs, offset, &len); the returned address `addr` will be the first byte at `offset` within the pack file. The optional variable len will also be updated with the number of bytes remaining following the address. Multiple calls to use_pack() with the same window cursor will update the window cursor, moving it from one window to another when necessary. In this way each window cursor variable maintains only one struct pack_window inuse at a time. Finally before exiting the scope which originally declared the window cursor we must invoke unuse_pack() to unuse the current window (which may be different from the one that was first obtained from use_pack): unuse_pack(&w_curs); This implementation is still not complete with regards to multiple windows, as only one window per pack file is supported right now. Signed-off-by: Shawn O. Pearce <spearce@spearce.org> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
2006-12-23 08:34:08 +01:00
if (left)
*left = win->len - xsize_t(offset);
Replace use_packed_git with window cursors. Part of the implementation concept of the sliding mmap window for pack access is to permit multiple windows per pack to be mapped independently. Since the inuse_cnt is associated with the mmap and not with the file, this value is in struct pack_window and needs to be incremented/decremented for each pack_window accessed by any code. To faciliate that implementation we need to replace all uses of use_packed_git() and unuse_packed_git() with a different API that follows struct pack_window objects rather than struct packed_git. The way this works is when we need to start accessing a pack for the first time we should setup a new window 'cursor' by declaring a local and setting it to NULL: struct pack_windows *w_curs = NULL; To obtain the memory region which contains a specific section of the pack file we invoke use_pack(), supplying the address of our current window cursor: unsigned int len; unsigned char *addr = use_pack(p, &w_curs, offset, &len); the returned address `addr` will be the first byte at `offset` within the pack file. The optional variable len will also be updated with the number of bytes remaining following the address. Multiple calls to use_pack() with the same window cursor will update the window cursor, moving it from one window to another when necessary. In this way each window cursor variable maintains only one struct pack_window inuse at a time. Finally before exiting the scope which originally declared the window cursor we must invoke unuse_pack() to unuse the current window (which may be different from the one that was first obtained from use_pack): unuse_pack(&w_curs); This implementation is still not complete with regards to multiple windows, as only one window per pack file is supported right now. Signed-off-by: Shawn O. Pearce <spearce@spearce.org> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
2006-12-23 08:34:08 +01:00
return win->base + offset;
}
static struct packed_git *alloc_packed_git(int extra)
{
struct packed_git *p = xmalloc(st_add(sizeof(*p), extra));
memset(p, 0, sizeof(*p));
p->pack_fd = -1;
return p;
}
static void try_to_free_pack_memory(size_t size)
{
release_pack_memory(size);
}
struct packed_git *add_packed_git(const char *path, size_t path_len, int local)
{
static int have_set_try_to_free_routine;
struct stat st;
size_t alloc;
struct packed_git *p;
if (!have_set_try_to_free_routine) {
have_set_try_to_free_routine = 1;
set_try_to_free_routine(try_to_free_pack_memory);
}
/*
* Make sure a corresponding .pack file exists and that
* the index looks sane.
*/
if (!strip_suffix_mem(path, &path_len, ".idx"))
return NULL;
/*
* ".pack" is long enough to hold any suffix we're adding (and
* the use xsnprintf double-checks that)
*/
alloc = st_add3(path_len, strlen(".pack"), 1);
p = alloc_packed_git(alloc);
memcpy(p->pack_name, path, path_len);
xsnprintf(p->pack_name + path_len, alloc - path_len, ".keep");
if (!access(p->pack_name, F_OK))
p->pack_keep = 1;
xsnprintf(p->pack_name + path_len, alloc - path_len, ".pack");
if (stat(p->pack_name, &st) || !S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {
free(p);
return NULL;
}
/* ok, it looks sane as far as we can check without
* actually mapping the pack file.
*/
p->pack_size = st.st_size;
p->pack_local = local;
p->mtime = st.st_mtime;
if (path_len < 40 || get_sha1_hex(path + path_len - 40, p->sha1))
hashclr(p->sha1);
return p;
}
struct packed_git *parse_pack_index(unsigned char *sha1, const char *idx_path)
{
const char *path = sha1_pack_name(sha1);
size_t alloc = st_add(strlen(path), 1);
struct packed_git *p = alloc_packed_git(alloc);
memcpy(p->pack_name, path, alloc); /* includes NUL */
hashcpy(p->sha1, sha1);
if (check_packed_git_idx(idx_path, p)) {
free(p);
return NULL;
}
return p;
}
void install_packed_git(struct packed_git *pack)
{
if (pack->pack_fd != -1)
pack_open_fds++;
pack->next = packed_git;
packed_git = pack;
}
void (*report_garbage)(unsigned seen_bits, const char *path);
static void report_helper(const struct string_list *list,
int seen_bits, int first, int last)
{
if (seen_bits == (PACKDIR_FILE_PACK|PACKDIR_FILE_IDX))
return;
for (; first < last; first++)
report_garbage(seen_bits, list->items[first].string);
}
static void report_pack_garbage(struct string_list *list)
{
int i, baselen = -1, first = 0, seen_bits = 0;
if (!report_garbage)
return;
string_list_sort(list);
for (i = 0; i < list->nr; i++) {
const char *path = list->items[i].string;
if (baselen != -1 &&
strncmp(path, list->items[first].string, baselen)) {
report_helper(list, seen_bits, first, i);
baselen = -1;
seen_bits = 0;
}
if (baselen == -1) {
const char *dot = strrchr(path, '.');
if (!dot) {
report_garbage(PACKDIR_FILE_GARBAGE, path);
continue;
}
baselen = dot - path + 1;
first = i;
}
if (!strcmp(path + baselen, "pack"))
seen_bits |= 1;
else if (!strcmp(path + baselen, "idx"))
seen_bits |= 2;
}
report_helper(list, seen_bits, first, list->nr);
}
static void prepare_packed_git_one(char *objdir, int local)
{
struct strbuf path = STRBUF_INIT;
size_t dirnamelen;
DIR *dir;
struct dirent *de;
struct string_list garbage = STRING_LIST_INIT_DUP;
strbuf_addstr(&path, objdir);
strbuf_addstr(&path, "/pack");
dir = opendir(path.buf);
if (!dir) {
if (errno != ENOENT)
error("unable to open object pack directory: %s: %s",
path.buf, strerror(errno));
strbuf_release(&path);
return;
}
strbuf_addch(&path, '/');
dirnamelen = path.len;
while ((de = readdir(dir)) != NULL) {
struct packed_git *p;
size_t base_len;
if (is_dot_or_dotdot(de->d_name))
continue;
strbuf_setlen(&path, dirnamelen);
strbuf_addstr(&path, de->d_name);
base_len = path.len;
if (strip_suffix_mem(path.buf, &base_len, ".idx")) {
/* Don't reopen a pack we already have. */
for (p = packed_git; p; p = p->next) {
size_t len;
if (strip_suffix(p->pack_name, ".pack", &len) &&
len == base_len &&
!memcmp(p->pack_name, path.buf, len))
break;
}
if (p == NULL &&
/*
* See if it really is a valid .idx file with
* corresponding .pack file that we can map.
*/
(p = add_packed_git(path.buf, path.len, local)) != NULL)
install_packed_git(p);
}
if (!report_garbage)
continue;
if (ends_with(de->d_name, ".idx") ||
ends_with(de->d_name, ".pack") ||
ends_with(de->d_name, ".bitmap") ||
ends_with(de->d_name, ".keep"))
string_list_append(&garbage, path.buf);
else
report_garbage(PACKDIR_FILE_GARBAGE, path.buf);
}
closedir(dir);
report_pack_garbage(&garbage);
string_list_clear(&garbage, 0);
strbuf_release(&path);
}
static int sort_pack(const void *a_, const void *b_)
{
struct packed_git *a = *((struct packed_git **)a_);
struct packed_git *b = *((struct packed_git **)b_);
int st;
/*
* Local packs tend to contain objects specific to our
* variant of the project than remote ones. In addition,
* remote ones could be on a network mounted filesystem.
* Favor local ones for these reasons.
*/
st = a->pack_local - b->pack_local;
if (st)
return -st;
/*
* Younger packs tend to contain more recent objects,
* and more recent objects tend to get accessed more
* often.
*/
if (a->mtime < b->mtime)
return 1;
else if (a->mtime == b->mtime)
return 0;
return -1;
}
static void rearrange_packed_git(void)
{
struct packed_git **ary, *p;
int i, n;
for (n = 0, p = packed_git; p; p = p->next)
n++;
if (n < 2)
return;
/* prepare an array of packed_git for easier sorting */
ary = xcalloc(n, sizeof(struct packed_git *));
for (n = 0, p = packed_git; p; p = p->next)
ary[n++] = p;
qsort(ary, n, sizeof(struct packed_git *), sort_pack);
/* link them back again */
for (i = 0; i < n - 1; i++)
ary[i]->next = ary[i + 1];
ary[n - 1]->next = NULL;
packed_git = ary[0];
free(ary);
}
static int prepare_packed_git_run_once = 0;
void prepare_packed_git(void)
{
struct alternate_object_database *alt;
if (prepare_packed_git_run_once)
return;
prepare_packed_git_one(get_object_directory(), 1);
prepare_alt_odb();
for (alt = alt_odb_list; alt; alt = alt->next) {
alt->name[-1] = 0;
prepare_packed_git_one(alt->base, 0);
alt->name[-1] = '/';
}
rearrange_packed_git();
prepare_packed_git_run_once = 1;
}
void reprepare_packed_git(void)
{
prepare_packed_git_run_once = 0;
prepare_packed_git();
}
static void mark_bad_packed_object(struct packed_git *p,
const unsigned char *sha1)
{
unsigned i;
for (i = 0; i < p->num_bad_objects; i++)
if (!hashcmp(sha1, p->bad_object_sha1 + GIT_SHA1_RAWSZ * i))
return;
p->bad_object_sha1 = xrealloc(p->bad_object_sha1,
st_mult(GIT_SHA1_RAWSZ,
st_add(p->num_bad_objects, 1)));
hashcpy(p->bad_object_sha1 + GIT_SHA1_RAWSZ * p->num_bad_objects, sha1);
p->num_bad_objects++;
}
static const struct packed_git *has_packed_and_bad(const unsigned char *sha1)
{
struct packed_git *p;
unsigned i;
for (p = packed_git; p; p = p->next)
for (i = 0; i < p->num_bad_objects; i++)
if (!hashcmp(sha1, p->bad_object_sha1 + 20 * i))
return p;
return NULL;
}
/*
* With an in-core object data in "map", rehash it to make sure the
* object name actually matches "sha1" to detect object corruption.
* With "map" == NULL, try reading the object named with "sha1" using
* the streaming interface and rehash it to do the same.
*/
int check_sha1_signature(const unsigned char *sha1, void *map,
unsigned long size, const char *type)
{
unsigned char real_sha1[20];
enum object_type obj_type;
struct git_istream *st;
git_SHA_CTX c;
char hdr[32];
int hdrlen;
if (map) {
hash_sha1_file(map, size, type, real_sha1);
return hashcmp(sha1, real_sha1) ? -1 : 0;
}
st = open_istream(sha1, &obj_type, &size, NULL);
if (!st)
return -1;
/* Generate the header */
hdrlen = xsnprintf(hdr, sizeof(hdr), "%s %lu", typename(obj_type), size) + 1;
/* Sha1.. */
git_SHA1_Init(&c);
git_SHA1_Update(&c, hdr, hdrlen);
for (;;) {
char buf[1024 * 16];
ssize_t readlen = read_istream(st, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (readlen < 0) {
close_istream(st);
return -1;
}
if (!readlen)
break;
git_SHA1_Update(&c, buf, readlen);
}
git_SHA1_Final(real_sha1, &c);
close_istream(st);
return hashcmp(sha1, real_sha1) ? -1 : 0;
}
int git_open_noatime(const char *name)
{
static int sha1_file_open_flag = O_NOATIME;
for (;;) {
int fd;
errno = 0;
fd = open(name, O_RDONLY | sha1_file_open_flag);
if (fd >= 0)
return fd;
/* Might the failure be due to O_NOATIME? */
if (errno != ENOENT && sha1_file_open_flag) {
sha1_file_open_flag = 0;
continue;
}
return -1;
}
}
static int stat_sha1_file(const unsigned char *sha1, struct stat *st)
{
struct alternate_object_database *alt;
if (!lstat(sha1_file_name(sha1), st))
return 0;
prepare_alt_odb();
errno = ENOENT;
for (alt = alt_odb_list; alt; alt = alt->next) {
fill_sha1_path(alt->name, sha1);
if (!lstat(alt->base, st))
return 0;
}
return -1;
}
static int open_sha1_file(const unsigned char *sha1)
{
int fd;
struct alternate_object_database *alt;
int most_interesting_errno;
fd = git_open_noatime(sha1_file_name(sha1));
if (fd >= 0)
return fd;
most_interesting_errno = errno;
prepare_alt_odb();
for (alt = alt_odb_list; alt; alt = alt->next) {
fill_sha1_path(alt->name, sha1);
fd = git_open_noatime(alt->base);
if (fd >= 0)
return fd;
if (most_interesting_errno == ENOENT)
most_interesting_errno = errno;
}
errno = most_interesting_errno;
return -1;
}
void *map_sha1_file(const unsigned char *sha1, unsigned long *size)
{
void *map;
int fd;
fd = open_sha1_file(sha1);
map = NULL;
if (fd >= 0) {
struct stat st;
if (!fstat(fd, &st)) {
*size = xsize_t(st.st_size);
if (!*size) {
/* mmap() is forbidden on empty files */
error("object file %s is empty", sha1_file_name(sha1));
return NULL;
}
map = xmmap(NULL, *size, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, fd, 0);
}
close(fd);
}
return map;
}
unsigned long unpack_object_header_buffer(const unsigned char *buf,
unsigned long len, enum object_type *type, unsigned long *sizep)
{
unsigned shift;
Fix big left-shifts of unsigned char Shifting 'unsigned char' or 'unsigned short' left can result in sign extension errors, since the C integer promotion rules means that the unsigned char/short will get implicitly promoted to a signed 'int' due to the shift (or due to other operations). This normally doesn't matter, but if you shift things up sufficiently, it will now set the sign bit in 'int', and a subsequent cast to a bigger type (eg 'long' or 'unsigned long') will now sign-extend the value despite the original expression being unsigned. One example of this would be something like unsigned long size; unsigned char c; size += c << 24; where despite all the variables being unsigned, 'c << 24' ends up being a signed entity, and will get sign-extended when then doing the addition in an 'unsigned long' type. Since git uses 'unsigned char' pointers extensively, we actually have this bug in a couple of places. I may have missed some, but this is the result of looking at git grep '[^0-9 ][ ]*<<[ ][a-z]' -- '*.c' '*.h' git grep '<<[ ]*24' which catches at least the common byte cases (shifting variables by a variable amount, and shifting by 24 bits). I also grepped for just 'unsigned char' variables in general, and converted the ones that most obviously ended up getting implicitly cast immediately anyway (eg hash_name(), encode_85()). In addition to just avoiding 'unsigned char', this patch also tries to use a common idiom for the delta header size thing. We had three different variations on it: "& 0x7fUL" in one place (getting the sign extension right), and "& ~0x80" and "& 0x7f" in two other places (not getting it right). Apart from making them all just avoid using "unsigned char" at all, I also unified them to then use a simple "& 0x7f". I considered making a sparse extension which warns about doing implicit casts from unsigned types to signed types, but it gets rather complex very quickly, so this is just a hack. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2009-06-18 02:22:27 +02:00
unsigned long size, c;
unsigned long used = 0;
c = buf[used++];
*type = (c >> 4) & 7;
size = c & 15;
shift = 4;
while (c & 0x80) {
if (len <= used || bitsizeof(long) <= shift) {
error("bad object header");
size = used = 0;
break;
}
c = buf[used++];
size += (c & 0x7f) << shift;
shift += 7;
}
*sizep = size;
return used;
}
int unpack_sha1_header(git_zstream *stream, unsigned char *map, unsigned long mapsize, void *buffer, unsigned long bufsiz)
{
/* Get the data stream */
memset(stream, 0, sizeof(*stream));
stream->next_in = map;
stream->avail_in = mapsize;
stream->next_out = buffer;
stream->avail_out = bufsiz;
git_inflate_init(stream);
return git_inflate(stream, 0);
}
static int unpack_sha1_header_to_strbuf(git_zstream *stream, unsigned char *map,
unsigned long mapsize, void *buffer,
unsigned long bufsiz, struct strbuf *header)
{
int status;
status = unpack_sha1_header(stream, map, mapsize, buffer, bufsiz);
/*
* Check if entire header is unpacked in the first iteration.
*/
if (memchr(buffer, '\0', stream->next_out - (unsigned char *)buffer))
return 0;
/*
* buffer[0..bufsiz] was not large enough. Copy the partial
* result out to header, and then append the result of further
* reading the stream.
*/
strbuf_add(header, buffer, stream->next_out - (unsigned char *)buffer);
stream->next_out = buffer;
stream->avail_out = bufsiz;
do {
status = git_inflate(stream, 0);
strbuf_add(header, buffer, stream->next_out - (unsigned char *)buffer);
if (memchr(buffer, '\0', stream->next_out - (unsigned char *)buffer))
return 0;
stream->next_out = buffer;
stream->avail_out = bufsiz;
} while (status != Z_STREAM_END);
return -1;
}
2011-06-10 20:52:15 +02:00
static void *unpack_sha1_rest(git_zstream *stream, void *buffer, unsigned long size, const unsigned char *sha1)
{
int bytes = strlen(buffer) + 1;
unsigned char *buf = xmallocz(size);
unsigned long n;
int status = Z_OK;
n = stream->total_out - bytes;
if (n > size)
n = size;
memcpy(buf, (char *) buffer + bytes, n);
bytes = n;
if (bytes <= size) {
/*
* The above condition must be (bytes <= size), not
* (bytes < size). In other words, even though we
* expect no more output and set avail_out to zero,
* the input zlib stream may have bytes that express
* "this concludes the stream", and we *do* want to
* eat that input.
*
* Otherwise we would not be able to test that we
* consumed all the input to reach the expected size;
* we also want to check that zlib tells us that all
* went well with status == Z_STREAM_END at the end.
*/
stream->next_out = buf + bytes;
stream->avail_out = size - bytes;
while (status == Z_OK)
status = git_inflate(stream, Z_FINISH);
}
if (status == Z_STREAM_END && !stream->avail_in) {
git_inflate_end(stream);
return buf;
}
if (status < 0)
error("corrupt loose object '%s'", sha1_to_hex(sha1));
else if (stream->avail_in)
error("garbage at end of loose object '%s'",
sha1_to_hex(sha1));
free(buf);
return NULL;
}
/*
* We used to just use "sscanf()", but that's actually way
* too permissive for what we want to check. So do an anal
* object header parse by hand.
*/
static int parse_sha1_header_extended(const char *hdr, struct object_info *oi,
unsigned int flags)
{
const char *type_buf = hdr;
unsigned long size;
int type, type_len = 0;
/*
* The type can be of any size but is followed by
* a space.
*/
for (;;) {
char c = *hdr++;
if (c == ' ')
break;
type_len++;
}
type = type_from_string_gently(type_buf, type_len, 1);
if (oi->typename)
strbuf_add(oi->typename, type_buf, type_len);
/*
* Set type to 0 if its an unknown object and
* we're obtaining the type using '--allow-unkown-type'
* option.
*/
if ((flags & LOOKUP_UNKNOWN_OBJECT) && (type < 0))
type = 0;
else if (type < 0)
die("invalid object type");
if (oi->typep)
*oi->typep = type;
/*
* The length must follow immediately, and be in canonical
* decimal format (ie "010" is not valid).
*/
size = *hdr++ - '0';
if (size > 9)
return -1;
if (size) {
for (;;) {
unsigned long c = *hdr - '0';
if (c > 9)
break;
hdr++;
size = size * 10 + c;
}
}
if (oi->sizep)
*oi->sizep = size;
/*
* The length must be followed by a zero byte
*/
return *hdr ? -1 : type;
}
int parse_sha1_header(const char *hdr, unsigned long *sizep)
{
struct object_info oi;
oi.sizep = sizep;
oi.typename = NULL;
oi.typep = NULL;
return parse_sha1_header_extended(hdr, &oi, LOOKUP_REPLACE_OBJECT);
}
static void *unpack_sha1_file(void *map, unsigned long mapsize, enum object_type *type, unsigned long *size, const unsigned char *sha1)
{
int ret;
2011-06-10 20:52:15 +02:00
git_zstream stream;
char hdr[8192];
ret = unpack_sha1_header(&stream, map, mapsize, hdr, sizeof(hdr));
if (ret < Z_OK || (*type = parse_sha1_header(hdr, size)) < 0)
return NULL;
return unpack_sha1_rest(&stream, hdr, *size, sha1);
}
unsigned long get_size_from_delta(struct packed_git *p,
struct pack_window **w_curs,
off_t curpos)
{
const unsigned char *data;
unsigned char delta_head[20], *in;
2011-06-10 20:52:15 +02:00
git_zstream stream;
int st;
memset(&stream, 0, sizeof(stream));
stream.next_out = delta_head;
stream.avail_out = sizeof(delta_head);
git_inflate_init(&stream);
do {
in = use_pack(p, w_curs, curpos, &stream.avail_in);
stream.next_in = in;
st = git_inflate(&stream, Z_FINISH);
curpos += stream.next_in - in;
} while ((st == Z_OK || st == Z_BUF_ERROR) &&
stream.total_out < sizeof(delta_head));
git_inflate_end(&stream);
if ((st != Z_STREAM_END) && stream.total_out != sizeof(delta_head)) {
error("delta data unpack-initial failed");
return 0;
}
/* Examine the initial part of the delta to figure out
* the result size.
*/
data = delta_head;
/* ignore base size */
get_delta_hdr_size(&data, delta_head+sizeof(delta_head));
/* Read the result size */
return get_delta_hdr_size(&data, delta_head+sizeof(delta_head));
}
static off_t get_delta_base(struct packed_git *p,
Replace use_packed_git with window cursors. Part of the implementation concept of the sliding mmap window for pack access is to permit multiple windows per pack to be mapped independently. Since the inuse_cnt is associated with the mmap and not with the file, this value is in struct pack_window and needs to be incremented/decremented for each pack_window accessed by any code. To faciliate that implementation we need to replace all uses of use_packed_git() and unuse_packed_git() with a different API that follows struct pack_window objects rather than struct packed_git. The way this works is when we need to start accessing a pack for the first time we should setup a new window 'cursor' by declaring a local and setting it to NULL: struct pack_windows *w_curs = NULL; To obtain the memory region which contains a specific section of the pack file we invoke use_pack(), supplying the address of our current window cursor: unsigned int len; unsigned char *addr = use_pack(p, &w_curs, offset, &len); the returned address `addr` will be the first byte at `offset` within the pack file. The optional variable len will also be updated with the number of bytes remaining following the address. Multiple calls to use_pack() with the same window cursor will update the window cursor, moving it from one window to another when necessary. In this way each window cursor variable maintains only one struct pack_window inuse at a time. Finally before exiting the scope which originally declared the window cursor we must invoke unuse_pack() to unuse the current window (which may be different from the one that was first obtained from use_pack): unuse_pack(&w_curs); This implementation is still not complete with regards to multiple windows, as only one window per pack file is supported right now. Signed-off-by: Shawn O. Pearce <spearce@spearce.org> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
2006-12-23 08:34:08 +01:00
struct pack_window **w_curs,
off_t *curpos,
enum object_type type,
off_t delta_obj_offset)
{
unsigned char *base_info = use_pack(p, w_curs, *curpos, NULL);
off_t base_offset;
/* use_pack() assured us we have [base_info, base_info + 20)
* as a range that we can look at without walking off the
* end of the mapped window. Its actually the hash size
* that is assured. An OFS_DELTA longer than the hash size
* is stupid, as then a REF_DELTA would be smaller to store.
*/
if (type == OBJ_OFS_DELTA) {
unsigned used = 0;
unsigned char c = base_info[used++];
base_offset = c & 127;
while (c & 128) {
base_offset += 1;
if (!base_offset || MSB(base_offset, 7))
return 0; /* overflow */
c = base_info[used++];
base_offset = (base_offset << 7) + (c & 127);
}
base_offset = delta_obj_offset - base_offset;
if (base_offset <= 0 || base_offset >= delta_obj_offset)
return 0; /* out of bound */
*curpos += used;
} else if (type == OBJ_REF_DELTA) {
/* The base entry _must_ be in the same pack */
base_offset = find_pack_entry_one(base_info, p);
*curpos += 20;
} else
die("I am totally screwed");
return base_offset;
}
/*
* Like get_delta_base above, but we return the sha1 instead of the pack
* offset. This means it is cheaper for REF deltas (we do not have to do
* the final object lookup), but more expensive for OFS deltas (we
* have to load the revidx to convert the offset back into a sha1).
*/
static const unsigned char *get_delta_base_sha1(struct packed_git *p,
struct pack_window **w_curs,
off_t curpos,
enum object_type type,
off_t delta_obj_offset)
{
if (type == OBJ_REF_DELTA) {
unsigned char *base = use_pack(p, w_curs, curpos, NULL);
return base;
} else if (type == OBJ_OFS_DELTA) {
struct revindex_entry *revidx;
off_t base_offset = get_delta_base(p, w_curs, &curpos,
type, delta_obj_offset);
if (!base_offset)
return NULL;
revidx = find_pack_revindex(p, base_offset);
if (!revidx)
return NULL;
return nth_packed_object_sha1(p, revidx->nr);
} else
return NULL;
}
int unpack_object_header(struct packed_git *p,
struct pack_window **w_curs,
off_t *curpos,
unsigned long *sizep)
{
Replace use_packed_git with window cursors. Part of the implementation concept of the sliding mmap window for pack access is to permit multiple windows per pack to be mapped independently. Since the inuse_cnt is associated with the mmap and not with the file, this value is in struct pack_window and needs to be incremented/decremented for each pack_window accessed by any code. To faciliate that implementation we need to replace all uses of use_packed_git() and unuse_packed_git() with a different API that follows struct pack_window objects rather than struct packed_git. The way this works is when we need to start accessing a pack for the first time we should setup a new window 'cursor' by declaring a local and setting it to NULL: struct pack_windows *w_curs = NULL; To obtain the memory region which contains a specific section of the pack file we invoke use_pack(), supplying the address of our current window cursor: unsigned int len; unsigned char *addr = use_pack(p, &w_curs, offset, &len); the returned address `addr` will be the first byte at `offset` within the pack file. The optional variable len will also be updated with the number of bytes remaining following the address. Multiple calls to use_pack() with the same window cursor will update the window cursor, moving it from one window to another when necessary. In this way each window cursor variable maintains only one struct pack_window inuse at a time. Finally before exiting the scope which originally declared the window cursor we must invoke unuse_pack() to unuse the current window (which may be different from the one that was first obtained from use_pack): unuse_pack(&w_curs); This implementation is still not complete with regards to multiple windows, as only one window per pack file is supported right now. Signed-off-by: Shawn O. Pearce <spearce@spearce.org> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
2006-12-23 08:34:08 +01:00
unsigned char *base;
2011-06-10 20:52:15 +02:00
unsigned long left;
unsigned long used;
enum object_type type;
/* use_pack() assures us we have [base, base + 20) available
* as a range that we can look at. (Its actually the hash
* size that is assured.) With our object header encoding
* the maximum deflated object size is 2^137, which is just
* insane, so we know won't exceed what we have been given.
*/
base = use_pack(p, w_curs, *curpos, &left);
used = unpack_object_header_buffer(base, left, &type, sizep);
if (!used) {
type = OBJ_BAD;
} else
*curpos += used;
return type;
}
sha1_file: remove recursion in packed_object_info packed_object_info() and packed_delta_info() were mutually recursive. The former would handle ordinary types and defer deltas to the latter; the latter would use the former to resolve the delta base. This arrangement, however, leads to trouble with threaded index-pack and long delta chains on platforms where thread stacks are small, as happened on OS X (512kB thread stacks by default) with the chromium repo. The task of the two functions is not all that hard to describe without any recursion, however. It proceeds in three steps: - determine the representation type and size, based on the outermost object (delta or not) - follow through the delta chain, if any - determine the object type from what is found at the end of the delta chain The only complication stems from the error recovery. If parsing fails at any step, we want to mark that object (within the pack) as bad and try getting the corresponding SHA1 from elsewhere. If that also fails, we want to repeat this process back up the delta chain until we find a reasonable solution or conclude that there is no way to reconstruct the object. (This is conveniently checked by t5303.) To achieve that within the pack, we keep track of the entire delta chain in a stack. When things go sour, we process that stack from the top, marking entries as bad and attempting to re-resolve by sha1. To avoid excessive malloc(), the stack starts out with a small stack-allocated array. The choice of 64 is based on the default of pack.depth, which is 50, in the hope that it covers "most" delta chains without any need for malloc(). It's much harder to make the actual re-resolving by sha1 nonrecursive, so we skip that. If you can't afford *that* recursion, your corruption problems are more serious than your stack size problems. Reported-by: Stefan Zager <szager@google.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Rast <trast@student.ethz.ch> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2013-03-25 19:07:39 +01:00
static int retry_bad_packed_offset(struct packed_git *p, off_t obj_offset)
{
int type;
struct revindex_entry *revidx;
const unsigned char *sha1;
revidx = find_pack_revindex(p, obj_offset);
if (!revidx)
return OBJ_BAD;
sha1 = nth_packed_object_sha1(p, revidx->nr);
mark_bad_packed_object(p, sha1);
type = sha1_object_info(sha1, NULL);
if (type <= OBJ_NONE)
return OBJ_BAD;
return type;
}
#define POI_STACK_PREALLOC 64
static enum object_type packed_to_object_type(struct packed_git *p,
off_t obj_offset,
enum object_type type,
struct pack_window **w_curs,
off_t curpos)
{
sha1_file: remove recursion in packed_object_info packed_object_info() and packed_delta_info() were mutually recursive. The former would handle ordinary types and defer deltas to the latter; the latter would use the former to resolve the delta base. This arrangement, however, leads to trouble with threaded index-pack and long delta chains on platforms where thread stacks are small, as happened on OS X (512kB thread stacks by default) with the chromium repo. The task of the two functions is not all that hard to describe without any recursion, however. It proceeds in three steps: - determine the representation type and size, based on the outermost object (delta or not) - follow through the delta chain, if any - determine the object type from what is found at the end of the delta chain The only complication stems from the error recovery. If parsing fails at any step, we want to mark that object (within the pack) as bad and try getting the corresponding SHA1 from elsewhere. If that also fails, we want to repeat this process back up the delta chain until we find a reasonable solution or conclude that there is no way to reconstruct the object. (This is conveniently checked by t5303.) To achieve that within the pack, we keep track of the entire delta chain in a stack. When things go sour, we process that stack from the top, marking entries as bad and attempting to re-resolve by sha1. To avoid excessive malloc(), the stack starts out with a small stack-allocated array. The choice of 64 is based on the default of pack.depth, which is 50, in the hope that it covers "most" delta chains without any need for malloc(). It's much harder to make the actual re-resolving by sha1 nonrecursive, so we skip that. If you can't afford *that* recursion, your corruption problems are more serious than your stack size problems. Reported-by: Stefan Zager <szager@google.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Rast <trast@student.ethz.ch> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2013-03-25 19:07:39 +01:00
off_t small_poi_stack[POI_STACK_PREALLOC];
off_t *poi_stack = small_poi_stack;
int poi_stack_nr = 0, poi_stack_alloc = POI_STACK_PREALLOC;
sha1_file: remove recursion in packed_object_info packed_object_info() and packed_delta_info() were mutually recursive. The former would handle ordinary types and defer deltas to the latter; the latter would use the former to resolve the delta base. This arrangement, however, leads to trouble with threaded index-pack and long delta chains on platforms where thread stacks are small, as happened on OS X (512kB thread stacks by default) with the chromium repo. The task of the two functions is not all that hard to describe without any recursion, however. It proceeds in three steps: - determine the representation type and size, based on the outermost object (delta or not) - follow through the delta chain, if any - determine the object type from what is found at the end of the delta chain The only complication stems from the error recovery. If parsing fails at any step, we want to mark that object (within the pack) as bad and try getting the corresponding SHA1 from elsewhere. If that also fails, we want to repeat this process back up the delta chain until we find a reasonable solution or conclude that there is no way to reconstruct the object. (This is conveniently checked by t5303.) To achieve that within the pack, we keep track of the entire delta chain in a stack. When things go sour, we process that stack from the top, marking entries as bad and attempting to re-resolve by sha1. To avoid excessive malloc(), the stack starts out with a small stack-allocated array. The choice of 64 is based on the default of pack.depth, which is 50, in the hope that it covers "most" delta chains without any need for malloc(). It's much harder to make the actual re-resolving by sha1 nonrecursive, so we skip that. If you can't afford *that* recursion, your corruption problems are more serious than your stack size problems. Reported-by: Stefan Zager <szager@google.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Rast <trast@student.ethz.ch> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2013-03-25 19:07:39 +01:00
while (type == OBJ_OFS_DELTA || type == OBJ_REF_DELTA) {
off_t base_offset;
unsigned long size;
sha1_file: remove recursion in packed_object_info packed_object_info() and packed_delta_info() were mutually recursive. The former would handle ordinary types and defer deltas to the latter; the latter would use the former to resolve the delta base. This arrangement, however, leads to trouble with threaded index-pack and long delta chains on platforms where thread stacks are small, as happened on OS X (512kB thread stacks by default) with the chromium repo. The task of the two functions is not all that hard to describe without any recursion, however. It proceeds in three steps: - determine the representation type and size, based on the outermost object (delta or not) - follow through the delta chain, if any - determine the object type from what is found at the end of the delta chain The only complication stems from the error recovery. If parsing fails at any step, we want to mark that object (within the pack) as bad and try getting the corresponding SHA1 from elsewhere. If that also fails, we want to repeat this process back up the delta chain until we find a reasonable solution or conclude that there is no way to reconstruct the object. (This is conveniently checked by t5303.) To achieve that within the pack, we keep track of the entire delta chain in a stack. When things go sour, we process that stack from the top, marking entries as bad and attempting to re-resolve by sha1. To avoid excessive malloc(), the stack starts out with a small stack-allocated array. The choice of 64 is based on the default of pack.depth, which is 50, in the hope that it covers "most" delta chains without any need for malloc(). It's much harder to make the actual re-resolving by sha1 nonrecursive, so we skip that. If you can't afford *that* recursion, your corruption problems are more serious than your stack size problems. Reported-by: Stefan Zager <szager@google.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Rast <trast@student.ethz.ch> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2013-03-25 19:07:39 +01:00
/* Push the object we're going to leave behind */
if (poi_stack_nr >= poi_stack_alloc && poi_stack == small_poi_stack) {
poi_stack_alloc = alloc_nr(poi_stack_nr);
ALLOC_ARRAY(poi_stack, poi_stack_alloc);
sha1_file: remove recursion in packed_object_info packed_object_info() and packed_delta_info() were mutually recursive. The former would handle ordinary types and defer deltas to the latter; the latter would use the former to resolve the delta base. This arrangement, however, leads to trouble with threaded index-pack and long delta chains on platforms where thread stacks are small, as happened on OS X (512kB thread stacks by default) with the chromium repo. The task of the two functions is not all that hard to describe without any recursion, however. It proceeds in three steps: - determine the representation type and size, based on the outermost object (delta or not) - follow through the delta chain, if any - determine the object type from what is found at the end of the delta chain The only complication stems from the error recovery. If parsing fails at any step, we want to mark that object (within the pack) as bad and try getting the corresponding SHA1 from elsewhere. If that also fails, we want to repeat this process back up the delta chain until we find a reasonable solution or conclude that there is no way to reconstruct the object. (This is conveniently checked by t5303.) To achieve that within the pack, we keep track of the entire delta chain in a stack. When things go sour, we process that stack from the top, marking entries as bad and attempting to re-resolve by sha1. To avoid excessive malloc(), the stack starts out with a small stack-allocated array. The choice of 64 is based on the default of pack.depth, which is 50, in the hope that it covers "most" delta chains without any need for malloc(). It's much harder to make the actual re-resolving by sha1 nonrecursive, so we skip that. If you can't afford *that* recursion, your corruption problems are more serious than your stack size problems. Reported-by: Stefan Zager <szager@google.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Rast <trast@student.ethz.ch> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2013-03-25 19:07:39 +01:00
memcpy(poi_stack, small_poi_stack, sizeof(off_t)*poi_stack_nr);
} else {
ALLOC_GROW(poi_stack, poi_stack_nr+1, poi_stack_alloc);
}
poi_stack[poi_stack_nr++] = obj_offset;
/* If parsing the base offset fails, just unwind */
base_offset = get_delta_base(p, w_curs, &curpos, type, obj_offset);
sha1_file: remove recursion in packed_object_info packed_object_info() and packed_delta_info() were mutually recursive. The former would handle ordinary types and defer deltas to the latter; the latter would use the former to resolve the delta base. This arrangement, however, leads to trouble with threaded index-pack and long delta chains on platforms where thread stacks are small, as happened on OS X (512kB thread stacks by default) with the chromium repo. The task of the two functions is not all that hard to describe without any recursion, however. It proceeds in three steps: - determine the representation type and size, based on the outermost object (delta or not) - follow through the delta chain, if any - determine the object type from what is found at the end of the delta chain The only complication stems from the error recovery. If parsing fails at any step, we want to mark that object (within the pack) as bad and try getting the corresponding SHA1 from elsewhere. If that also fails, we want to repeat this process back up the delta chain until we find a reasonable solution or conclude that there is no way to reconstruct the object. (This is conveniently checked by t5303.) To achieve that within the pack, we keep track of the entire delta chain in a stack. When things go sour, we process that stack from the top, marking entries as bad and attempting to re-resolve by sha1. To avoid excessive malloc(), the stack starts out with a small stack-allocated array. The choice of 64 is based on the default of pack.depth, which is 50, in the hope that it covers "most" delta chains without any need for malloc(). It's much harder to make the actual re-resolving by sha1 nonrecursive, so we skip that. If you can't afford *that* recursion, your corruption problems are more serious than your stack size problems. Reported-by: Stefan Zager <szager@google.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Rast <trast@student.ethz.ch> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2013-03-25 19:07:39 +01:00
if (!base_offset)
goto unwind;
curpos = obj_offset = base_offset;
type = unpack_object_header(p, w_curs, &curpos, &size);
sha1_file: remove recursion in packed_object_info packed_object_info() and packed_delta_info() were mutually recursive. The former would handle ordinary types and defer deltas to the latter; the latter would use the former to resolve the delta base. This arrangement, however, leads to trouble with threaded index-pack and long delta chains on platforms where thread stacks are small, as happened on OS X (512kB thread stacks by default) with the chromium repo. The task of the two functions is not all that hard to describe without any recursion, however. It proceeds in three steps: - determine the representation type and size, based on the outermost object (delta or not) - follow through the delta chain, if any - determine the object type from what is found at the end of the delta chain The only complication stems from the error recovery. If parsing fails at any step, we want to mark that object (within the pack) as bad and try getting the corresponding SHA1 from elsewhere. If that also fails, we want to repeat this process back up the delta chain until we find a reasonable solution or conclude that there is no way to reconstruct the object. (This is conveniently checked by t5303.) To achieve that within the pack, we keep track of the entire delta chain in a stack. When things go sour, we process that stack from the top, marking entries as bad and attempting to re-resolve by sha1. To avoid excessive malloc(), the stack starts out with a small stack-allocated array. The choice of 64 is based on the default of pack.depth, which is 50, in the hope that it covers "most" delta chains without any need for malloc(). It's much harder to make the actual re-resolving by sha1 nonrecursive, so we skip that. If you can't afford *that* recursion, your corruption problems are more serious than your stack size problems. Reported-by: Stefan Zager <szager@google.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Rast <trast@student.ethz.ch> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2013-03-25 19:07:39 +01:00
if (type <= OBJ_NONE) {
/* If getting the base itself fails, we first
* retry the base, otherwise unwind */
type = retry_bad_packed_offset(p, base_offset);
if (type > OBJ_NONE)
goto out;
goto unwind;
}
}
switch (type) {
sha1_file: remove recursion in packed_object_info packed_object_info() and packed_delta_info() were mutually recursive. The former would handle ordinary types and defer deltas to the latter; the latter would use the former to resolve the delta base. This arrangement, however, leads to trouble with threaded index-pack and long delta chains on platforms where thread stacks are small, as happened on OS X (512kB thread stacks by default) with the chromium repo. The task of the two functions is not all that hard to describe without any recursion, however. It proceeds in three steps: - determine the representation type and size, based on the outermost object (delta or not) - follow through the delta chain, if any - determine the object type from what is found at the end of the delta chain The only complication stems from the error recovery. If parsing fails at any step, we want to mark that object (within the pack) as bad and try getting the corresponding SHA1 from elsewhere. If that also fails, we want to repeat this process back up the delta chain until we find a reasonable solution or conclude that there is no way to reconstruct the object. (This is conveniently checked by t5303.) To achieve that within the pack, we keep track of the entire delta chain in a stack. When things go sour, we process that stack from the top, marking entries as bad and attempting to re-resolve by sha1. To avoid excessive malloc(), the stack starts out with a small stack-allocated array. The choice of 64 is based on the default of pack.depth, which is 50, in the hope that it covers "most" delta chains without any need for malloc(). It's much harder to make the actual re-resolving by sha1 nonrecursive, so we skip that. If you can't afford *that* recursion, your corruption problems are more serious than your stack size problems. Reported-by: Stefan Zager <szager@google.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Rast <trast@student.ethz.ch> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2013-03-25 19:07:39 +01:00
case OBJ_BAD:
case OBJ_COMMIT:
case OBJ_TREE:
case OBJ_BLOB:
case OBJ_TAG:
break;
default:
error("unknown object type %i at offset %"PRIuMAX" in %s",
type, (uintmax_t)obj_offset, p->pack_name);
type = OBJ_BAD;
}
sha1_file: remove recursion in packed_object_info packed_object_info() and packed_delta_info() were mutually recursive. The former would handle ordinary types and defer deltas to the latter; the latter would use the former to resolve the delta base. This arrangement, however, leads to trouble with threaded index-pack and long delta chains on platforms where thread stacks are small, as happened on OS X (512kB thread stacks by default) with the chromium repo. The task of the two functions is not all that hard to describe without any recursion, however. It proceeds in three steps: - determine the representation type and size, based on the outermost object (delta or not) - follow through the delta chain, if any - determine the object type from what is found at the end of the delta chain The only complication stems from the error recovery. If parsing fails at any step, we want to mark that object (within the pack) as bad and try getting the corresponding SHA1 from elsewhere. If that also fails, we want to repeat this process back up the delta chain until we find a reasonable solution or conclude that there is no way to reconstruct the object. (This is conveniently checked by t5303.) To achieve that within the pack, we keep track of the entire delta chain in a stack. When things go sour, we process that stack from the top, marking entries as bad and attempting to re-resolve by sha1. To avoid excessive malloc(), the stack starts out with a small stack-allocated array. The choice of 64 is based on the default of pack.depth, which is 50, in the hope that it covers "most" delta chains without any need for malloc(). It's much harder to make the actual re-resolving by sha1 nonrecursive, so we skip that. If you can't afford *that* recursion, your corruption problems are more serious than your stack size problems. Reported-by: Stefan Zager <szager@google.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Rast <trast@student.ethz.ch> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2013-03-25 19:07:39 +01:00
out:
if (poi_stack != small_poi_stack)
free(poi_stack);
return type;
sha1_file: remove recursion in packed_object_info packed_object_info() and packed_delta_info() were mutually recursive. The former would handle ordinary types and defer deltas to the latter; the latter would use the former to resolve the delta base. This arrangement, however, leads to trouble with threaded index-pack and long delta chains on platforms where thread stacks are small, as happened on OS X (512kB thread stacks by default) with the chromium repo. The task of the two functions is not all that hard to describe without any recursion, however. It proceeds in three steps: - determine the representation type and size, based on the outermost object (delta or not) - follow through the delta chain, if any - determine the object type from what is found at the end of the delta chain The only complication stems from the error recovery. If parsing fails at any step, we want to mark that object (within the pack) as bad and try getting the corresponding SHA1 from elsewhere. If that also fails, we want to repeat this process back up the delta chain until we find a reasonable solution or conclude that there is no way to reconstruct the object. (This is conveniently checked by t5303.) To achieve that within the pack, we keep track of the entire delta chain in a stack. When things go sour, we process that stack from the top, marking entries as bad and attempting to re-resolve by sha1. To avoid excessive malloc(), the stack starts out with a small stack-allocated array. The choice of 64 is based on the default of pack.depth, which is 50, in the hope that it covers "most" delta chains without any need for malloc(). It's much harder to make the actual re-resolving by sha1 nonrecursive, so we skip that. If you can't afford *that* recursion, your corruption problems are more serious than your stack size problems. Reported-by: Stefan Zager <szager@google.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Rast <trast@student.ethz.ch> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2013-03-25 19:07:39 +01:00
unwind:
while (poi_stack_nr) {
obj_offset = poi_stack[--poi_stack_nr];
type = retry_bad_packed_offset(p, obj_offset);
if (type > OBJ_NONE)
goto out;
}
type = OBJ_BAD;
goto out;
}
static int packed_object_info(struct packed_git *p, off_t obj_offset,
struct object_info *oi)
{
struct pack_window *w_curs = NULL;
unsigned long size;
off_t curpos = obj_offset;
enum object_type type;
/*
* We always get the representation type, but only convert it to
* a "real" type later if the caller is interested.
*/
type = unpack_object_header(p, &w_curs, &curpos, &size);
if (oi->sizep) {
if (type == OBJ_OFS_DELTA || type == OBJ_REF_DELTA) {
off_t tmp_pos = curpos;
off_t base_offset = get_delta_base(p, &w_curs, &tmp_pos,
type, obj_offset);
if (!base_offset) {
type = OBJ_BAD;
goto out;
}
*oi->sizep = get_size_from_delta(p, &w_curs, tmp_pos);
if (*oi->sizep == 0) {
type = OBJ_BAD;
goto out;
}
} else {
*oi->sizep = size;
}
}
if (oi->disk_sizep) {
struct revindex_entry *revidx = find_pack_revindex(p, obj_offset);
*oi->disk_sizep = revidx[1].offset - obj_offset;
}
if (oi->typep) {
*oi->typep = packed_to_object_type(p, obj_offset, type, &w_curs, curpos);
if (*oi->typep < 0) {
type = OBJ_BAD;
goto out;
}
}
if (oi->delta_base_sha1) {
if (type == OBJ_OFS_DELTA || type == OBJ_REF_DELTA) {
const unsigned char *base;
base = get_delta_base_sha1(p, &w_curs, curpos,
type, obj_offset);
if (!base) {
type = OBJ_BAD;
goto out;
}
hashcpy(oi->delta_base_sha1, base);
} else
hashclr(oi->delta_base_sha1);
}
out:
unuse_pack(&w_curs);
return type;
}
static void *unpack_compressed_entry(struct packed_git *p,
Replace use_packed_git with window cursors. Part of the implementation concept of the sliding mmap window for pack access is to permit multiple windows per pack to be mapped independently. Since the inuse_cnt is associated with the mmap and not with the file, this value is in struct pack_window and needs to be incremented/decremented for each pack_window accessed by any code. To faciliate that implementation we need to replace all uses of use_packed_git() and unuse_packed_git() with a different API that follows struct pack_window objects rather than struct packed_git. The way this works is when we need to start accessing a pack for the first time we should setup a new window 'cursor' by declaring a local and setting it to NULL: struct pack_windows *w_curs = NULL; To obtain the memory region which contains a specific section of the pack file we invoke use_pack(), supplying the address of our current window cursor: unsigned int len; unsigned char *addr = use_pack(p, &w_curs, offset, &len); the returned address `addr` will be the first byte at `offset` within the pack file. The optional variable len will also be updated with the number of bytes remaining following the address. Multiple calls to use_pack() with the same window cursor will update the window cursor, moving it from one window to another when necessary. In this way each window cursor variable maintains only one struct pack_window inuse at a time. Finally before exiting the scope which originally declared the window cursor we must invoke unuse_pack() to unuse the current window (which may be different from the one that was first obtained from use_pack): unuse_pack(&w_curs); This implementation is still not complete with regards to multiple windows, as only one window per pack file is supported right now. Signed-off-by: Shawn O. Pearce <spearce@spearce.org> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
2006-12-23 08:34:08 +01:00
struct pack_window **w_curs,
off_t curpos,
unsigned long size)
{
int st;
2011-06-10 20:52:15 +02:00
git_zstream stream;
unsigned char *buffer, *in;
buffer = xmallocz_gently(size);
if (!buffer)
return NULL;
memset(&stream, 0, sizeof(stream));
stream.next_out = buffer;
Fix incorrect error check while reading deflated pack data The loop in get_size_from_delta() feeds a deflated delta data from the pack stream _until_ we get inflated result of 20 bytes[*] or we reach the end of stream. Side note. This magic number 20 does not have anything to do with the size of the hash we use, but comes from 1a3b55c (reduce delta head inflated size, 2006-10-18). The loop reads like this: do { in = use_pack(); stream.next_in = in; st = git_inflate(&stream, Z_FINISH); curpos += stream.next_in - in; } while ((st == Z_OK || st == Z_BUF_ERROR) && stream.total_out < sizeof(delta_head)); This git_inflate() can return: - Z_STREAM_END, if use_pack() fed it enough input and the delta itself was smaller than 20 bytes; - Z_OK, when some progress has been made; - Z_BUF_ERROR, if no progress is possible, because we either ran out of input (due to corrupt pack), or we ran out of output before we saw the end of the stream. The fix b3118bd (sha1_file: Fix infinite loop when pack is corrupted, 2009-10-14) attempted was against a corruption that appears to be a valid stream that produces a result larger than the output buffer, but we are not even trying to read the stream to the end in this loop. If avail_out becomes zero, total_out will be the same as sizeof(delta_head) so the loop will terminate without the "fix". There is no fix from b3118bd needed for this loop, in other words. The loop in unpack_compressed_entry() is quite a different story. It feeds a deflated stream (either delta or base) and allows the stream to produce output up to what we expect but no more. do { in = use_pack(); stream.next_in = in; st = git_inflate(&stream, Z_FINISH); curpos += stream.next_in - in; } while (st == Z_OK || st == Z_BUF_ERROR) This _does_ risk falling into an endless interation, as we can exhaust avail_out if the length we expect is smaller than what the stream wants to produce (due to pack corruption). In such a case, avail_out will become zero and inflate() will return Z_BUF_ERROR, while avail_in may (or may not) be zero. But this is not a right fix: do { in = use_pack(); stream.next_in = in; st = git_inflate(&stream, Z_FINISH); + if (st == Z_BUF_ERROR && (stream.avail_in || !stream.avail_out) + break; /* wants more input??? */ curpos += stream.next_in - in; } while (st == Z_OK || st == Z_BUF_ERROR) as Z_BUF_ERROR from inflate() may be telling us that avail_in has also run out before reading the end of stream marker. In such a case, both avail_in and avail_out would be zero, and the loop should iterate to allow the end of stream marker to be seen by inflate from the input stream. The right fix for this loop is likely to be to increment the initial avail_out by one (we allocate one extra byte to terminate it with NUL anyway, so there is no risk to overrun the buffer), and break out if we see that avail_out has become zero, in order to detect that the stream wants to produce more than what we expect. After the loop, we have a check that exactly tests this condition: if ((st != Z_STREAM_END) || stream.total_out != size) { free(buffer); return NULL; } So here is a patch (without my previous botched attempts) to fix this issue. The first hunk reverts the corresponding hunk from b3118bd, and the second hunk is the same fix proposed earlier. Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2009-10-22 08:06:14 +02:00
stream.avail_out = size + 1;
git_inflate_init(&stream);
do {
in = use_pack(p, w_curs, curpos, &stream.avail_in);
stream.next_in = in;
st = git_inflate(&stream, Z_FINISH);
Fix incorrect error check while reading deflated pack data The loop in get_size_from_delta() feeds a deflated delta data from the pack stream _until_ we get inflated result of 20 bytes[*] or we reach the end of stream. Side note. This magic number 20 does not have anything to do with the size of the hash we use, but comes from 1a3b55c (reduce delta head inflated size, 2006-10-18). The loop reads like this: do { in = use_pack(); stream.next_in = in; st = git_inflate(&stream, Z_FINISH); curpos += stream.next_in - in; } while ((st == Z_OK || st == Z_BUF_ERROR) && stream.total_out < sizeof(delta_head)); This git_inflate() can return: - Z_STREAM_END, if use_pack() fed it enough input and the delta itself was smaller than 20 bytes; - Z_OK, when some progress has been made; - Z_BUF_ERROR, if no progress is possible, because we either ran out of input (due to corrupt pack), or we ran out of output before we saw the end of the stream. The fix b3118bd (sha1_file: Fix infinite loop when pack is corrupted, 2009-10-14) attempted was against a corruption that appears to be a valid stream that produces a result larger than the output buffer, but we are not even trying to read the stream to the end in this loop. If avail_out becomes zero, total_out will be the same as sizeof(delta_head) so the loop will terminate without the "fix". There is no fix from b3118bd needed for this loop, in other words. The loop in unpack_compressed_entry() is quite a different story. It feeds a deflated stream (either delta or base) and allows the stream to produce output up to what we expect but no more. do { in = use_pack(); stream.next_in = in; st = git_inflate(&stream, Z_FINISH); curpos += stream.next_in - in; } while (st == Z_OK || st == Z_BUF_ERROR) This _does_ risk falling into an endless interation, as we can exhaust avail_out if the length we expect is smaller than what the stream wants to produce (due to pack corruption). In such a case, avail_out will become zero and inflate() will return Z_BUF_ERROR, while avail_in may (or may not) be zero. But this is not a right fix: do { in = use_pack(); stream.next_in = in; st = git_inflate(&stream, Z_FINISH); + if (st == Z_BUF_ERROR && (stream.avail_in || !stream.avail_out) + break; /* wants more input??? */ curpos += stream.next_in - in; } while (st == Z_OK || st == Z_BUF_ERROR) as Z_BUF_ERROR from inflate() may be telling us that avail_in has also run out before reading the end of stream marker. In such a case, both avail_in and avail_out would be zero, and the loop should iterate to allow the end of stream marker to be seen by inflate from the input stream. The right fix for this loop is likely to be to increment the initial avail_out by one (we allocate one extra byte to terminate it with NUL anyway, so there is no risk to overrun the buffer), and break out if we see that avail_out has become zero, in order to detect that the stream wants to produce more than what we expect. After the loop, we have a check that exactly tests this condition: if ((st != Z_STREAM_END) || stream.total_out != size) { free(buffer); return NULL; } So here is a patch (without my previous botched attempts) to fix this issue. The first hunk reverts the corresponding hunk from b3118bd, and the second hunk is the same fix proposed earlier. Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2009-10-22 08:06:14 +02:00
if (!stream.avail_out)
break; /* the payload is larger than it should be */
curpos += stream.next_in - in;
} while (st == Z_OK || st == Z_BUF_ERROR);
git_inflate_end(&stream);
if ((st != Z_STREAM_END) || stream.total_out != size) {
free(buffer);
return NULL;
}
return buffer;
}
#define MAX_DELTA_CACHE (256)
static size_t delta_base_cached;
static struct delta_base_cache_lru_list {
struct delta_base_cache_lru_list *prev;
struct delta_base_cache_lru_list *next;
} delta_base_cache_lru = { &delta_base_cache_lru, &delta_base_cache_lru };
static struct delta_base_cache_entry {
struct delta_base_cache_lru_list lru;
void *data;
struct packed_git *p;
off_t base_offset;
unsigned long size;
enum object_type type;
} delta_base_cache[MAX_DELTA_CACHE];
static unsigned long pack_entry_hash(struct packed_git *p, off_t base_offset)
{
unsigned long hash;
hash = (unsigned long)(intptr_t)p + (unsigned long)base_offset;
hash += (hash >> 8) + (hash >> 16);
return hash % MAX_DELTA_CACHE;
}
static struct delta_base_cache_entry *
get_delta_base_cache_entry(struct packed_git *p, off_t base_offset)
{
unsigned long hash = pack_entry_hash(p, base_offset);
return delta_base_cache + hash;
}
static int eq_delta_base_cache_entry(struct delta_base_cache_entry *ent,
struct packed_git *p, off_t base_offset)
{
return (ent->data && ent->p == p && ent->base_offset == base_offset);
}
static int in_delta_base_cache(struct packed_git *p, off_t base_offset)
{
struct delta_base_cache_entry *ent;
ent = get_delta_base_cache_entry(p, base_offset);
return eq_delta_base_cache_entry(ent, p, base_offset);
}
static void clear_delta_base_cache_entry(struct delta_base_cache_entry *ent)
{
ent->data = NULL;
ent->lru.next->prev = ent->lru.prev;
ent->lru.prev->next = ent->lru.next;
delta_base_cached -= ent->size;
}
static void *cache_or_unpack_entry(struct packed_git *p, off_t base_offset,
unsigned long *base_size, enum object_type *type, int keep_cache)
{
struct delta_base_cache_entry *ent;
void *ret;
ent = get_delta_base_cache_entry(p, base_offset);
if (!eq_delta_base_cache_entry(ent, p, base_offset))
return unpack_entry(p, base_offset, type, base_size);
ret = ent->data;
if (!keep_cache)
clear_delta_base_cache_entry(ent);
else
ret = xmemdupz(ent->data, ent->size);
*type = ent->type;
*base_size = ent->size;
return ret;
}
static inline void release_delta_base_cache(struct delta_base_cache_entry *ent)
{
if (ent->data) {
free(ent->data);
ent->data = NULL;
ent->lru.next->prev = ent->lru.prev;
ent->lru.prev->next = ent->lru.next;
delta_base_cached -= ent->size;
}
}
void clear_delta_base_cache(void)
{
unsigned long p;
for (p = 0; p < MAX_DELTA_CACHE; p++)
release_delta_base_cache(&delta_base_cache[p]);
}
static void add_delta_base_cache(struct packed_git *p, off_t base_offset,
void *base, unsigned long base_size, enum object_type type)
{
unsigned long hash = pack_entry_hash(p, base_offset);
struct delta_base_cache_entry *ent = delta_base_cache + hash;
struct delta_base_cache_lru_list *lru;
release_delta_base_cache(ent);
delta_base_cached += base_size;
for (lru = delta_base_cache_lru.next;
delta_base_cached > delta_base_cache_limit
&& lru != &delta_base_cache_lru;
lru = lru->next) {
struct delta_base_cache_entry *f = (void *)lru;
if (f->type == OBJ_BLOB)
release_delta_base_cache(f);
}
for (lru = delta_base_cache_lru.next;
delta_base_cached > delta_base_cache_limit
&& lru != &delta_base_cache_lru;
lru = lru->next) {
struct delta_base_cache_entry *f = (void *)lru;
release_delta_base_cache(f);
}
ent->p = p;
ent->base_offset = base_offset;
ent->type = type;
ent->data = base;
ent->size = base_size;
ent->lru.next = &delta_base_cache_lru;
ent->lru.prev = delta_base_cache_lru.prev;
delta_base_cache_lru.prev->next = &ent->lru;
delta_base_cache_lru.prev = &ent->lru;
}
static void *read_object(const unsigned char *sha1, enum object_type *type,
unsigned long *size);
static void write_pack_access_log(struct packed_git *p, off_t obj_offset)
{
static struct trace_key pack_access = TRACE_KEY_INIT(PACK_ACCESS);
trace_printf_key(&pack_access, "%s %"PRIuMAX"\n",
p->pack_name, (uintmax_t)obj_offset);
}
close another possibility for propagating pack corruption Abstract -------- With index v2 we have a per object CRC to allow quick and safe reuse of pack data when repacking. This, however, doesn't currently prevent a stealth corruption from being propagated into a new pack when _not_ reusing pack data as demonstrated by the modification to t5302 included here. The Context ----------- The Git database is all checksummed with SHA1 hashes. Any kind of corruption can be confirmed by verifying this per object hash against corresponding data. However this can be costly to perform systematically and therefore this check is often not performed at run time when accessing the object database. First, the loose object format is entirely compressed with zlib which already provide a CRC verification of its own when inflating data. Any disk corruption would be caught already in this case. Then, packed objects are also compressed with zlib but only for their actual payload. The object headers and delta base references are not deflated for obvious performance reasons, however this leave them vulnerable to potentially undetected disk corruptions. Object types are often validated against the expected type when they're requested, and deflated size must always match the size recorded in the object header, so those cases are pretty much covered as well. Where corruptions could go unnoticed is in the delta base reference. Of course, in the OBJ_REF_DELTA case, the odds for a SHA1 reference to get corrupted so it actually matches the SHA1 of another object with the same size (the delta header stores the expected size of the base object to apply against) are virtually zero. In the OBJ_OFS_DELTA case, the reference is a pack offset which would have to match the start boundary of a different base object but still with the same size, and although this is relatively much more "probable" than in the OBJ_REF_DELTA case, the probability is also about zero in absolute terms. Still, the possibility exists as demonstrated in t5302 and is certainly greater than a SHA1 collision, especially in the OBJ_OFS_DELTA case which is now the default when repacking. Again, repacking by reusing existing pack data is OK since the per object CRC provided by index v2 guards against any such corruptions. What t5302 failed to test is a full repack in such case. The Solution ------------ As unlikely as this kind of stealth corruption can be in practice, it certainly isn't acceptable to propagate it into a freshly created pack. But, because this is so unlikely, we don't want to pay the run time cost associated with extra validation checks all the time either. Furthermore, consequences of such corruption in anything but repacking should be rather visible, and even if it could be quite unpleasant, it still has far less severe consequences than actively creating bad packs. So the best compromize is to check packed object CRC when unpacking objects, and only during the compression/writing phase of a repack, and only when not streaming the result. The cost of this is minimal (less than 1% CPU time), and visible only with a full repack. Someone with a stats background could provide an objective evaluation of this, but I suspect that it's bad RAM that has more potential for data corruptions at this point, even in those cases where this extra check is not performed. Still, it is best to prevent a known hole for corruption when recreating object data into a new pack. What about the streamed pack case? Well, any client receiving a pack must always consider that pack as untrusty and perform full validation anyway, hence no such stealth corruption could be propagated to remote repositoryes already. It is therefore worthless doing local validation in that case. Signed-off-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@cam.org> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2008-10-31 16:31:08 +01:00
int do_check_packed_object_crc;
#define UNPACK_ENTRY_STACK_PREALLOC 64
struct unpack_entry_stack_ent {
off_t obj_offset;
off_t curpos;
unsigned long size;
};
void *unpack_entry(struct packed_git *p, off_t obj_offset,
enum object_type *final_type, unsigned long *final_size)
{
Replace use_packed_git with window cursors. Part of the implementation concept of the sliding mmap window for pack access is to permit multiple windows per pack to be mapped independently. Since the inuse_cnt is associated with the mmap and not with the file, this value is in struct pack_window and needs to be incremented/decremented for each pack_window accessed by any code. To faciliate that implementation we need to replace all uses of use_packed_git() and unuse_packed_git() with a different API that follows struct pack_window objects rather than struct packed_git. The way this works is when we need to start accessing a pack for the first time we should setup a new window 'cursor' by declaring a local and setting it to NULL: struct pack_windows *w_curs = NULL; To obtain the memory region which contains a specific section of the pack file we invoke use_pack(), supplying the address of our current window cursor: unsigned int len; unsigned char *addr = use_pack(p, &w_curs, offset, &len); the returned address `addr` will be the first byte at `offset` within the pack file. The optional variable len will also be updated with the number of bytes remaining following the address. Multiple calls to use_pack() with the same window cursor will update the window cursor, moving it from one window to another when necessary. In this way each window cursor variable maintains only one struct pack_window inuse at a time. Finally before exiting the scope which originally declared the window cursor we must invoke unuse_pack() to unuse the current window (which may be different from the one that was first obtained from use_pack): unuse_pack(&w_curs); This implementation is still not complete with regards to multiple windows, as only one window per pack file is supported right now. Signed-off-by: Shawn O. Pearce <spearce@spearce.org> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
2006-12-23 08:34:08 +01:00
struct pack_window *w_curs = NULL;
off_t curpos = obj_offset;
void *data = NULL;
unsigned long size;
enum object_type type;
struct unpack_entry_stack_ent small_delta_stack[UNPACK_ENTRY_STACK_PREALLOC];
struct unpack_entry_stack_ent *delta_stack = small_delta_stack;
int delta_stack_nr = 0, delta_stack_alloc = UNPACK_ENTRY_STACK_PREALLOC;
int base_from_cache = 0;
write_pack_access_log(p, obj_offset);
/* PHASE 1: drill down to the innermost base object */
for (;;) {
off_t base_offset;
int i;
struct delta_base_cache_entry *ent;
ent = get_delta_base_cache_entry(p, curpos);
if (eq_delta_base_cache_entry(ent, p, curpos)) {
type = ent->type;
data = ent->data;
size = ent->size;
clear_delta_base_cache_entry(ent);
base_from_cache = 1;
break;
}
if (do_check_packed_object_crc && p->index_version > 1) {
struct revindex_entry *revidx = find_pack_revindex(p, obj_offset);
unsigned long len = revidx[1].offset - obj_offset;
if (check_pack_crc(p, &w_curs, obj_offset, len, revidx->nr)) {
const unsigned char *sha1 =
nth_packed_object_sha1(p, revidx->nr);
error("bad packed object CRC for %s",
sha1_to_hex(sha1));
mark_bad_packed_object(p, sha1);
unuse_pack(&w_curs);
return NULL;
}
}
type = unpack_object_header(p, &w_curs, &curpos, &size);
if (type != OBJ_OFS_DELTA && type != OBJ_REF_DELTA)
break;
base_offset = get_delta_base(p, &w_curs, &curpos, type, obj_offset);
if (!base_offset) {
error("failed to validate delta base reference "
"at offset %"PRIuMAX" from %s",
(uintmax_t)curpos, p->pack_name);
/* bail to phase 2, in hopes of recovery */
data = NULL;
break;
}
/* push object, proceed to base */
if (delta_stack_nr >= delta_stack_alloc
&& delta_stack == small_delta_stack) {
delta_stack_alloc = alloc_nr(delta_stack_nr);
ALLOC_ARRAY(delta_stack, delta_stack_alloc);
memcpy(delta_stack, small_delta_stack,
sizeof(*delta_stack)*delta_stack_nr);
} else {
ALLOC_GROW(delta_stack, delta_stack_nr+1, delta_stack_alloc);
}
i = delta_stack_nr++;
delta_stack[i].obj_offset = obj_offset;
delta_stack[i].curpos = curpos;
delta_stack[i].size = size;
curpos = obj_offset = base_offset;
close another possibility for propagating pack corruption Abstract -------- With index v2 we have a per object CRC to allow quick and safe reuse of pack data when repacking. This, however, doesn't currently prevent a stealth corruption from being propagated into a new pack when _not_ reusing pack data as demonstrated by the modification to t5302 included here. The Context ----------- The Git database is all checksummed with SHA1 hashes. Any kind of corruption can be confirmed by verifying this per object hash against corresponding data. However this can be costly to perform systematically and therefore this check is often not performed at run time when accessing the object database. First, the loose object format is entirely compressed with zlib which already provide a CRC verification of its own when inflating data. Any disk corruption would be caught already in this case. Then, packed objects are also compressed with zlib but only for their actual payload. The object headers and delta base references are not deflated for obvious performance reasons, however this leave them vulnerable to potentially undetected disk corruptions. Object types are often validated against the expected type when they're requested, and deflated size must always match the size recorded in the object header, so those cases are pretty much covered as well. Where corruptions could go unnoticed is in the delta base reference. Of course, in the OBJ_REF_DELTA case, the odds for a SHA1 reference to get corrupted so it actually matches the SHA1 of another object with the same size (the delta header stores the expected size of the base object to apply against) are virtually zero. In the OBJ_OFS_DELTA case, the reference is a pack offset which would have to match the start boundary of a different base object but still with the same size, and although this is relatively much more "probable" than in the OBJ_REF_DELTA case, the probability is also about zero in absolute terms. Still, the possibility exists as demonstrated in t5302 and is certainly greater than a SHA1 collision, especially in the OBJ_OFS_DELTA case which is now the default when repacking. Again, repacking by reusing existing pack data is OK since the per object CRC provided by index v2 guards against any such corruptions. What t5302 failed to test is a full repack in such case. The Solution ------------ As unlikely as this kind of stealth corruption can be in practice, it certainly isn't acceptable to propagate it into a freshly created pack. But, because this is so unlikely, we don't want to pay the run time cost associated with extra validation checks all the time either. Furthermore, consequences of such corruption in anything but repacking should be rather visible, and even if it could be quite unpleasant, it still has far less severe consequences than actively creating bad packs. So the best compromize is to check packed object CRC when unpacking objects, and only during the compression/writing phase of a repack, and only when not streaming the result. The cost of this is minimal (less than 1% CPU time), and visible only with a full repack. Someone with a stats background could provide an objective evaluation of this, but I suspect that it's bad RAM that has more potential for data corruptions at this point, even in those cases where this extra check is not performed. Still, it is best to prevent a known hole for corruption when recreating object data into a new pack. What about the streamed pack case? Well, any client receiving a pack must always consider that pack as untrusty and perform full validation anyway, hence no such stealth corruption could be propagated to remote repositoryes already. It is therefore worthless doing local validation in that case. Signed-off-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@cam.org> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2008-10-31 16:31:08 +01:00
}
/* PHASE 2: handle the base */
switch (type) {
case OBJ_OFS_DELTA:
case OBJ_REF_DELTA:
if (data)
die("BUG in unpack_entry: left loop at a valid delta");
break;
case OBJ_COMMIT:
case OBJ_TREE:
case OBJ_BLOB:
case OBJ_TAG:
if (!base_from_cache)
data = unpack_compressed_entry(p, &w_curs, curpos, size);
break;
default:
data = NULL;
error("unknown object type %i at offset %"PRIuMAX" in %s",
type, (uintmax_t)obj_offset, p->pack_name);
}
/* PHASE 3: apply deltas in order */
/* invariants:
* 'data' holds the base data, or NULL if there was corruption
*/
while (delta_stack_nr) {
void *delta_data;
void *base = data;
unsigned long delta_size, base_size = size;
int i;
data = NULL;
if (base)
add_delta_base_cache(p, obj_offset, base, base_size, type);
if (!base) {
/*
* We're probably in deep shit, but let's try to fetch
* the required base anyway from another pack or loose.
* This is costly but should happen only in the presence
* of a corrupted pack, and is better than failing outright.
*/
struct revindex_entry *revidx;
const unsigned char *base_sha1;
revidx = find_pack_revindex(p, obj_offset);
if (revidx) {
base_sha1 = nth_packed_object_sha1(p, revidx->nr);
error("failed to read delta base object %s"
" at offset %"PRIuMAX" from %s",
sha1_to_hex(base_sha1), (uintmax_t)obj_offset,
p->pack_name);
mark_bad_packed_object(p, base_sha1);
base = read_object(base_sha1, &type, &base_size);
}
}
i = --delta_stack_nr;
obj_offset = delta_stack[i].obj_offset;
curpos = delta_stack[i].curpos;
delta_size = delta_stack[i].size;
if (!base)
continue;
delta_data = unpack_compressed_entry(p, &w_curs, curpos, delta_size);
if (!delta_data) {
error("failed to unpack compressed delta "
"at offset %"PRIuMAX" from %s",
(uintmax_t)curpos, p->pack_name);
data = NULL;
continue;
}
data = patch_delta(base, base_size,
delta_data, delta_size,
&size);
unpack_entry: do not die when we fail to apply a delta When we try to load an object from disk and fail, our general strategy is to see if we can get it from somewhere else (e.g., a loose object). That lets users fix corruption problems by copying known-good versions of objects into the object database. We already handle the case where we were not able to read the delta from disk. However, when we find that the delta we read does not apply, we simply die. This case is harder to trigger, as corruption in the delta data itself would trigger a crc error from zlib. However, a corruption that pointed us at the wrong delta base might cause it. We can do the same "fail and try to find the object elsewhere" trick instead of dying. This not only gives us a chance to recover, but also puts us on code paths that will alert the user to the problem (with the current message, they do not even know which sha1 caused the problem). Note that unlike some other pack corruptions, we do not recover automatically from this case when doing a repack. There is nothing apparently wrong with the delta, as it points to a valid, accessible object, and we realize the error only when the resulting size does not match up. And in theory, one could even have a case where the corrupted size is the same, and the problem would only be noticed by recomputing the sha1. We can get around this by recomputing the deltas with --no-reuse-delta, which our test does (and this is probably good advice for anyone recovering from pack corruption). Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2013-06-14 23:53:34 +02:00
/*
* We could not apply the delta; warn the user, but keep going.
* Our failure will be noticed either in the next iteration of
* the loop, or if this is the final delta, in the caller when
* we return NULL. Those code paths will take care of making
* a more explicit warning and retrying with another copy of
* the object.
*/
if (!data)
unpack_entry: do not die when we fail to apply a delta When we try to load an object from disk and fail, our general strategy is to see if we can get it from somewhere else (e.g., a loose object). That lets users fix corruption problems by copying known-good versions of objects into the object database. We already handle the case where we were not able to read the delta from disk. However, when we find that the delta we read does not apply, we simply die. This case is harder to trigger, as corruption in the delta data itself would trigger a crc error from zlib. However, a corruption that pointed us at the wrong delta base might cause it. We can do the same "fail and try to find the object elsewhere" trick instead of dying. This not only gives us a chance to recover, but also puts us on code paths that will alert the user to the problem (with the current message, they do not even know which sha1 caused the problem). Note that unlike some other pack corruptions, we do not recover automatically from this case when doing a repack. There is nothing apparently wrong with the delta, as it points to a valid, accessible object, and we realize the error only when the resulting size does not match up. And in theory, one could even have a case where the corrupted size is the same, and the problem would only be noticed by recomputing the sha1. We can get around this by recomputing the deltas with --no-reuse-delta, which our test does (and this is probably good advice for anyone recovering from pack corruption). Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2013-06-14 23:53:34 +02:00
error("failed to apply delta");
free(delta_data);
}
*final_type = type;
*final_size = size;
Replace use_packed_git with window cursors. Part of the implementation concept of the sliding mmap window for pack access is to permit multiple windows per pack to be mapped independently. Since the inuse_cnt is associated with the mmap and not with the file, this value is in struct pack_window and needs to be incremented/decremented for each pack_window accessed by any code. To faciliate that implementation we need to replace all uses of use_packed_git() and unuse_packed_git() with a different API that follows struct pack_window objects rather than struct packed_git. The way this works is when we need to start accessing a pack for the first time we should setup a new window 'cursor' by declaring a local and setting it to NULL: struct pack_windows *w_curs = NULL; To obtain the memory region which contains a specific section of the pack file we invoke use_pack(), supplying the address of our current window cursor: unsigned int len; unsigned char *addr = use_pack(p, &w_curs, offset, &len); the returned address `addr` will be the first byte at `offset` within the pack file. The optional variable len will also be updated with the number of bytes remaining following the address. Multiple calls to use_pack() with the same window cursor will update the window cursor, moving it from one window to another when necessary. In this way each window cursor variable maintains only one struct pack_window inuse at a time. Finally before exiting the scope which originally declared the window cursor we must invoke unuse_pack() to unuse the current window (which may be different from the one that was first obtained from use_pack): unuse_pack(&w_curs); This implementation is still not complete with regards to multiple windows, as only one window per pack file is supported right now. Signed-off-by: Shawn O. Pearce <spearce@spearce.org> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
2006-12-23 08:34:08 +01:00
unuse_pack(&w_curs);
if (delta_stack != small_delta_stack)
free(delta_stack);
return data;
}
const unsigned char *nth_packed_object_sha1(struct packed_git *p,
uint32_t n)
{
const unsigned char *index = p->index_data;
if (!index) {
if (open_pack_index(p))
return NULL;
index = p->index_data;
}
if (n >= p->num_objects)
return NULL;
index += 4 * 256;
if (p->index_version == 1) {
return index + 24 * n + 4;
} else {
index += 8;
return index + 20 * n;
}
}
void check_pack_index_ptr(const struct packed_git *p, const void *vptr)
{
const unsigned char *ptr = vptr;
const unsigned char *start = p->index_data;
const unsigned char *end = start + p->index_size;
if (ptr < start)
die(_("offset before start of pack index for %s (corrupt index?)"),
p->pack_name);
/* No need to check for underflow; .idx files must be at least 8 bytes */
if (ptr >= end - 8)
die(_("offset beyond end of pack index for %s (truncated index?)"),
p->pack_name);
}
off_t nth_packed_object_offset(const struct packed_git *p, uint32_t n)
{
const unsigned char *index = p->index_data;
index += 4 * 256;
if (p->index_version == 1) {
return ntohl(*((uint32_t *)(index + 24 * n)));
} else {
uint32_t off;
index += 8 + p->num_objects * (20 + 4);
off = ntohl(*((uint32_t *)(index + 4 * n)));
if (!(off & 0x80000000))
return off;
index += p->num_objects * 4 + (off & 0x7fffffff) * 8;
check_pack_index_ptr(p, index);
return (((uint64_t)ntohl(*((uint32_t *)(index + 0)))) << 32) |
ntohl(*((uint32_t *)(index + 4)));
}
}
off_t find_pack_entry_one(const unsigned char *sha1,
struct packed_git *p)
{
const uint32_t *level1_ofs = p->index_data;
const unsigned char *index = p->index_data;
sha1-lookup: more memory efficient search in sorted list of SHA-1 Currently, when looking for a packed object from the pack idx, a simple binary search is used. A conventional binary search loop looks like this: unsigned lo, hi; do { unsigned mi = (lo + hi) / 2; int cmp = "entry pointed at by mi" minus "target"; if (!cmp) return mi; "mi is the wanted one" if (cmp > 0) hi = mi; "mi is larger than target" else lo = mi+1; "mi is smaller than target" } while (lo < hi); "did not find what we wanted" The invariants are: - When entering the loop, 'lo' points at a slot that is never above the target (it could be at the target), 'hi' points at a slot that is guaranteed to be above the target (it can never be at the target). - We find a point 'mi' between 'lo' and 'hi' ('mi' could be the same as 'lo', but never can be as high as 'hi'), and check if 'mi' hits the target. There are three cases: - if it is a hit, we have found what we are looking for; - if it is strictly higher than the target, we set it to 'hi', and repeat the search. - if it is strictly lower than the target, we update 'lo' to one slot after it, because we allow 'lo' to be at the target and 'mi' is known to be below the target. If the loop exits, there is no matching entry. When choosing 'mi', we do not have to take the "middle" but anywhere in between 'lo' and 'hi', as long as lo <= mi < hi is satisfied. When we somehow know that the distance between the target and 'lo' is much shorter than the target and 'hi', we could pick 'mi' that is much closer to 'lo' than (hi+lo)/2, which a conventional binary search would pick. This patch takes advantage of the fact that the SHA-1 is a good hash function, and as long as there are enough entries in the table, we can expect uniform distribution. An entry that begins with for example "deadbeef..." is much likely to appear much later than in the midway of a reasonably populated table. In fact, it can be expected to be near 87% (222/256) from the top of the table. This is a work-in-progress and has switches to allow easier experiments and debugging. Exporting GIT_USE_LOOKUP environment variable enables this code. On my admittedly memory starved machine, with a partial KDE repository (3.0G pack with 95M idx): $ GIT_USE_LOOKUP=t git log -800 --stat HEAD >/dev/null 3.93user 0.16system 0:04.09elapsed 100%CPU (0avgtext+0avgdata 0maxresident)k 0inputs+0outputs (0major+55588minor)pagefaults 0swaps Without the patch, the numbers are: $ git log -800 --stat HEAD >/dev/null 4.00user 0.15system 0:04.17elapsed 99%CPU (0avgtext+0avgdata 0maxresident)k 0inputs+0outputs (0major+60258minor)pagefaults 0swaps In the same repository: $ GIT_USE_LOOKUP=t git log -2000 HEAD >/dev/null 0.12user 0.00system 0:00.12elapsed 97%CPU (0avgtext+0avgdata 0maxresident)k 0inputs+0outputs (0major+4241minor)pagefaults 0swaps Without the patch, the numbers are: $ git log -2000 HEAD >/dev/null 0.05user 0.01system 0:00.07elapsed 100%CPU (0avgtext+0avgdata 0maxresident)k 0inputs+0outputs (0major+8506minor)pagefaults 0swaps There isn't much time difference, but the number of minor faults seems to show that we are touching much smaller number of pages, which is expected. Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2007-12-29 11:05:47 +01:00
unsigned hi, lo, stride;
static int use_lookup = -1;
static int debug_lookup = -1;
if (debug_lookup < 0)
debug_lookup = !!getenv("GIT_DEBUG_LOOKUP");
if (!index) {
if (open_pack_index(p))
return 0;
level1_ofs = p->index_data;
index = p->index_data;
}
if (p->index_version > 1) {
level1_ofs += 2;
index += 8;
}
index += 4 * 256;
hi = ntohl(level1_ofs[*sha1]);
lo = ((*sha1 == 0x0) ? 0 : ntohl(level1_ofs[*sha1 - 1]));
sha1-lookup: more memory efficient search in sorted list of SHA-1 Currently, when looking for a packed object from the pack idx, a simple binary search is used. A conventional binary search loop looks like this: unsigned lo, hi; do { unsigned mi = (lo + hi) / 2; int cmp = "entry pointed at by mi" minus "target"; if (!cmp) return mi; "mi is the wanted one" if (cmp > 0) hi = mi; "mi is larger than target" else lo = mi+1; "mi is smaller than target" } while (lo < hi); "did not find what we wanted" The invariants are: - When entering the loop, 'lo' points at a slot that is never above the target (it could be at the target), 'hi' points at a slot that is guaranteed to be above the target (it can never be at the target). - We find a point 'mi' between 'lo' and 'hi' ('mi' could be the same as 'lo', but never can be as high as 'hi'), and check if 'mi' hits the target. There are three cases: - if it is a hit, we have found what we are looking for; - if it is strictly higher than the target, we set it to 'hi', and repeat the search. - if it is strictly lower than the target, we update 'lo' to one slot after it, because we allow 'lo' to be at the target and 'mi' is known to be below the target. If the loop exits, there is no matching entry. When choosing 'mi', we do not have to take the "middle" but anywhere in between 'lo' and 'hi', as long as lo <= mi < hi is satisfied. When we somehow know that the distance between the target and 'lo' is much shorter than the target and 'hi', we could pick 'mi' that is much closer to 'lo' than (hi+lo)/2, which a conventional binary search would pick. This patch takes advantage of the fact that the SHA-1 is a good hash function, and as long as there are enough entries in the table, we can expect uniform distribution. An entry that begins with for example "deadbeef..." is much likely to appear much later than in the midway of a reasonably populated table. In fact, it can be expected to be near 87% (222/256) from the top of the table. This is a work-in-progress and has switches to allow easier experiments and debugging. Exporting GIT_USE_LOOKUP environment variable enables this code. On my admittedly memory starved machine, with a partial KDE repository (3.0G pack with 95M idx): $ GIT_USE_LOOKUP=t git log -800 --stat HEAD >/dev/null 3.93user 0.16system 0:04.09elapsed 100%CPU (0avgtext+0avgdata 0maxresident)k 0inputs+0outputs (0major+55588minor)pagefaults 0swaps Without the patch, the numbers are: $ git log -800 --stat HEAD >/dev/null 4.00user 0.15system 0:04.17elapsed 99%CPU (0avgtext+0avgdata 0maxresident)k 0inputs+0outputs (0major+60258minor)pagefaults 0swaps In the same repository: $ GIT_USE_LOOKUP=t git log -2000 HEAD >/dev/null 0.12user 0.00system 0:00.12elapsed 97%CPU (0avgtext+0avgdata 0maxresident)k 0inputs+0outputs (0major+4241minor)pagefaults 0swaps Without the patch, the numbers are: $ git log -2000 HEAD >/dev/null 0.05user 0.01system 0:00.07elapsed 100%CPU (0avgtext+0avgdata 0maxresident)k 0inputs+0outputs (0major+8506minor)pagefaults 0swaps There isn't much time difference, but the number of minor faults seems to show that we are touching much smaller number of pages, which is expected. Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2007-12-29 11:05:47 +01:00
if (p->index_version > 1) {
stride = 20;
} else {
stride = 24;
index += 4;
}
if (debug_lookup)
printf("%02x%02x%02x... lo %u hi %u nr %"PRIu32"\n",
sha1-lookup: more memory efficient search in sorted list of SHA-1 Currently, when looking for a packed object from the pack idx, a simple binary search is used. A conventional binary search loop looks like this: unsigned lo, hi; do { unsigned mi = (lo + hi) / 2; int cmp = "entry pointed at by mi" minus "target"; if (!cmp) return mi; "mi is the wanted one" if (cmp > 0) hi = mi; "mi is larger than target" else lo = mi+1; "mi is smaller than target" } while (lo < hi); "did not find what we wanted" The invariants are: - When entering the loop, 'lo' points at a slot that is never above the target (it could be at the target), 'hi' points at a slot that is guaranteed to be above the target (it can never be at the target). - We find a point 'mi' between 'lo' and 'hi' ('mi' could be the same as 'lo', but never can be as high as 'hi'), and check if 'mi' hits the target. There are three cases: - if it is a hit, we have found what we are looking for; - if it is strictly higher than the target, we set it to 'hi', and repeat the search. - if it is strictly lower than the target, we update 'lo' to one slot after it, because we allow 'lo' to be at the target and 'mi' is known to be below the target. If the loop exits, there is no matching entry. When choosing 'mi', we do not have to take the "middle" but anywhere in between 'lo' and 'hi', as long as lo <= mi < hi is satisfied. When we somehow know that the distance between the target and 'lo' is much shorter than the target and 'hi', we could pick 'mi' that is much closer to 'lo' than (hi+lo)/2, which a conventional binary search would pick. This patch takes advantage of the fact that the SHA-1 is a good hash function, and as long as there are enough entries in the table, we can expect uniform distribution. An entry that begins with for example "deadbeef..." is much likely to appear much later than in the midway of a reasonably populated table. In fact, it can be expected to be near 87% (222/256) from the top of the table. This is a work-in-progress and has switches to allow easier experiments and debugging. Exporting GIT_USE_LOOKUP environment variable enables this code. On my admittedly memory starved machine, with a partial KDE repository (3.0G pack with 95M idx): $ GIT_USE_LOOKUP=t git log -800 --stat HEAD >/dev/null 3.93user 0.16system 0:04.09elapsed 100%CPU (0avgtext+0avgdata 0maxresident)k 0inputs+0outputs (0major+55588minor)pagefaults 0swaps Without the patch, the numbers are: $ git log -800 --stat HEAD >/dev/null 4.00user 0.15system 0:04.17elapsed 99%CPU (0avgtext+0avgdata 0maxresident)k 0inputs+0outputs (0major+60258minor)pagefaults 0swaps In the same repository: $ GIT_USE_LOOKUP=t git log -2000 HEAD >/dev/null 0.12user 0.00system 0:00.12elapsed 97%CPU (0avgtext+0avgdata 0maxresident)k 0inputs+0outputs (0major+4241minor)pagefaults 0swaps Without the patch, the numbers are: $ git log -2000 HEAD >/dev/null 0.05user 0.01system 0:00.07elapsed 100%CPU (0avgtext+0avgdata 0maxresident)k 0inputs+0outputs (0major+8506minor)pagefaults 0swaps There isn't much time difference, but the number of minor faults seems to show that we are touching much smaller number of pages, which is expected. Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2007-12-29 11:05:47 +01:00
sha1[0], sha1[1], sha1[2], lo, hi, p->num_objects);
if (use_lookup < 0)
use_lookup = !!getenv("GIT_USE_LOOKUP");
if (use_lookup) {
int pos = sha1_entry_pos(index, stride, 0,
lo, hi, p->num_objects, sha1);
if (pos < 0)
return 0;
return nth_packed_object_offset(p, pos);
}
do {
unsigned mi = (lo + hi) / 2;
sha1-lookup: more memory efficient search in sorted list of SHA-1 Currently, when looking for a packed object from the pack idx, a simple binary search is used. A conventional binary search loop looks like this: unsigned lo, hi; do { unsigned mi = (lo + hi) / 2; int cmp = "entry pointed at by mi" minus "target"; if (!cmp) return mi; "mi is the wanted one" if (cmp > 0) hi = mi; "mi is larger than target" else lo = mi+1; "mi is smaller than target" } while (lo < hi); "did not find what we wanted" The invariants are: - When entering the loop, 'lo' points at a slot that is never above the target (it could be at the target), 'hi' points at a slot that is guaranteed to be above the target (it can never be at the target). - We find a point 'mi' between 'lo' and 'hi' ('mi' could be the same as 'lo', but never can be as high as 'hi'), and check if 'mi' hits the target. There are three cases: - if it is a hit, we have found what we are looking for; - if it is strictly higher than the target, we set it to 'hi', and repeat the search. - if it is strictly lower than the target, we update 'lo' to one slot after it, because we allow 'lo' to be at the target and 'mi' is known to be below the target. If the loop exits, there is no matching entry. When choosing 'mi', we do not have to take the "middle" but anywhere in between 'lo' and 'hi', as long as lo <= mi < hi is satisfied. When we somehow know that the distance between the target and 'lo' is much shorter than the target and 'hi', we could pick 'mi' that is much closer to 'lo' than (hi+lo)/2, which a conventional binary search would pick. This patch takes advantage of the fact that the SHA-1 is a good hash function, and as long as there are enough entries in the table, we can expect uniform distribution. An entry that begins with for example "deadbeef..." is much likely to appear much later than in the midway of a reasonably populated table. In fact, it can be expected to be near 87% (222/256) from the top of the table. This is a work-in-progress and has switches to allow easier experiments and debugging. Exporting GIT_USE_LOOKUP environment variable enables this code. On my admittedly memory starved machine, with a partial KDE repository (3.0G pack with 95M idx): $ GIT_USE_LOOKUP=t git log -800 --stat HEAD >/dev/null 3.93user 0.16system 0:04.09elapsed 100%CPU (0avgtext+0avgdata 0maxresident)k 0inputs+0outputs (0major+55588minor)pagefaults 0swaps Without the patch, the numbers are: $ git log -800 --stat HEAD >/dev/null 4.00user 0.15system 0:04.17elapsed 99%CPU (0avgtext+0avgdata 0maxresident)k 0inputs+0outputs (0major+60258minor)pagefaults 0swaps In the same repository: $ GIT_USE_LOOKUP=t git log -2000 HEAD >/dev/null 0.12user 0.00system 0:00.12elapsed 97%CPU (0avgtext+0avgdata 0maxresident)k 0inputs+0outputs (0major+4241minor)pagefaults 0swaps Without the patch, the numbers are: $ git log -2000 HEAD >/dev/null 0.05user 0.01system 0:00.07elapsed 100%CPU (0avgtext+0avgdata 0maxresident)k 0inputs+0outputs (0major+8506minor)pagefaults 0swaps There isn't much time difference, but the number of minor faults seems to show that we are touching much smaller number of pages, which is expected. Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2007-12-29 11:05:47 +01:00
int cmp = hashcmp(index + mi * stride, sha1);
if (debug_lookup)
printf("lo %u hi %u rg %u mi %u\n",
lo, hi, hi - lo, mi);
if (!cmp)
return nth_packed_object_offset(p, mi);
if (cmp > 0)
hi = mi;
else
lo = mi+1;
} while (lo < hi);
return 0;
}
pack-objects: protect against disappearing packs It's possible that while pack-objects is running, a simultaneously running prune process might delete a pack that we are interested in. Because we load the pack indices early on, we know that the pack contains our item, but by the time we try to open and map it, it is gone. Since c715f78, we already protect against this in the normal object access code path, but pack-objects accesses the packs at a lower level. In the normal access path, we call find_pack_entry, which will call find_pack_entry_one on each pack index, which does the actual lookup. If it gets a hit, we will actually open and verify the validity of the matching packfile (using c715f78's is_pack_valid). If we can't open it, we'll issue a warning and pretend that we didn't find it, causing us to go on to the next pack (or on to loose objects). Furthermore, we will cache the descriptor to the opened packfile. Which means that later, when we actually try to access the object, we are likely to still have that packfile opened, and won't care if it has been unlinked from the filesystem. Notice the "likely" above. If there is another pack access in the interim, and we run out of descriptors, we could close the pack. And then a later attempt to access the closed pack could fail (we'll try to re-open it, of course, but it may have been deleted). In practice, this doesn't happen because we tend to look up items and then access them immediately. Pack-objects does not follow this code path. Instead, it accesses the packs at a much lower level, using find_pack_entry_one directly. This means we skip the is_pack_valid check, and may end up with the name of a packfile, but no open descriptor. We can add the same is_pack_valid check here. Unfortunately, the access patterns of pack-objects are not quite as nice for keeping lookup and object access together. We look up each object as we find out about it, and the only later when writing the packfile do we necessarily access it. Which means that the opened packfile may be closed in the interim. In practice, however, adding this check still has value, for three reasons. 1. If you have a reasonable number of packs and/or a reasonable file descriptor limit, you can keep all of your packs open simultaneously. If this is the case, then the race is impossible to trigger. 2. Even if you can't keep all packs open at once, you may end up keeping the deleted one open (i.e., you may get lucky). 3. The race window is shortened. You may notice early that the pack is gone, and not try to access it. Triggering the problem without this check means deleting the pack any time after we read the list of index files, but before we access the looked-up objects. Triggering it with this check means deleting the pack means deleting the pack after we do a lookup (and successfully access the packfile), but before we access the object. Which is a smaller window. Acked-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@fluxnic.net> Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2011-10-14 20:03:48 +02:00
int is_pack_valid(struct packed_git *p)
{
/* An already open pack is known to be valid. */
if (p->pack_fd != -1)
return 1;
/* If the pack has one window completely covering the
* file size, the pack is known to be valid even if
* the descriptor is not currently open.
*/
if (p->windows) {
struct pack_window *w = p->windows;
if (!w->offset && w->len == p->pack_size)
return 1;
}
/* Force the pack to open to prove its valid. */
return !open_packed_git(p);
}
static int fill_pack_entry(const unsigned char *sha1,
struct pack_entry *e,
struct packed_git *p)
{
off_t offset;
if (p->num_bad_objects) {
unsigned i;
for (i = 0; i < p->num_bad_objects; i++)
if (!hashcmp(sha1, p->bad_object_sha1 + 20 * i))
return 0;
}
offset = find_pack_entry_one(sha1, p);
if (!offset)
return 0;
/*
* We are about to tell the caller where they can locate the
* requested object. We better make sure the packfile is
* still here and can be accessed before supplying that
* answer, as it may have been deleted since the index was
* loaded!
*/
sha1_file: squelch "packfile cannot be accessed" warnings When we find an object in a packfile index, we make sure we can still open the packfile itself (or that it is already open), as it might have been deleted by a simultaneous repack. If we can't access the packfile, we print a warning for the user and tell the caller that we don't have the object (we can then look in other packfiles, or find a loose version, before giving up). The warning we print to the user isn't really accomplishing anything, and it is potentially confusing to users. In the normal case, it is complete noise; we find the object elsewhere, and the user does not have to care that we racily saw a packfile index that became stale. It didn't affect the operation at all. A possibly more interesting case is when we later can't find the object, and report failure to the user. In this case the warning could be considered a clue toward that ultimate failure. But it's not really a useful clue in practice. We wouldn't even print it consistently (since we are racing with another process, we might not even see the .idx file, or we might win the race and open the packfile, completing the operation). This patch drops the warning entirely (not only from the fill_pack_entry site, but also from an identical use in pack-objects). If we did find the warning interesting in the error case, we could stuff it away and reveal it to the user when we later die() due to the broken object. But that complexity just isn't worth it. Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2015-03-31 02:47:38 +02:00
if (!is_pack_valid(p))
return 0;
e->offset = offset;
e->p = p;
hashcpy(e->sha1, sha1);
return 1;
}
/*
* Iff a pack file contains the object named by sha1, return true and
* store its location to e.
*/
static int find_pack_entry(const unsigned char *sha1, struct pack_entry *e)
{
struct packed_git *p;
prepare_packed_git();
if (!packed_git)
return 0;
if (last_found_pack && fill_pack_entry(sha1, e, last_found_pack))
return 1;
for (p = packed_git; p; p = p->next) {
if (p == last_found_pack)
continue; /* we already checked this one */
if (fill_pack_entry(sha1, e, p)) {
last_found_pack = p;
return 1;
}
}
return 0;
}
struct packed_git *find_sha1_pack(const unsigned char *sha1,
struct packed_git *packs)
{
struct packed_git *p;
for (p = packs; p; p = p->next) {
if (find_pack_entry_one(sha1, p))
return p;
}
return NULL;
}
static int sha1_loose_object_info(const unsigned char *sha1,
struct object_info *oi,
int flags)
{
int status = 0;
unsigned long mapsize;
void *map;
2011-06-10 20:52:15 +02:00
git_zstream stream;
char hdr[32];
struct strbuf hdrbuf = STRBUF_INIT;
if (oi->delta_base_sha1)
hashclr(oi->delta_base_sha1);
/*
* If we don't care about type or size, then we don't
* need to look inside the object at all. Note that we
* do not optimize out the stat call, even if the
* caller doesn't care about the disk-size, since our
* return value implicitly indicates whether the
* object even exists.
*/
if (!oi->typep && !oi->typename && !oi->sizep) {
struct stat st;
if (stat_sha1_file(sha1, &st) < 0)
return -1;
if (oi->disk_sizep)
*oi->disk_sizep = st.st_size;
return 0;
}
map = map_sha1_file(sha1, &mapsize);
if (!map)
return -1;
if (oi->disk_sizep)
*oi->disk_sizep = mapsize;
if ((flags & LOOKUP_UNKNOWN_OBJECT)) {
if (unpack_sha1_header_to_strbuf(&stream, map, mapsize, hdr, sizeof(hdr), &hdrbuf) < 0)
status = error("unable to unpack %s header with --allow-unknown-type",
sha1_to_hex(sha1));
} else if (unpack_sha1_header(&stream, map, mapsize, hdr, sizeof(hdr)) < 0)
status = error("unable to unpack %s header",
sha1_to_hex(sha1));
if (status < 0)
; /* Do nothing */
else if (hdrbuf.len) {
if ((status = parse_sha1_header_extended(hdrbuf.buf, oi, flags)) < 0)
status = error("unable to parse %s header with --allow-unknown-type",
sha1_to_hex(sha1));
} else if ((status = parse_sha1_header_extended(hdr, oi, flags)) < 0)
status = error("unable to parse %s header", sha1_to_hex(sha1));
git_inflate_end(&stream);
munmap(map, mapsize);
if (status && oi->typep)
*oi->typep = status;
strbuf_release(&hdrbuf);
return 0;
}
int sha1_object_info_extended(const unsigned char *sha1, struct object_info *oi, unsigned flags)
{
struct cached_object *co;
struct pack_entry e;
sha1_object_info_extended: make type calculation optional Each caller of sha1_object_info_extended sets up an object_info struct to tell the function which elements of the object it wants to get. Until now, getting the type of the object has always been required (and it is returned via the return type rather than a pointer in object_info). This can involve actually opening a loose object file to determine its type, or following delta chains to determine a packed file's base type. These effects produce a measurable slow-down when doing a "cat-file --batch-check" that does not include %(objecttype). This patch adds a "typep" query to struct object_info, so that it can be optionally queried just like size and disk_size. As a result, the return type of the function is no longer the object type, but rather 0/-1 for success/error. As there are only three callers total, we just fix up each caller rather than keep a compatibility wrapper: 1. The simpler sha1_object_info wrapper continues to always ask for and return the type field. 2. The istream_source function wants to know the type, and so always asks for it. 3. The cat-file batch code asks for the type only when %(objecttype) is part of the format string. On linux.git, the best-of-five for running: $ git rev-list --objects --all >objects $ time git cat-file --batch-check='%(objectsize:disk)' on a fully packed repository goes from: real 0m8.680s user 0m8.160s sys 0m0.512s to: real 0m7.205s user 0m6.580s sys 0m0.608s Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2013-07-12 08:34:57 +02:00
int rtype;
enum object_type real_type;
const unsigned char *real = lookup_replace_object_extended(sha1, flags);
co = find_cached_object(real);
if (co) {
sha1_object_info_extended: make type calculation optional Each caller of sha1_object_info_extended sets up an object_info struct to tell the function which elements of the object it wants to get. Until now, getting the type of the object has always been required (and it is returned via the return type rather than a pointer in object_info). This can involve actually opening a loose object file to determine its type, or following delta chains to determine a packed file's base type. These effects produce a measurable slow-down when doing a "cat-file --batch-check" that does not include %(objecttype). This patch adds a "typep" query to struct object_info, so that it can be optionally queried just like size and disk_size. As a result, the return type of the function is no longer the object type, but rather 0/-1 for success/error. As there are only three callers total, we just fix up each caller rather than keep a compatibility wrapper: 1. The simpler sha1_object_info wrapper continues to always ask for and return the type field. 2. The istream_source function wants to know the type, and so always asks for it. 3. The cat-file batch code asks for the type only when %(objecttype) is part of the format string. On linux.git, the best-of-five for running: $ git rev-list --objects --all >objects $ time git cat-file --batch-check='%(objectsize:disk)' on a fully packed repository goes from: real 0m8.680s user 0m8.160s sys 0m0.512s to: real 0m7.205s user 0m6.580s sys 0m0.608s Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2013-07-12 08:34:57 +02:00
if (oi->typep)
*(oi->typep) = co->type;
if (oi->sizep)
*(oi->sizep) = co->size;
if (oi->disk_sizep)
*(oi->disk_sizep) = 0;
if (oi->delta_base_sha1)
hashclr(oi->delta_base_sha1);
if (oi->typename)
strbuf_addstr(oi->typename, typename(co->type));
oi->whence = OI_CACHED;
sha1_object_info_extended: make type calculation optional Each caller of sha1_object_info_extended sets up an object_info struct to tell the function which elements of the object it wants to get. Until now, getting the type of the object has always been required (and it is returned via the return type rather than a pointer in object_info). This can involve actually opening a loose object file to determine its type, or following delta chains to determine a packed file's base type. These effects produce a measurable slow-down when doing a "cat-file --batch-check" that does not include %(objecttype). This patch adds a "typep" query to struct object_info, so that it can be optionally queried just like size and disk_size. As a result, the return type of the function is no longer the object type, but rather 0/-1 for success/error. As there are only three callers total, we just fix up each caller rather than keep a compatibility wrapper: 1. The simpler sha1_object_info wrapper continues to always ask for and return the type field. 2. The istream_source function wants to know the type, and so always asks for it. 3. The cat-file batch code asks for the type only when %(objecttype) is part of the format string. On linux.git, the best-of-five for running: $ git rev-list --objects --all >objects $ time git cat-file --batch-check='%(objectsize:disk)' on a fully packed repository goes from: real 0m8.680s user 0m8.160s sys 0m0.512s to: real 0m7.205s user 0m6.580s sys 0m0.608s Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2013-07-12 08:34:57 +02:00
return 0;
}
if (!find_pack_entry(real, &e)) {
/* Most likely it's a loose object. */
if (!sha1_loose_object_info(real, oi, flags)) {
oi->whence = OI_LOOSE;
sha1_object_info_extended: make type calculation optional Each caller of sha1_object_info_extended sets up an object_info struct to tell the function which elements of the object it wants to get. Until now, getting the type of the object has always been required (and it is returned via the return type rather than a pointer in object_info). This can involve actually opening a loose object file to determine its type, or following delta chains to determine a packed file's base type. These effects produce a measurable slow-down when doing a "cat-file --batch-check" that does not include %(objecttype). This patch adds a "typep" query to struct object_info, so that it can be optionally queried just like size and disk_size. As a result, the return type of the function is no longer the object type, but rather 0/-1 for success/error. As there are only three callers total, we just fix up each caller rather than keep a compatibility wrapper: 1. The simpler sha1_object_info wrapper continues to always ask for and return the type field. 2. The istream_source function wants to know the type, and so always asks for it. 3. The cat-file batch code asks for the type only when %(objecttype) is part of the format string. On linux.git, the best-of-five for running: $ git rev-list --objects --all >objects $ time git cat-file --batch-check='%(objectsize:disk)' on a fully packed repository goes from: real 0m8.680s user 0m8.160s sys 0m0.512s to: real 0m7.205s user 0m6.580s sys 0m0.608s Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2013-07-12 08:34:57 +02:00
return 0;
}
/* Not a loose object; someone else may have just packed it. */
reprepare_packed_git();
if (!find_pack_entry(real, &e))
return -1;
}
/*
* packed_object_info() does not follow the delta chain to
* find out the real type, unless it is given oi->typep.
*/
if (oi->typename && !oi->typep)
oi->typep = &real_type;
rtype = packed_object_info(e.p, e.offset, oi);
if (rtype < 0) {
mark_bad_packed_object(e.p, real);
if (oi->typep == &real_type)
oi->typep = NULL;
return sha1_object_info_extended(real, oi, 0);
} else if (in_delta_base_cache(e.p, e.offset)) {
oi->whence = OI_DBCACHED;
} else {
oi->whence = OI_PACKED;
oi->u.packed.offset = e.offset;
oi->u.packed.pack = e.p;
oi->u.packed.is_delta = (rtype == OBJ_REF_DELTA ||
rtype == OBJ_OFS_DELTA);
}
if (oi->typename)
strbuf_addstr(oi->typename, typename(*oi->typep));
if (oi->typep == &real_type)
oi->typep = NULL;
sha1_object_info_extended: make type calculation optional Each caller of sha1_object_info_extended sets up an object_info struct to tell the function which elements of the object it wants to get. Until now, getting the type of the object has always been required (and it is returned via the return type rather than a pointer in object_info). This can involve actually opening a loose object file to determine its type, or following delta chains to determine a packed file's base type. These effects produce a measurable slow-down when doing a "cat-file --batch-check" that does not include %(objecttype). This patch adds a "typep" query to struct object_info, so that it can be optionally queried just like size and disk_size. As a result, the return type of the function is no longer the object type, but rather 0/-1 for success/error. As there are only three callers total, we just fix up each caller rather than keep a compatibility wrapper: 1. The simpler sha1_object_info wrapper continues to always ask for and return the type field. 2. The istream_source function wants to know the type, and so always asks for it. 3. The cat-file batch code asks for the type only when %(objecttype) is part of the format string. On linux.git, the best-of-five for running: $ git rev-list --objects --all >objects $ time git cat-file --batch-check='%(objectsize:disk)' on a fully packed repository goes from: real 0m8.680s user 0m8.160s sys 0m0.512s to: real 0m7.205s user 0m6.580s sys 0m0.608s Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2013-07-12 08:34:57 +02:00
return 0;
}
/* returns enum object_type or negative */
int sha1_object_info(const unsigned char *sha1, unsigned long *sizep)
{
sha1_object_info_extended: make type calculation optional Each caller of sha1_object_info_extended sets up an object_info struct to tell the function which elements of the object it wants to get. Until now, getting the type of the object has always been required (and it is returned via the return type rather than a pointer in object_info). This can involve actually opening a loose object file to determine its type, or following delta chains to determine a packed file's base type. These effects produce a measurable slow-down when doing a "cat-file --batch-check" that does not include %(objecttype). This patch adds a "typep" query to struct object_info, so that it can be optionally queried just like size and disk_size. As a result, the return type of the function is no longer the object type, but rather 0/-1 for success/error. As there are only three callers total, we just fix up each caller rather than keep a compatibility wrapper: 1. The simpler sha1_object_info wrapper continues to always ask for and return the type field. 2. The istream_source function wants to know the type, and so always asks for it. 3. The cat-file batch code asks for the type only when %(objecttype) is part of the format string. On linux.git, the best-of-five for running: $ git rev-list --objects --all >objects $ time git cat-file --batch-check='%(objectsize:disk)' on a fully packed repository goes from: real 0m8.680s user 0m8.160s sys 0m0.512s to: real 0m7.205s user 0m6.580s sys 0m0.608s Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2013-07-12 08:34:57 +02:00
enum object_type type;
struct object_info oi = {NULL};
sha1_object_info_extended: make type calculation optional Each caller of sha1_object_info_extended sets up an object_info struct to tell the function which elements of the object it wants to get. Until now, getting the type of the object has always been required (and it is returned via the return type rather than a pointer in object_info). This can involve actually opening a loose object file to determine its type, or following delta chains to determine a packed file's base type. These effects produce a measurable slow-down when doing a "cat-file --batch-check" that does not include %(objecttype). This patch adds a "typep" query to struct object_info, so that it can be optionally queried just like size and disk_size. As a result, the return type of the function is no longer the object type, but rather 0/-1 for success/error. As there are only three callers total, we just fix up each caller rather than keep a compatibility wrapper: 1. The simpler sha1_object_info wrapper continues to always ask for and return the type field. 2. The istream_source function wants to know the type, and so always asks for it. 3. The cat-file batch code asks for the type only when %(objecttype) is part of the format string. On linux.git, the best-of-five for running: $ git rev-list --objects --all >objects $ time git cat-file --batch-check='%(objectsize:disk)' on a fully packed repository goes from: real 0m8.680s user 0m8.160s sys 0m0.512s to: real 0m7.205s user 0m6.580s sys 0m0.608s Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2013-07-12 08:34:57 +02:00
oi.typep = &type;
oi.sizep = sizep;
if (sha1_object_info_extended(sha1, &oi, LOOKUP_REPLACE_OBJECT) < 0)
sha1_object_info_extended: make type calculation optional Each caller of sha1_object_info_extended sets up an object_info struct to tell the function which elements of the object it wants to get. Until now, getting the type of the object has always been required (and it is returned via the return type rather than a pointer in object_info). This can involve actually opening a loose object file to determine its type, or following delta chains to determine a packed file's base type. These effects produce a measurable slow-down when doing a "cat-file --batch-check" that does not include %(objecttype). This patch adds a "typep" query to struct object_info, so that it can be optionally queried just like size and disk_size. As a result, the return type of the function is no longer the object type, but rather 0/-1 for success/error. As there are only three callers total, we just fix up each caller rather than keep a compatibility wrapper: 1. The simpler sha1_object_info wrapper continues to always ask for and return the type field. 2. The istream_source function wants to know the type, and so always asks for it. 3. The cat-file batch code asks for the type only when %(objecttype) is part of the format string. On linux.git, the best-of-five for running: $ git rev-list --objects --all >objects $ time git cat-file --batch-check='%(objectsize:disk)' on a fully packed repository goes from: real 0m8.680s user 0m8.160s sys 0m0.512s to: real 0m7.205s user 0m6.580s sys 0m0.608s Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2013-07-12 08:34:57 +02:00
return -1;
return type;
}
static void *read_packed_sha1(const unsigned char *sha1,
enum object_type *type, unsigned long *size)
{
struct pack_entry e;
void *data;
if (!find_pack_entry(sha1, &e))
return NULL;
data = cache_or_unpack_entry(e.p, e.offset, size, type, 1);
if (!data) {
/*
* We're probably in deep shit, but let's try to fetch
* the required object anyway from another pack or loose.
* This should happen only in the presence of a corrupted
* pack, and is better than failing outright.
*/
error("failed to read object %s at offset %"PRIuMAX" from %s",
sha1_to_hex(sha1), (uintmax_t)e.offset, e.p->pack_name);
mark_bad_packed_object(e.p, sha1);
data = read_object(sha1, type, size);
}
return data;
}
int pretend_sha1_file(void *buf, unsigned long len, enum object_type type,
unsigned char *sha1)
{
struct cached_object *co;
hash_sha1_file(buf, len, typename(type), sha1);
if (has_sha1_file(sha1) || find_cached_object(sha1))
return 0;
ALLOC_GROW(cached_objects, cached_object_nr + 1, cached_object_alloc);
co = &cached_objects[cached_object_nr++];
co->size = len;
co->type = type;
co->buf = xmalloc(len);
memcpy(co->buf, buf, len);
hashcpy(co->sha1, sha1);
return 0;
}
static void *read_object(const unsigned char *sha1, enum object_type *type,
unsigned long *size)
{
unsigned long mapsize;
void *map, *buf;
struct cached_object *co;
co = find_cached_object(sha1);
if (co) {
*type = co->type;
*size = co->size;
return xmemdupz(co->buf, co->size);
}
buf = read_packed_sha1(sha1, type, size);
if (buf)
return buf;
map = map_sha1_file(sha1, &mapsize);
if (map) {
buf = unpack_sha1_file(map, mapsize, type, size, sha1);
munmap(map, mapsize);
return buf;
}
reprepare_packed_git();
return read_packed_sha1(sha1, type, size);
}
/*
* This function dies on corrupt objects; the callers who want to
* deal with them should arrange to call read_object() and give error
* messages themselves.
*/
void *read_sha1_file_extended(const unsigned char *sha1,
enum object_type *type,
unsigned long *size,
unsigned flag)
{
void *data;
const struct packed_git *p;
const unsigned char *repl = lookup_replace_object_extended(sha1, flag);
errno = 0;
data = read_object(repl, type, size);
if (data)
return data;
if (errno && errno != ENOENT)
die_errno("failed to read object %s", sha1_to_hex(sha1));
/* die if we replaced an object with one that does not exist */
if (repl != sha1)
die("replacement %s not found for %s",
sha1_to_hex(repl), sha1_to_hex(sha1));
if (has_loose_object(repl)) {
const char *path = sha1_file_name(sha1);
die("loose object %s (stored in %s) is corrupt",
sha1_to_hex(repl), path);
}
if ((p = has_packed_and_bad(repl)) != NULL)
die("packed object %s (stored in %s) is corrupt",
sha1_to_hex(repl), p->pack_name);
return NULL;
}
void *read_object_with_reference(const unsigned char *sha1,
const char *required_type_name,
unsigned long *size,
unsigned char *actual_sha1_return)
{
enum object_type type, required_type;
void *buffer;
unsigned long isize;
unsigned char actual_sha1[20];
required_type = type_from_string(required_type_name);
hashcpy(actual_sha1, sha1);
while (1) {
int ref_length = -1;
const char *ref_type = NULL;
buffer = read_sha1_file(actual_sha1, &type, &isize);
if (!buffer)
return NULL;
if (type == required_type) {
*size = isize;
if (actual_sha1_return)
hashcpy(actual_sha1_return, actual_sha1);
return buffer;
}
/* Handle references */
else if (type == OBJ_COMMIT)
ref_type = "tree ";
else if (type == OBJ_TAG)
ref_type = "object ";
else {
free(buffer);
return NULL;
}
ref_length = strlen(ref_type);
if (ref_length + 40 > isize ||
memcmp(buffer, ref_type, ref_length) ||
get_sha1_hex((char *) buffer + ref_length, actual_sha1)) {
free(buffer);
return NULL;
}
free(buffer);
/* Now we have the ID of the referred-to object in
* actual_sha1. Check again. */
}
}
static void write_sha1_file_prepare(const void *buf, unsigned long len,
const char *type, unsigned char *sha1,
char *hdr, int *hdrlen)
{
fix openssl headers conflicting with custom SHA1 implementations On ARM I have the following compilation errors: CC fast-import.o In file included from cache.h:8, from builtin.h:6, from fast-import.c:142: arm/sha1.h:14: error: conflicting types for 'SHA_CTX' /usr/include/openssl/sha.h:105: error: previous declaration of 'SHA_CTX' was here arm/sha1.h:16: error: conflicting types for 'SHA1_Init' /usr/include/openssl/sha.h:115: error: previous declaration of 'SHA1_Init' was here arm/sha1.h:17: error: conflicting types for 'SHA1_Update' /usr/include/openssl/sha.h:116: error: previous declaration of 'SHA1_Update' was here arm/sha1.h:18: error: conflicting types for 'SHA1_Final' /usr/include/openssl/sha.h:117: error: previous declaration of 'SHA1_Final' was here make: *** [fast-import.o] Error 1 This is because openssl header files are always included in git-compat-util.h since commit 684ec6c63c whenever NO_OPENSSL is not set, which somehow brings in <openssl/sha1.h> clashing with the custom ARM version. Compilation of git is probably broken on PPC too for the same reason. Turns out that the only file requiring openssl/ssl.h and openssl/err.h is imap-send.c. But only moving those problematic includes there doesn't solve the issue as it also includes cache.h which brings in the conflicting local SHA1 header file. As suggested by Jeff King, the best solution is to rename our references to SHA1 functions and structure to something git specific, and define those according to the implementation used. Signed-off-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@cam.org> Signed-off-by: Shawn O. Pearce <spearce@spearce.org>
2008-10-01 20:05:20 +02:00
git_SHA_CTX c;
/* Generate the header */
*hdrlen = xsnprintf(hdr, *hdrlen, "%s %lu", type, len)+1;
/* Sha1.. */
fix openssl headers conflicting with custom SHA1 implementations On ARM I have the following compilation errors: CC fast-import.o In file included from cache.h:8, from builtin.h:6, from fast-import.c:142: arm/sha1.h:14: error: conflicting types for 'SHA_CTX' /usr/include/openssl/sha.h:105: error: previous declaration of 'SHA_CTX' was here arm/sha1.h:16: error: conflicting types for 'SHA1_Init' /usr/include/openssl/sha.h:115: error: previous declaration of 'SHA1_Init' was here arm/sha1.h:17: error: conflicting types for 'SHA1_Update' /usr/include/openssl/sha.h:116: error: previous declaration of 'SHA1_Update' was here arm/sha1.h:18: error: conflicting types for 'SHA1_Final' /usr/include/openssl/sha.h:117: error: previous declaration of 'SHA1_Final' was here make: *** [fast-import.o] Error 1 This is because openssl header files are always included in git-compat-util.h since commit 684ec6c63c whenever NO_OPENSSL is not set, which somehow brings in <openssl/sha1.h> clashing with the custom ARM version. Compilation of git is probably broken on PPC too for the same reason. Turns out that the only file requiring openssl/ssl.h and openssl/err.h is imap-send.c. But only moving those problematic includes there doesn't solve the issue as it also includes cache.h which brings in the conflicting local SHA1 header file. As suggested by Jeff King, the best solution is to rename our references to SHA1 functions and structure to something git specific, and define those according to the implementation used. Signed-off-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@cam.org> Signed-off-by: Shawn O. Pearce <spearce@spearce.org>
2008-10-01 20:05:20 +02:00
git_SHA1_Init(&c);
git_SHA1_Update(&c, hdr, *hdrlen);
git_SHA1_Update(&c, buf, len);
git_SHA1_Final(sha1, &c);
}
Create object subdirectories on demand This makes it possible to have a "sparse" git object subdirectory structure, something that has become much more attractive now that people use pack-files all the time. As a result of pack-files, a git object directory doesn't necessarily have any individual objects lying around, and in that case it's just wasting space to keep the empty first-level object directories around: on many filesystems the 256 empty directories will be aboue 1MB of diskspace. Even more importantly, after you re-pack a project that _used_ to be unpacked, you could be left with huge directories that no longer contain anything, but that waste space and take time to look through. With this change, "git prune-packed" can just do an rmdir() on the directories, and they'll get removed if empty, and re-created on demand. This patch also tries to fix up "write_sha1_from_fd()" to use the new common infrastructure for creating the object files, closing a hole where we might otherwise leave half-written objects in the object database. [jc: I unoptimized the part that really removes the fan-out directories to ease transition. init-db still wastes 1MB of diskspace to hold 256 empty fan-outs, and prune-packed rmdir()'s the grown but empty directories, but runs mkdir() immediately after that -- reducing the saving from 150KB to 146KB. These parts will be re-introduced when everybody has the on-demand capability.] Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
2005-10-09 00:54:01 +02:00
/*
* Move the just written object into its final resting place.
Create object subdirectories on demand This makes it possible to have a "sparse" git object subdirectory structure, something that has become much more attractive now that people use pack-files all the time. As a result of pack-files, a git object directory doesn't necessarily have any individual objects lying around, and in that case it's just wasting space to keep the empty first-level object directories around: on many filesystems the 256 empty directories will be aboue 1MB of diskspace. Even more importantly, after you re-pack a project that _used_ to be unpacked, you could be left with huge directories that no longer contain anything, but that waste space and take time to look through. With this change, "git prune-packed" can just do an rmdir() on the directories, and they'll get removed if empty, and re-created on demand. This patch also tries to fix up "write_sha1_from_fd()" to use the new common infrastructure for creating the object files, closing a hole where we might otherwise leave half-written objects in the object database. [jc: I unoptimized the part that really removes the fan-out directories to ease transition. init-db still wastes 1MB of diskspace to hold 256 empty fan-outs, and prune-packed rmdir()'s the grown but empty directories, but runs mkdir() immediately after that -- reducing the saving from 150KB to 146KB. These parts will be re-introduced when everybody has the on-demand capability.] Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
2005-10-09 00:54:01 +02:00
*/
int finalize_object_file(const char *tmpfile, const char *filename)
Create object subdirectories on demand This makes it possible to have a "sparse" git object subdirectory structure, something that has become much more attractive now that people use pack-files all the time. As a result of pack-files, a git object directory doesn't necessarily have any individual objects lying around, and in that case it's just wasting space to keep the empty first-level object directories around: on many filesystems the 256 empty directories will be aboue 1MB of diskspace. Even more importantly, after you re-pack a project that _used_ to be unpacked, you could be left with huge directories that no longer contain anything, but that waste space and take time to look through. With this change, "git prune-packed" can just do an rmdir() on the directories, and they'll get removed if empty, and re-created on demand. This patch also tries to fix up "write_sha1_from_fd()" to use the new common infrastructure for creating the object files, closing a hole where we might otherwise leave half-written objects in the object database. [jc: I unoptimized the part that really removes the fan-out directories to ease transition. init-db still wastes 1MB of diskspace to hold 256 empty fan-outs, and prune-packed rmdir()'s the grown but empty directories, but runs mkdir() immediately after that -- reducing the saving from 150KB to 146KB. These parts will be re-introduced when everybody has the on-demand capability.] Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
2005-10-09 00:54:01 +02:00
{
int ret = 0;
if (object_creation_mode == OBJECT_CREATION_USES_RENAMES)
goto try_rename;
else if (link(tmpfile, filename))
ret = errno;
/*
* Coda hack - coda doesn't like cross-directory links,
* so we fall back to a rename, which will mean that it
* won't be able to check collisions, but that's not a
* big deal.
*
* The same holds for FAT formatted media.
*
* When this succeeds, we just return. We have nothing
* left to unlink.
*/
if (ret && ret != EEXIST) {
try_rename:
if (!rename(tmpfile, filename))
goto out;
ret = errno;
Create object subdirectories on demand This makes it possible to have a "sparse" git object subdirectory structure, something that has become much more attractive now that people use pack-files all the time. As a result of pack-files, a git object directory doesn't necessarily have any individual objects lying around, and in that case it's just wasting space to keep the empty first-level object directories around: on many filesystems the 256 empty directories will be aboue 1MB of diskspace. Even more importantly, after you re-pack a project that _used_ to be unpacked, you could be left with huge directories that no longer contain anything, but that waste space and take time to look through. With this change, "git prune-packed" can just do an rmdir() on the directories, and they'll get removed if empty, and re-created on demand. This patch also tries to fix up "write_sha1_from_fd()" to use the new common infrastructure for creating the object files, closing a hole where we might otherwise leave half-written objects in the object database. [jc: I unoptimized the part that really removes the fan-out directories to ease transition. init-db still wastes 1MB of diskspace to hold 256 empty fan-outs, and prune-packed rmdir()'s the grown but empty directories, but runs mkdir() immediately after that -- reducing the saving from 150KB to 146KB. These parts will be re-introduced when everybody has the on-demand capability.] Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
2005-10-09 00:54:01 +02:00
}
unlink_or_warn(tmpfile);
Create object subdirectories on demand This makes it possible to have a "sparse" git object subdirectory structure, something that has become much more attractive now that people use pack-files all the time. As a result of pack-files, a git object directory doesn't necessarily have any individual objects lying around, and in that case it's just wasting space to keep the empty first-level object directories around: on many filesystems the 256 empty directories will be aboue 1MB of diskspace. Even more importantly, after you re-pack a project that _used_ to be unpacked, you could be left with huge directories that no longer contain anything, but that waste space and take time to look through. With this change, "git prune-packed" can just do an rmdir() on the directories, and they'll get removed if empty, and re-created on demand. This patch also tries to fix up "write_sha1_from_fd()" to use the new common infrastructure for creating the object files, closing a hole where we might otherwise leave half-written objects in the object database. [jc: I unoptimized the part that really removes the fan-out directories to ease transition. init-db still wastes 1MB of diskspace to hold 256 empty fan-outs, and prune-packed rmdir()'s the grown but empty directories, but runs mkdir() immediately after that -- reducing the saving from 150KB to 146KB. These parts will be re-introduced when everybody has the on-demand capability.] Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
2005-10-09 00:54:01 +02:00
if (ret) {
if (ret != EEXIST) {
return error("unable to write sha1 filename %s: %s", filename, strerror(ret));
Create object subdirectories on demand This makes it possible to have a "sparse" git object subdirectory structure, something that has become much more attractive now that people use pack-files all the time. As a result of pack-files, a git object directory doesn't necessarily have any individual objects lying around, and in that case it's just wasting space to keep the empty first-level object directories around: on many filesystems the 256 empty directories will be aboue 1MB of diskspace. Even more importantly, after you re-pack a project that _used_ to be unpacked, you could be left with huge directories that no longer contain anything, but that waste space and take time to look through. With this change, "git prune-packed" can just do an rmdir() on the directories, and they'll get removed if empty, and re-created on demand. This patch also tries to fix up "write_sha1_from_fd()" to use the new common infrastructure for creating the object files, closing a hole where we might otherwise leave half-written objects in the object database. [jc: I unoptimized the part that really removes the fan-out directories to ease transition. init-db still wastes 1MB of diskspace to hold 256 empty fan-outs, and prune-packed rmdir()'s the grown but empty directories, but runs mkdir() immediately after that -- reducing the saving from 150KB to 146KB. These parts will be re-introduced when everybody has the on-demand capability.] Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
2005-10-09 00:54:01 +02:00
}
/* FIXME!!! Collision check here ? */
}
out:
if (adjust_shared_perm(filename))
return error("unable to set permission to '%s'", filename);
Create object subdirectories on demand This makes it possible to have a "sparse" git object subdirectory structure, something that has become much more attractive now that people use pack-files all the time. As a result of pack-files, a git object directory doesn't necessarily have any individual objects lying around, and in that case it's just wasting space to keep the empty first-level object directories around: on many filesystems the 256 empty directories will be aboue 1MB of diskspace. Even more importantly, after you re-pack a project that _used_ to be unpacked, you could be left with huge directories that no longer contain anything, but that waste space and take time to look through. With this change, "git prune-packed" can just do an rmdir() on the directories, and they'll get removed if empty, and re-created on demand. This patch also tries to fix up "write_sha1_from_fd()" to use the new common infrastructure for creating the object files, closing a hole where we might otherwise leave half-written objects in the object database. [jc: I unoptimized the part that really removes the fan-out directories to ease transition. init-db still wastes 1MB of diskspace to hold 256 empty fan-outs, and prune-packed rmdir()'s the grown but empty directories, but runs mkdir() immediately after that -- reducing the saving from 150KB to 146KB. These parts will be re-introduced when everybody has the on-demand capability.] Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
2005-10-09 00:54:01 +02:00
return 0;
}
static int write_buffer(int fd, const void *buf, size_t len)
{
if (write_in_full(fd, buf, len) < 0)
return error("file write error (%s)", strerror(errno));
return 0;
}
int hash_sha1_file(const void *buf, unsigned long len, const char *type,
unsigned char *sha1)
{
char hdr[32];
int hdrlen = sizeof(hdr);
write_sha1_file_prepare(buf, len, type, sha1, hdr, &hdrlen);
return 0;
}
/* Finalize a file on disk, and close it. */
static void close_sha1_file(int fd)
{
if (fsync_object_files)
fsync_or_die(fd, "sha1 file");
if (close(fd) != 0)
die_errno("error when closing sha1 file");
}
/* Size of directory component, including the ending '/' */
static inline int directory_size(const char *filename)
{
const char *s = strrchr(filename, '/');
if (!s)
return 0;
return s - filename + 1;
}
/*
* This creates a temporary file in the same directory as the final
* 'filename'
*
* We want to avoid cross-directory filename renames, because those
* can have problems on various filesystems (FAT, NFS, Coda).
*/
static int create_tmpfile(struct strbuf *tmp, const char *filename)
{
int fd, dirlen = directory_size(filename);
strbuf_reset(tmp);
strbuf_add(tmp, filename, dirlen);
strbuf_addstr(tmp, "tmp_obj_XXXXXX");
fd = git_mkstemp_mode(tmp->buf, 0444);
if (fd < 0 && dirlen && errno == ENOENT) {
/*
* Make sure the directory exists; note that the contents
* of the buffer are undefined after mkstemp returns an
* error, so we have to rewrite the whole buffer from
* scratch.
*/
strbuf_reset(tmp);
strbuf_add(tmp, filename, dirlen - 1);
if (mkdir(tmp->buf, 0777) && errno != EEXIST)
sha1_file.c:create_tmpfile(): Fix race when creating loose object dirs There are cases (e.g. when running concurrent fetches in a repo) where multiple Git processes concurrently attempt to create loose objects within the same objects/XX/ dir. The creation of the loose object files is (AFAICS) safe from races, but the creation of the objects/XX/ dir in which the loose objects reside is unsafe, for example: Two concurrent fetches - A and B. As part of its fetch, A needs to store 12aaaaa as a loose object. B, on the other hand, needs to store 12bbbbb as a loose object. The objects/12 directory does not already exist. Concurrently, both A and B determine that they need to create the objects/12 directory (because their first call to git_mkstemp_mode() within create_tmpfile() fails witn ENOENT). One of them - let's say A - executes the following mkdir() call before the other. This first call returns success, and A moves on. When B gets around to calling mkdir(), it fails with EEXIST, because A won the race. The mkdir() error causes B to return -1 from create_tmpfile(), which propagates all the way, resulting in the fetch failing with: error: unable to create temporary file: File exists fatal: failed to write object fatal: unpack-objects failed Although it's hard to add a testcase reproducing this issue, it's easy to provoke if we insert a sleep after the if (mkdir(buffer, 0777) || adjust_shared_perm(buffer)) return -1; block, and then run two concurrent "git fetch"es against the same repo. The fix is to simply handle mkdir() failing with EEXIST as a success. If EEXIST is somehow returned for the wrong reasons (because the relevant objects/XX is not a directory, or is otherwise unsuitable for object storage), the following call to adjust_shared_perm(), or ultimately the retried call to git_mkstemp_mode() will fail, and we end up returning error from create_tmpfile() in any case. Note that there are still cases where two users with unsuitable umasks in a shared repo can end up in two races where one user first wins the mkdir() race to create an objects/XX/ directory, and then the other user wins the adjust_shared_perms() race to chmod() that directory, but fails because it is (transiently, until the first users completes its chmod()) unwriteable to the other user. However, (an equivalent of) this race also exists before this patch, and is made no worse by this patch. Signed-off-by: Johan Herland <johan@herland.net> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2013-10-27 12:35:43 +01:00
return -1;
if (adjust_shared_perm(tmp->buf))
return -1;
/* Try again */
strbuf_addstr(tmp, "/tmp_obj_XXXXXX");
fd = git_mkstemp_mode(tmp->buf, 0444);
}
return fd;
}
static int write_loose_object(const unsigned char *sha1, char *hdr, int hdrlen,
const void *buf, unsigned long len, time_t mtime)
{
int fd, ret;
unsigned char compressed[4096];
2011-06-10 20:52:15 +02:00
git_zstream stream;
sha1_file: be paranoid when creating loose objects We don't want the data being deflated and stored into loose objects to be different from what we expect. While the deflated data is protected by a CRC which is good enough for safe data retrieval operations, we still want to be doubly sure that the source data used at object creation time is still what we expected once that data has been deflated and its CRC32 computed. The most plausible data corruption may occur if the source file is modified while Git is deflating and writing it out in a loose object. Or Git itself could have a bug causing memory corruption. Or even bad RAM could cause trouble. So it is best to make sure everything is coherent and checksum protected from beginning to end. To do so we compute the SHA1 of the data being deflated _after_ the deflate operation has consumed that data, and make sure it matches with the expected SHA1. This way we can rely on the CRC32 checked by the inflate operation to provide a good indication that the data is still coherent with its SHA1 hash. One pathological case we ignore is when the data is modified before (or during) deflate call, but changed back before it is hashed. There is some overhead of course. Using 'git add' on a set of large files: Before: real 0m25.210s user 0m23.783s sys 0m1.408s After: real 0m26.537s user 0m25.175s sys 0m1.358s The overhead is around 5% for full data coherency guarantee. Signed-off-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@fluxnic.net> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2010-02-21 21:48:06 +01:00
git_SHA_CTX c;
unsigned char parano_sha1[20];
static struct strbuf tmp_file = STRBUF_INIT;
const char *filename = sha1_file_name(sha1);
fd = create_tmpfile(&tmp_file, filename);
if (fd < 0) {
if (errno == EACCES)
return error("insufficient permission for adding an object to repository database %s", get_object_directory());
else
return error("unable to create temporary file: %s", strerror(errno));
}
/* Set it up */
git_deflate_init(&stream, zlib_compression_level);
stream.next_out = compressed;
stream.avail_out = sizeof(compressed);
sha1_file: be paranoid when creating loose objects We don't want the data being deflated and stored into loose objects to be different from what we expect. While the deflated data is protected by a CRC which is good enough for safe data retrieval operations, we still want to be doubly sure that the source data used at object creation time is still what we expected once that data has been deflated and its CRC32 computed. The most plausible data corruption may occur if the source file is modified while Git is deflating and writing it out in a loose object. Or Git itself could have a bug causing memory corruption. Or even bad RAM could cause trouble. So it is best to make sure everything is coherent and checksum protected from beginning to end. To do so we compute the SHA1 of the data being deflated _after_ the deflate operation has consumed that data, and make sure it matches with the expected SHA1. This way we can rely on the CRC32 checked by the inflate operation to provide a good indication that the data is still coherent with its SHA1 hash. One pathological case we ignore is when the data is modified before (or during) deflate call, but changed back before it is hashed. There is some overhead of course. Using 'git add' on a set of large files: Before: real 0m25.210s user 0m23.783s sys 0m1.408s After: real 0m26.537s user 0m25.175s sys 0m1.358s The overhead is around 5% for full data coherency guarantee. Signed-off-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@fluxnic.net> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2010-02-21 21:48:06 +01:00
git_SHA1_Init(&c);
/* First header.. */
stream.next_in = (unsigned char *)hdr;
stream.avail_in = hdrlen;
while (git_deflate(&stream, 0) == Z_OK)
; /* nothing */
sha1_file: be paranoid when creating loose objects We don't want the data being deflated and stored into loose objects to be different from what we expect. While the deflated data is protected by a CRC which is good enough for safe data retrieval operations, we still want to be doubly sure that the source data used at object creation time is still what we expected once that data has been deflated and its CRC32 computed. The most plausible data corruption may occur if the source file is modified while Git is deflating and writing it out in a loose object. Or Git itself could have a bug causing memory corruption. Or even bad RAM could cause trouble. So it is best to make sure everything is coherent and checksum protected from beginning to end. To do so we compute the SHA1 of the data being deflated _after_ the deflate operation has consumed that data, and make sure it matches with the expected SHA1. This way we can rely on the CRC32 checked by the inflate operation to provide a good indication that the data is still coherent with its SHA1 hash. One pathological case we ignore is when the data is modified before (or during) deflate call, but changed back before it is hashed. There is some overhead of course. Using 'git add' on a set of large files: Before: real 0m25.210s user 0m23.783s sys 0m1.408s After: real 0m26.537s user 0m25.175s sys 0m1.358s The overhead is around 5% for full data coherency guarantee. Signed-off-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@fluxnic.net> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2010-02-21 21:48:06 +01:00
git_SHA1_Update(&c, hdr, hdrlen);
/* Then the data itself.. */
stream.next_in = (void *)buf;
stream.avail_in = len;
do {
sha1_file: be paranoid when creating loose objects We don't want the data being deflated and stored into loose objects to be different from what we expect. While the deflated data is protected by a CRC which is good enough for safe data retrieval operations, we still want to be doubly sure that the source data used at object creation time is still what we expected once that data has been deflated and its CRC32 computed. The most plausible data corruption may occur if the source file is modified while Git is deflating and writing it out in a loose object. Or Git itself could have a bug causing memory corruption. Or even bad RAM could cause trouble. So it is best to make sure everything is coherent and checksum protected from beginning to end. To do so we compute the SHA1 of the data being deflated _after_ the deflate operation has consumed that data, and make sure it matches with the expected SHA1. This way we can rely on the CRC32 checked by the inflate operation to provide a good indication that the data is still coherent with its SHA1 hash. One pathological case we ignore is when the data is modified before (or during) deflate call, but changed back before it is hashed. There is some overhead of course. Using 'git add' on a set of large files: Before: real 0m25.210s user 0m23.783s sys 0m1.408s After: real 0m26.537s user 0m25.175s sys 0m1.358s The overhead is around 5% for full data coherency guarantee. Signed-off-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@fluxnic.net> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2010-02-21 21:48:06 +01:00
unsigned char *in0 = stream.next_in;
ret = git_deflate(&stream, Z_FINISH);
sha1_file: be paranoid when creating loose objects We don't want the data being deflated and stored into loose objects to be different from what we expect. While the deflated data is protected by a CRC which is good enough for safe data retrieval operations, we still want to be doubly sure that the source data used at object creation time is still what we expected once that data has been deflated and its CRC32 computed. The most plausible data corruption may occur if the source file is modified while Git is deflating and writing it out in a loose object. Or Git itself could have a bug causing memory corruption. Or even bad RAM could cause trouble. So it is best to make sure everything is coherent and checksum protected from beginning to end. To do so we compute the SHA1 of the data being deflated _after_ the deflate operation has consumed that data, and make sure it matches with the expected SHA1. This way we can rely on the CRC32 checked by the inflate operation to provide a good indication that the data is still coherent with its SHA1 hash. One pathological case we ignore is when the data is modified before (or during) deflate call, but changed back before it is hashed. There is some overhead of course. Using 'git add' on a set of large files: Before: real 0m25.210s user 0m23.783s sys 0m1.408s After: real 0m26.537s user 0m25.175s sys 0m1.358s The overhead is around 5% for full data coherency guarantee. Signed-off-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@fluxnic.net> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2010-02-21 21:48:06 +01:00
git_SHA1_Update(&c, in0, stream.next_in - in0);
if (write_buffer(fd, compressed, stream.next_out - compressed) < 0)
die("unable to write sha1 file");
stream.next_out = compressed;
stream.avail_out = sizeof(compressed);
} while (ret == Z_OK);
if (ret != Z_STREAM_END)
die("unable to deflate new object %s (%d)", sha1_to_hex(sha1), ret);
ret = git_deflate_end_gently(&stream);
if (ret != Z_OK)
die("deflateEnd on object %s failed (%d)", sha1_to_hex(sha1), ret);
sha1_file: be paranoid when creating loose objects We don't want the data being deflated and stored into loose objects to be different from what we expect. While the deflated data is protected by a CRC which is good enough for safe data retrieval operations, we still want to be doubly sure that the source data used at object creation time is still what we expected once that data has been deflated and its CRC32 computed. The most plausible data corruption may occur if the source file is modified while Git is deflating and writing it out in a loose object. Or Git itself could have a bug causing memory corruption. Or even bad RAM could cause trouble. So it is best to make sure everything is coherent and checksum protected from beginning to end. To do so we compute the SHA1 of the data being deflated _after_ the deflate operation has consumed that data, and make sure it matches with the expected SHA1. This way we can rely on the CRC32 checked by the inflate operation to provide a good indication that the data is still coherent with its SHA1 hash. One pathological case we ignore is when the data is modified before (or during) deflate call, but changed back before it is hashed. There is some overhead of course. Using 'git add' on a set of large files: Before: real 0m25.210s user 0m23.783s sys 0m1.408s After: real 0m26.537s user 0m25.175s sys 0m1.358s The overhead is around 5% for full data coherency guarantee. Signed-off-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@fluxnic.net> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2010-02-21 21:48:06 +01:00
git_SHA1_Final(parano_sha1, &c);
if (hashcmp(sha1, parano_sha1) != 0)
die("confused by unstable object source data for %s", sha1_to_hex(sha1));
close_sha1_file(fd);
if (mtime) {
struct utimbuf utb;
utb.actime = mtime;
utb.modtime = mtime;
if (utime(tmp_file.buf, &utb) < 0)
warning("failed utime() on %s: %s",
tmp_file.buf, strerror(errno));
}
return finalize_object_file(tmp_file.buf, filename);
}
static int freshen_loose_object(const unsigned char *sha1)
{
return check_and_freshen(sha1, 1);
}
static int freshen_packed_object(const unsigned char *sha1)
{
struct pack_entry e;
if (!find_pack_entry(sha1, &e))
return 0;
if (e.p->freshened)
return 1;
if (!freshen_file(e.p->pack_name))
return 0;
e.p->freshened = 1;
return 1;
}
int write_sha1_file(const void *buf, unsigned long len, const char *type, unsigned char *sha1)
{
char hdr[32];
int hdrlen = sizeof(hdr);
/* Normally if we have it in the pack then we do not bother writing
* it out into .git/objects/??/?{38} file.
*/
write_sha1_file_prepare(buf, len, type, sha1, hdr, &hdrlen);
if (freshen_packed_object(sha1) || freshen_loose_object(sha1))
return 0;
return write_loose_object(sha1, hdr, hdrlen, buf, len, 0);
}
int hash_sha1_file_literally(const void *buf, unsigned long len, const char *type,
unsigned char *sha1, unsigned flags)
{
char *header;
int hdrlen, status = 0;
/* type string, SP, %lu of the length plus NUL must fit this */
hdrlen = strlen(type) + 32;
header = xmalloc(hdrlen);
write_sha1_file_prepare(buf, len, type, sha1, header, &hdrlen);
if (!(flags & HASH_WRITE_OBJECT))
goto cleanup;
if (freshen_packed_object(sha1) || freshen_loose_object(sha1))
goto cleanup;
status = write_loose_object(sha1, header, hdrlen, buf, len, 0);
cleanup:
free(header);
return status;
}
int force_object_loose(const unsigned char *sha1, time_t mtime)
{
void *buf;
unsigned long len;
enum object_type type;
char hdr[32];
int hdrlen;
int ret;
if (has_loose_object(sha1))
return 0;
buf = read_packed_sha1(sha1, &type, &len);
if (!buf)
return error("cannot read sha1_file for %s", sha1_to_hex(sha1));
hdrlen = xsnprintf(hdr, sizeof(hdr), "%s %lu", typename(type), len) + 1;
ret = write_loose_object(sha1, hdr, hdrlen, buf, len, mtime);
free(buf);
return ret;
}
int has_pack_index(const unsigned char *sha1)
{
struct stat st;
if (stat(sha1_pack_index_name(sha1), &st))
return 0;
return 1;
}
int has_sha1_pack(const unsigned char *sha1)
{
struct pack_entry e;
return find_pack_entry(sha1, &e);
}
int has_sha1_file_with_flags(const unsigned char *sha1, int flags)
{
struct pack_entry e;
if (find_pack_entry(sha1, &e))
return 1;
has_sha1_file: re-check pack directory before giving up When we read a sha1 file, we first look for a packed version, then a loose version, and then re-check the pack directory again before concluding that we cannot find it. This lets us handle a process that is writing to the repository simultaneously (e.g., receive-pack writing a new pack followed by a ref update, or git-repack packing existing loose objects into a new pack). However, we do not do the same trick with has_sha1_file; we only check the packed objects once, followed by loose objects. This means that we might incorrectly report that we do not have an object, even though we could find it if we simply re-checked the pack directory. By itself, this is usually not a big deal. The other process is running simultaneously, so we may run has_sha1_file before it writes, anyway. It is a race whether we see the object or not. However, we may also see other things the writing process has done (like updating refs); and in that case, we must be able to also see the new objects. For example, imagine we are doing a for_each_ref iteration, and somebody simultaneously pushes. Receive-pack may write the pack and update a ref after we have examined the objects/pack directory, but before the iteration gets to the updated ref. When we do finally see the updated ref, for_each_ref will call has_sha1_file to check whether the ref is broken. If has_sha1_file returns the wrong answer, we erroneously will think that the ref is broken. For a normal iteration without DO_FOR_EACH_INCLUDE_BROKEN, this means that the caller does not see the ref at all (neither the old nor the new value). So not only will we fail to see the new value of the ref (which is acceptable, since we are running simultaneously with the writer, and we might well read the ref before the writer commits its write), but we will not see the old value either. For programs that act on reachability like pack-objects or prune, this can cause data loss, as we may see the objects referenced by the original ref value as dangling (and either omit them from the pack, or delete them via prune). There's no test included here, because the success case is two processes running simultaneously forever. But you can replicate the issue with: # base.sh # run this in one terminal; it creates and pushes # repeatedly to a repository git init parent && (cd parent && # create a base commit that will trigger us looking at # the objects/pack directory before we hit the updated ref echo content >file && git add file && git commit -m base && # set the unpack limit abnormally low, which # lets us simulate full-size pushes using tiny ones git config receive.unpackLimit 1 ) && git clone parent child && cd child && n=0 && while true; do echo $n >file && git add file && git commit -m $n && git push origin HEAD:refs/remotes/child/master && n=$(($n + 1)) done # fsck.sh # now run this simultaneously in another terminal; it # repeatedly fscks, looking for us to consider the # newly-pushed ref broken. We cannot use for-each-ref # here, as it uses DO_FOR_EACH_INCLUDE_BROKEN, which # skips the has_sha1_file check (and if it wants # more information on the object, it will actually read # the object, which does the proper two-step lookup) cd parent && while true; do broken=`git fsck 2>&1 | grep remotes/child` if test -n "$broken"; then echo $broken exit 1 fi done Without this patch, the fsck loop fails within a few seconds (and almost instantly if the test repository actually has a large number of refs). With it, the two can run indefinitely. Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2013-08-30 21:14:13 +02:00
if (has_loose_object(sha1))
return 1;
if (flags & HAS_SHA1_QUICK)
return 0;
has_sha1_file: re-check pack directory before giving up When we read a sha1 file, we first look for a packed version, then a loose version, and then re-check the pack directory again before concluding that we cannot find it. This lets us handle a process that is writing to the repository simultaneously (e.g., receive-pack writing a new pack followed by a ref update, or git-repack packing existing loose objects into a new pack). However, we do not do the same trick with has_sha1_file; we only check the packed objects once, followed by loose objects. This means that we might incorrectly report that we do not have an object, even though we could find it if we simply re-checked the pack directory. By itself, this is usually not a big deal. The other process is running simultaneously, so we may run has_sha1_file before it writes, anyway. It is a race whether we see the object or not. However, we may also see other things the writing process has done (like updating refs); and in that case, we must be able to also see the new objects. For example, imagine we are doing a for_each_ref iteration, and somebody simultaneously pushes. Receive-pack may write the pack and update a ref after we have examined the objects/pack directory, but before the iteration gets to the updated ref. When we do finally see the updated ref, for_each_ref will call has_sha1_file to check whether the ref is broken. If has_sha1_file returns the wrong answer, we erroneously will think that the ref is broken. For a normal iteration without DO_FOR_EACH_INCLUDE_BROKEN, this means that the caller does not see the ref at all (neither the old nor the new value). So not only will we fail to see the new value of the ref (which is acceptable, since we are running simultaneously with the writer, and we might well read the ref before the writer commits its write), but we will not see the old value either. For programs that act on reachability like pack-objects or prune, this can cause data loss, as we may see the objects referenced by the original ref value as dangling (and either omit them from the pack, or delete them via prune). There's no test included here, because the success case is two processes running simultaneously forever. But you can replicate the issue with: # base.sh # run this in one terminal; it creates and pushes # repeatedly to a repository git init parent && (cd parent && # create a base commit that will trigger us looking at # the objects/pack directory before we hit the updated ref echo content >file && git add file && git commit -m base && # set the unpack limit abnormally low, which # lets us simulate full-size pushes using tiny ones git config receive.unpackLimit 1 ) && git clone parent child && cd child && n=0 && while true; do echo $n >file && git add file && git commit -m $n && git push origin HEAD:refs/remotes/child/master && n=$(($n + 1)) done # fsck.sh # now run this simultaneously in another terminal; it # repeatedly fscks, looking for us to consider the # newly-pushed ref broken. We cannot use for-each-ref # here, as it uses DO_FOR_EACH_INCLUDE_BROKEN, which # skips the has_sha1_file check (and if it wants # more information on the object, it will actually read # the object, which does the proper two-step lookup) cd parent && while true; do broken=`git fsck 2>&1 | grep remotes/child` if test -n "$broken"; then echo $broken exit 1 fi done Without this patch, the fsck loop fails within a few seconds (and almost instantly if the test repository actually has a large number of refs). With it, the two can run indefinitely. Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2013-08-30 21:14:13 +02:00
reprepare_packed_git();
return find_pack_entry(sha1, &e);
}
int has_object_file(const struct object_id *oid)
{
return has_sha1_file(oid->hash);
}
static void check_tree(const void *buf, size_t size)
{
struct tree_desc desc;
struct name_entry entry;
init_tree_desc(&desc, buf, size);
while (tree_entry(&desc, &entry))
/* do nothing
* tree_entry() will die() on malformed entries */
;
}
static void check_commit(const void *buf, size_t size)
{
struct commit c;
memset(&c, 0, sizeof(c));
if (parse_commit_buffer(&c, buf, size))
die("corrupt commit");
}
static void check_tag(const void *buf, size_t size)
{
struct tag t;
memset(&t, 0, sizeof(t));
if (parse_tag_buffer(&t, buf, size))
die("corrupt tag");
}
static int index_mem(unsigned char *sha1, void *buf, size_t size,
enum object_type type,
const char *path, unsigned flags)
{
Lazy man's auto-CRLF It currently does NOT know about file attributes, so it does its conversion purely based on content. Maybe that is more in the "git philosophy" anyway, since content is king, but I think we should try to do the file attributes to turn it off on demand. Anyway, BY DEFAULT it is off regardless, because it requires a [core] AutoCRLF = true in your config file to be enabled. We could make that the default for Windows, of course, the same way we do some other things (filemode etc). But you can actually enable it on UNIX, and it will cause: - "git update-index" will write blobs without CRLF - "git diff" will diff working tree files without CRLF - "git checkout" will write files to the working tree _with_ CRLF and things work fine. Funnily, it actually shows an odd file in git itself: git clone -n git test-crlf cd test-crlf git config core.autocrlf true git checkout git diff shows a diff for "Documentation/docbook-xsl.css". Why? Because we have actually checked in that file *with* CRLF! So when "core.autocrlf" is true, we'll always generate a *different* hash for it in the index, because the index hash will be for the content _without_ CRLF. Is this complete? I dunno. It seems to work for me. It doesn't use the filename at all right now, and that's probably a deficiency (we could certainly make the "is_binary()" heuristics also take standard filename heuristics into account). I don't pass in the filename at all for the "index_fd()" case (git-update-index), so that would need to be passed around, but this actually works fine. NOTE NOTE NOTE! The "is_binary()" heuristics are totally made-up by yours truly. I will not guarantee that they work at all reasonable. Caveat emptor. But it _is_ simple, and it _is_ safe, since it's all off by default. The patch is pretty simple - the biggest part is the new "convert.c" file, but even that is really just basic stuff that anybody can write in "Teaching C 101" as a final project for their first class in programming. Not to say that it's bug-free, of course - but at least we're not talking about rocket surgery here. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
2007-02-13 20:07:23 +01:00
int ret, re_allocated = 0;
int write_object = flags & HASH_WRITE_OBJECT;
if (!type)
type = OBJ_BLOB;
Lazy man's auto-CRLF It currently does NOT know about file attributes, so it does its conversion purely based on content. Maybe that is more in the "git philosophy" anyway, since content is king, but I think we should try to do the file attributes to turn it off on demand. Anyway, BY DEFAULT it is off regardless, because it requires a [core] AutoCRLF = true in your config file to be enabled. We could make that the default for Windows, of course, the same way we do some other things (filemode etc). But you can actually enable it on UNIX, and it will cause: - "git update-index" will write blobs without CRLF - "git diff" will diff working tree files without CRLF - "git checkout" will write files to the working tree _with_ CRLF and things work fine. Funnily, it actually shows an odd file in git itself: git clone -n git test-crlf cd test-crlf git config core.autocrlf true git checkout git diff shows a diff for "Documentation/docbook-xsl.css". Why? Because we have actually checked in that file *with* CRLF! So when "core.autocrlf" is true, we'll always generate a *different* hash for it in the index, because the index hash will be for the content _without_ CRLF. Is this complete? I dunno. It seems to work for me. It doesn't use the filename at all right now, and that's probably a deficiency (we could certainly make the "is_binary()" heuristics also take standard filename heuristics into account). I don't pass in the filename at all for the "index_fd()" case (git-update-index), so that would need to be passed around, but this actually works fine. NOTE NOTE NOTE! The "is_binary()" heuristics are totally made-up by yours truly. I will not guarantee that they work at all reasonable. Caveat emptor. But it _is_ simple, and it _is_ safe, since it's all off by default. The patch is pretty simple - the biggest part is the new "convert.c" file, but even that is really just basic stuff that anybody can write in "Teaching C 101" as a final project for their first class in programming. Not to say that it's bug-free, of course - but at least we're not talking about rocket surgery here. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
2007-02-13 20:07:23 +01:00
/*
* Convert blobs to git internal format
*/
if ((type == OBJ_BLOB) && path) {
struct strbuf nbuf = STRBUF_INIT;
safecrlf: Add mechanism to warn about irreversible crlf conversions CRLF conversion bears a slight chance of corrupting data. autocrlf=true will convert CRLF to LF during commit and LF to CRLF during checkout. A file that contains a mixture of LF and CRLF before the commit cannot be recreated by git. For text files this is the right thing to do: it corrects line endings such that we have only LF line endings in the repository. But for binary files that are accidentally classified as text the conversion can corrupt data. If you recognize such corruption early you can easily fix it by setting the conversion type explicitly in .gitattributes. Right after committing you still have the original file in your work tree and this file is not yet corrupted. You can explicitly tell git that this file is binary and git will handle the file appropriately. Unfortunately, the desired effect of cleaning up text files with mixed line endings and the undesired effect of corrupting binary files cannot be distinguished. In both cases CRLFs are removed in an irreversible way. For text files this is the right thing to do because CRLFs are line endings, while for binary files converting CRLFs corrupts data. This patch adds a mechanism that can either warn the user about an irreversible conversion or can even refuse to convert. The mechanism is controlled by the variable core.safecrlf, with the following values: - false: disable safecrlf mechanism - warn: warn about irreversible conversions - true: refuse irreversible conversions The default is to warn. Users are only affected by this default if core.autocrlf is set. But the current default of git is to leave core.autocrlf unset, so users will not see warnings unless they deliberately chose to activate the autocrlf mechanism. The safecrlf mechanism's details depend on the git command. The general principles when safecrlf is active (not false) are: - we warn/error out if files in the work tree can modified in an irreversible way without giving the user a chance to backup the original file. - for read-only operations that do not modify files in the work tree we do not not print annoying warnings. There are exceptions. Even though... - "git add" itself does not touch the files in the work tree, the next checkout would, so the safety triggers; - "git apply" to update a text file with a patch does touch the files in the work tree, but the operation is about text files and CRLF conversion is about fixing the line ending inconsistencies, so the safety does not trigger; - "git diff" itself does not touch the files in the work tree, it is often run to inspect the changes you intend to next "git add". To catch potential problems early, safety triggers. The concept of a safety check was originally proposed in a similar way by Linus Torvalds. Thanks to Dimitry Potapov for insisting on getting the naked LF/autocrlf=true case right. Signed-off-by: Steffen Prohaska <prohaska@zib.de>
2008-02-06 12:25:58 +01:00
if (convert_to_git(path, buf, size, &nbuf,
write_object ? safe_crlf : SAFE_CRLF_FALSE)) {
buf = strbuf_detach(&nbuf, &size);
Lazy man's auto-CRLF It currently does NOT know about file attributes, so it does its conversion purely based on content. Maybe that is more in the "git philosophy" anyway, since content is king, but I think we should try to do the file attributes to turn it off on demand. Anyway, BY DEFAULT it is off regardless, because it requires a [core] AutoCRLF = true in your config file to be enabled. We could make that the default for Windows, of course, the same way we do some other things (filemode etc). But you can actually enable it on UNIX, and it will cause: - "git update-index" will write blobs without CRLF - "git diff" will diff working tree files without CRLF - "git checkout" will write files to the working tree _with_ CRLF and things work fine. Funnily, it actually shows an odd file in git itself: git clone -n git test-crlf cd test-crlf git config core.autocrlf true git checkout git diff shows a diff for "Documentation/docbook-xsl.css". Why? Because we have actually checked in that file *with* CRLF! So when "core.autocrlf" is true, we'll always generate a *different* hash for it in the index, because the index hash will be for the content _without_ CRLF. Is this complete? I dunno. It seems to work for me. It doesn't use the filename at all right now, and that's probably a deficiency (we could certainly make the "is_binary()" heuristics also take standard filename heuristics into account). I don't pass in the filename at all for the "index_fd()" case (git-update-index), so that would need to be passed around, but this actually works fine. NOTE NOTE NOTE! The "is_binary()" heuristics are totally made-up by yours truly. I will not guarantee that they work at all reasonable. Caveat emptor. But it _is_ simple, and it _is_ safe, since it's all off by default. The patch is pretty simple - the biggest part is the new "convert.c" file, but even that is really just basic stuff that anybody can write in "Teaching C 101" as a final project for their first class in programming. Not to say that it's bug-free, of course - but at least we're not talking about rocket surgery here. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
2007-02-13 20:07:23 +01:00
re_allocated = 1;
}
}
if (flags & HASH_FORMAT_CHECK) {
if (type == OBJ_TREE)
check_tree(buf, size);
if (type == OBJ_COMMIT)
check_commit(buf, size);
if (type == OBJ_TAG)
check_tag(buf, size);
}
Lazy man's auto-CRLF It currently does NOT know about file attributes, so it does its conversion purely based on content. Maybe that is more in the "git philosophy" anyway, since content is king, but I think we should try to do the file attributes to turn it off on demand. Anyway, BY DEFAULT it is off regardless, because it requires a [core] AutoCRLF = true in your config file to be enabled. We could make that the default for Windows, of course, the same way we do some other things (filemode etc). But you can actually enable it on UNIX, and it will cause: - "git update-index" will write blobs without CRLF - "git diff" will diff working tree files without CRLF - "git checkout" will write files to the working tree _with_ CRLF and things work fine. Funnily, it actually shows an odd file in git itself: git clone -n git test-crlf cd test-crlf git config core.autocrlf true git checkout git diff shows a diff for "Documentation/docbook-xsl.css". Why? Because we have actually checked in that file *with* CRLF! So when "core.autocrlf" is true, we'll always generate a *different* hash for it in the index, because the index hash will be for the content _without_ CRLF. Is this complete? I dunno. It seems to work for me. It doesn't use the filename at all right now, and that's probably a deficiency (we could certainly make the "is_binary()" heuristics also take standard filename heuristics into account). I don't pass in the filename at all for the "index_fd()" case (git-update-index), so that would need to be passed around, but this actually works fine. NOTE NOTE NOTE! The "is_binary()" heuristics are totally made-up by yours truly. I will not guarantee that they work at all reasonable. Caveat emptor. But it _is_ simple, and it _is_ safe, since it's all off by default. The patch is pretty simple - the biggest part is the new "convert.c" file, but even that is really just basic stuff that anybody can write in "Teaching C 101" as a final project for their first class in programming. Not to say that it's bug-free, of course - but at least we're not talking about rocket surgery here. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
2007-02-13 20:07:23 +01:00
if (write_object)
ret = write_sha1_file(buf, size, typename(type), sha1);
else
ret = hash_sha1_file(buf, size, typename(type), sha1);
if (re_allocated)
Lazy man's auto-CRLF It currently does NOT know about file attributes, so it does its conversion purely based on content. Maybe that is more in the "git philosophy" anyway, since content is king, but I think we should try to do the file attributes to turn it off on demand. Anyway, BY DEFAULT it is off regardless, because it requires a [core] AutoCRLF = true in your config file to be enabled. We could make that the default for Windows, of course, the same way we do some other things (filemode etc). But you can actually enable it on UNIX, and it will cause: - "git update-index" will write blobs without CRLF - "git diff" will diff working tree files without CRLF - "git checkout" will write files to the working tree _with_ CRLF and things work fine. Funnily, it actually shows an odd file in git itself: git clone -n git test-crlf cd test-crlf git config core.autocrlf true git checkout git diff shows a diff for "Documentation/docbook-xsl.css". Why? Because we have actually checked in that file *with* CRLF! So when "core.autocrlf" is true, we'll always generate a *different* hash for it in the index, because the index hash will be for the content _without_ CRLF. Is this complete? I dunno. It seems to work for me. It doesn't use the filename at all right now, and that's probably a deficiency (we could certainly make the "is_binary()" heuristics also take standard filename heuristics into account). I don't pass in the filename at all for the "index_fd()" case (git-update-index), so that would need to be passed around, but this actually works fine. NOTE NOTE NOTE! The "is_binary()" heuristics are totally made-up by yours truly. I will not guarantee that they work at all reasonable. Caveat emptor. But it _is_ simple, and it _is_ safe, since it's all off by default. The patch is pretty simple - the biggest part is the new "convert.c" file, but even that is really just basic stuff that anybody can write in "Teaching C 101" as a final project for their first class in programming. Not to say that it's bug-free, of course - but at least we're not talking about rocket surgery here. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
2007-02-13 20:07:23 +01:00
free(buf);
return ret;
}
convert: stream from fd to required clean filter to reduce used address space The data is streamed to the filter process anyway. Better avoid mapping the file if possible. This is especially useful if a clean filter reduces the size, for example if it computes a sha1 for binary data, like git media. The file size that the previous implementation could handle was limited by the available address space; large files for example could not be handled with (32-bit) msysgit. The new implementation can filter files of any size as long as the filter output is small enough. The new code path is only taken if the filter is required. The filter consumes data directly from the fd. If it fails, the original data is not immediately available. The condition can easily be handled as a fatal error, which is expected for a required filter anyway. If the filter was not required, the condition would need to be handled in a different way, like seeking to 0 and reading the data. But this would require more restructuring of the code and is probably not worth it. The obvious approach of falling back to reading all data would not help achieving the main purpose of this patch, which is to handle large files with limited address space. If reading all data is an option, we can simply take the old code path right away and mmap the entire file. The environment variable GIT_MMAP_LIMIT, which has been introduced in a previous commit is used to test that the expected code path is taken. A related test that exercises required filters is modified to verify that the data actually has been modified on its way from the file system to the object store. Signed-off-by: Steffen Prohaska <prohaska@zib.de> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2014-08-26 17:23:25 +02:00
static int index_stream_convert_blob(unsigned char *sha1, int fd,
const char *path, unsigned flags)
{
int ret;
const int write_object = flags & HASH_WRITE_OBJECT;
struct strbuf sbuf = STRBUF_INIT;
assert(path);
assert(would_convert_to_git_filter_fd(path));
convert_to_git_filter_fd(path, fd, &sbuf,
write_object ? safe_crlf : SAFE_CRLF_FALSE);
if (write_object)
ret = write_sha1_file(sbuf.buf, sbuf.len, typename(OBJ_BLOB),
sha1);
else
ret = hash_sha1_file(sbuf.buf, sbuf.len, typename(OBJ_BLOB),
sha1);
strbuf_release(&sbuf);
return ret;
}
static int index_pipe(unsigned char *sha1, int fd, enum object_type type,
const char *path, unsigned flags)
{
struct strbuf sbuf = STRBUF_INIT;
int ret;
if (strbuf_read(&sbuf, fd, 4096) >= 0)
ret = index_mem(sha1, sbuf.buf, sbuf.len, type, path, flags);
else
ret = -1;
strbuf_release(&sbuf);
return ret;
}
#define SMALL_FILE_SIZE (32*1024)
static int index_core(unsigned char *sha1, int fd, size_t size,
enum object_type type, const char *path,
unsigned flags)
{
int ret;
if (!size) {
ret = index_mem(sha1, "", size, type, path, flags);
} else if (size <= SMALL_FILE_SIZE) {
char *buf = xmalloc(size);
if (size == read_in_full(fd, buf, size))
ret = index_mem(sha1, buf, size, type, path, flags);
else
ret = error("short read %s", strerror(errno));
free(buf);
} else {
void *buf = xmmap(NULL, size, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, fd, 0);
ret = index_mem(sha1, buf, size, type, path, flags);
munmap(buf, size);
}
return ret;
}
/*
* This creates one packfile per large blob unless bulk-checkin
* machinery is "plugged".
*
* This also bypasses the usual "convert-to-git" dance, and that is on
* purpose. We could write a streaming version of the converting
* functions and insert that before feeding the data to fast-import
do not stream large files to pack when filters are in use Because git's object format requires us to specify the number of bytes in the object in its header, we must know the size before streaming a blob into the object database. This is not a problem when adding a regular file, as we can get the size from stat(). However, when filters are in use (such as autocrlf, or the ident, filter, or eol gitattributes), we have no idea what the ultimate size will be. The current code just punts on the whole issue and ignores filter configuration entirely for files larger than core.bigfilethreshold. This can generate confusing results if you use filters for large binary files, as the filter will suddenly stop working as the file goes over a certain size. Rather than try to handle unknown input sizes with streaming, this patch just turns off the streaming optimization when filters are in use. This has a slight performance regression in a very specific case: if you have autocrlf on, but no gitattributes, a large binary file will avoid the streaming code path because we don't know beforehand whether it will need conversion or not. But if you are handling large binary files, you should be marking them as such via attributes (or at least not using autocrlf, and instead marking your text files as such). And the flip side is that if you have a large _non_-binary file, there is a correctness improvement; before we did not apply the conversion at all. The first half of the new t1051 script covers these failures on input. The second half tests the matching output code paths. These already work correctly, and do not need any adjustment. Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2012-02-24 23:10:17 +01:00
* (or equivalent in-core API described above). However, that is
* somewhat complicated, as we do not know the size of the filter
* result, which we need to know beforehand when writing a git object.
* Since the primary motivation for trying to stream from the working
* tree file and to avoid mmaping it in core is to deal with large
* binary blobs, they generally do not want to get any conversion, and
* callers should avoid this code path when filters are requested.
*/
static int index_stream(unsigned char *sha1, int fd, size_t size,
enum object_type type, const char *path,
unsigned flags)
{
return index_bulk_checkin(sha1, fd, size, type, path, flags);
}
int index_fd(unsigned char *sha1, int fd, struct stat *st,
enum object_type type, const char *path, unsigned flags)
{
int ret;
/*
* Call xsize_t() only when needed to avoid potentially unnecessary
* die() for large files.
*/
convert: stream from fd to required clean filter to reduce used address space The data is streamed to the filter process anyway. Better avoid mapping the file if possible. This is especially useful if a clean filter reduces the size, for example if it computes a sha1 for binary data, like git media. The file size that the previous implementation could handle was limited by the available address space; large files for example could not be handled with (32-bit) msysgit. The new implementation can filter files of any size as long as the filter output is small enough. The new code path is only taken if the filter is required. The filter consumes data directly from the fd. If it fails, the original data is not immediately available. The condition can easily be handled as a fatal error, which is expected for a required filter anyway. If the filter was not required, the condition would need to be handled in a different way, like seeking to 0 and reading the data. But this would require more restructuring of the code and is probably not worth it. The obvious approach of falling back to reading all data would not help achieving the main purpose of this patch, which is to handle large files with limited address space. If reading all data is an option, we can simply take the old code path right away and mmap the entire file. The environment variable GIT_MMAP_LIMIT, which has been introduced in a previous commit is used to test that the expected code path is taken. A related test that exercises required filters is modified to verify that the data actually has been modified on its way from the file system to the object store. Signed-off-by: Steffen Prohaska <prohaska@zib.de> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2014-08-26 17:23:25 +02:00
if (type == OBJ_BLOB && path && would_convert_to_git_filter_fd(path))
ret = index_stream_convert_blob(sha1, fd, path, flags);
else if (!S_ISREG(st->st_mode))
ret = index_pipe(sha1, fd, type, path, flags);
else if (st->st_size <= big_file_threshold || type != OBJ_BLOB ||
(path && would_convert_to_git(path)))
ret = index_core(sha1, fd, xsize_t(st->st_size), type, path,
flags);
else
ret = index_stream(sha1, fd, xsize_t(st->st_size), type, path,
flags);
close(fd);
return ret;
}
int index_path(unsigned char *sha1, const char *path, struct stat *st, unsigned flags)
{
int fd;
struct strbuf sb = STRBUF_INIT;
switch (st->st_mode & S_IFMT) {
case S_IFREG:
fd = open(path, O_RDONLY);
if (fd < 0)
return error("open(\"%s\"): %s", path,
strerror(errno));
if (index_fd(sha1, fd, st, OBJ_BLOB, path, flags) < 0)
return error("%s: failed to insert into database",
path);
break;
case S_IFLNK:
if (strbuf_readlink(&sb, path, st->st_size)) {
char *errstr = strerror(errno);
return error("readlink(\"%s\"): %s", path,
errstr);
}
if (!(flags & HASH_WRITE_OBJECT))
hash_sha1_file(sb.buf, sb.len, blob_type, sha1);
else if (write_sha1_file(sb.buf, sb.len, blob_type, sha1))
return error("%s: failed to insert into database",
path);
strbuf_release(&sb);
break;
case S_IFDIR:
return resolve_gitlink_ref(path, "HEAD", sha1);
default:
return error("%s: unsupported file type", path);
}
return 0;
}
int read_pack_header(int fd, struct pack_header *header)
{
if (read_in_full(fd, header, sizeof(*header)) < sizeof(*header))
/* "eof before pack header was fully read" */
return PH_ERROR_EOF;
if (header->hdr_signature != htonl(PACK_SIGNATURE))
/* "protocol error (pack signature mismatch detected)" */
return PH_ERROR_PACK_SIGNATURE;
if (!pack_version_ok(header->hdr_version))
/* "protocol error (pack version unsupported)" */
return PH_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
return 0;
}
void assert_sha1_type(const unsigned char *sha1, enum object_type expect)
{
enum object_type type = sha1_object_info(sha1, NULL);
if (type < 0)
die("%s is not a valid object", sha1_to_hex(sha1));
if (type != expect)
die("%s is not a valid '%s' object", sha1_to_hex(sha1),
typename(expect));
}
static int for_each_file_in_obj_subdir(int subdir_nr,
struct strbuf *path,
each_loose_object_fn obj_cb,
each_loose_cruft_fn cruft_cb,
each_loose_subdir_fn subdir_cb,
void *data)
{
size_t baselen = path->len;
DIR *dir = opendir(path->buf);
struct dirent *de;
int r = 0;
if (!dir) {
if (errno == ENOENT)
return 0;
return error("unable to open %s: %s", path->buf, strerror(errno));
}
while ((de = readdir(dir))) {
if (is_dot_or_dotdot(de->d_name))
continue;
strbuf_setlen(path, baselen);
strbuf_addf(path, "/%s", de->d_name);
if (strlen(de->d_name) == 38) {
char hex[41];
unsigned char sha1[20];
snprintf(hex, sizeof(hex), "%02x%s",
subdir_nr, de->d_name);
if (!get_sha1_hex(hex, sha1)) {
if (obj_cb) {
r = obj_cb(sha1, path->buf, data);
if (r)
break;
}
continue;
}
}
if (cruft_cb) {
r = cruft_cb(de->d_name, path->buf, data);
if (r)
break;
}
}
closedir(dir);
strbuf_setlen(path, baselen);
if (!r && subdir_cb)
r = subdir_cb(subdir_nr, path->buf, data);
return r;
}
int for_each_loose_file_in_objdir_buf(struct strbuf *path,
each_loose_object_fn obj_cb,
each_loose_cruft_fn cruft_cb,
each_loose_subdir_fn subdir_cb,
void *data)
{
size_t baselen = path->len;
int r = 0;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
strbuf_addf(path, "/%02x", i);
r = for_each_file_in_obj_subdir(i, path, obj_cb, cruft_cb,
subdir_cb, data);
strbuf_setlen(path, baselen);
if (r)
break;
}
return r;
}
int for_each_loose_file_in_objdir(const char *path,
each_loose_object_fn obj_cb,
each_loose_cruft_fn cruft_cb,
each_loose_subdir_fn subdir_cb,
void *data)
{
struct strbuf buf = STRBUF_INIT;
int r;
strbuf_addstr(&buf, path);
r = for_each_loose_file_in_objdir_buf(&buf, obj_cb, cruft_cb,
subdir_cb, data);
strbuf_release(&buf);
return r;
}
struct loose_alt_odb_data {
each_loose_object_fn *cb;
void *data;
};
static int loose_from_alt_odb(struct alternate_object_database *alt,
void *vdata)
{
struct loose_alt_odb_data *data = vdata;
struct strbuf buf = STRBUF_INIT;
int r;
/* copy base not including trailing '/' */
strbuf_add(&buf, alt->base, alt->name - alt->base - 1);
r = for_each_loose_file_in_objdir_buf(&buf,
data->cb, NULL, NULL,
data->data);
strbuf_release(&buf);
return r;
}
reachable: only mark local objects as recent When pruning and repacking a repository that has an alternate object store configured, we may traverse a large number of objects in the alternate. This serves no purpose, and may be expensive to do. A longer explanation is below. Commits d3038d2 and abcb865 taught prune and pack-objects (respectively) to treat "recent" objects as tips for reachability, so that we keep whole chunks of history. They built on the object traversal in 660c889 (sha1_file: add for_each iterators for loose and packed objects, 2014-10-15), which covers both local and alternate objects. In both cases, covering alternate objects is unnecessary, as both commands can only drop objects from the local repository. In the case of prune, we traverse only the local object directory. And in the case of repacking, while we may or may not include local objects in our pack, we will never reach into the alternate with "repack -d". The "-l" option is only a question of whether we are migrating objects from the alternate into our repository, or leaving them untouched. It is possible that we may drop an object that is depended upon by another object in the alternate. For example, imagine two repositories, A and B, with A pointing to B as an alternate. Now imagine a commit that is in B which references a tree that is only in A. Traversing from recent objects in B might prevent A from dropping that tree. But this case isn't worth covering. Repo B should take responsibility for its own objects. It would never have had the commit in the first place if it did not also have the tree, and assuming it is using the same "keep recent chunks of history" scheme, then it would itself keep the tree, as well. So checking the alternate objects is not worth doing, and come with a significant performance impact. In both cases, we skip any recent objects that have already been marked SEEN (i.e., that we know are already reachable for prune, or included in the pack for a repack). So there is a slight waste of time in opening the alternate packs at all, only to notice that we have already considered each object. But much worse, the alternate repository may have a large number of objects that are not reachable from the local repository at all, and we end up adding them to the traversal. We can fix this by considering only local unseen objects. Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2015-03-27 12:32:41 +01:00
int for_each_loose_object(each_loose_object_fn cb, void *data, unsigned flags)
{
struct loose_alt_odb_data alt;
int r;
r = for_each_loose_file_in_objdir(get_object_directory(),
cb, NULL, NULL, data);
if (r)
return r;
reachable: only mark local objects as recent When pruning and repacking a repository that has an alternate object store configured, we may traverse a large number of objects in the alternate. This serves no purpose, and may be expensive to do. A longer explanation is below. Commits d3038d2 and abcb865 taught prune and pack-objects (respectively) to treat "recent" objects as tips for reachability, so that we keep whole chunks of history. They built on the object traversal in 660c889 (sha1_file: add for_each iterators for loose and packed objects, 2014-10-15), which covers both local and alternate objects. In both cases, covering alternate objects is unnecessary, as both commands can only drop objects from the local repository. In the case of prune, we traverse only the local object directory. And in the case of repacking, while we may or may not include local objects in our pack, we will never reach into the alternate with "repack -d". The "-l" option is only a question of whether we are migrating objects from the alternate into our repository, or leaving them untouched. It is possible that we may drop an object that is depended upon by another object in the alternate. For example, imagine two repositories, A and B, with A pointing to B as an alternate. Now imagine a commit that is in B which references a tree that is only in A. Traversing from recent objects in B might prevent A from dropping that tree. But this case isn't worth covering. Repo B should take responsibility for its own objects. It would never have had the commit in the first place if it did not also have the tree, and assuming it is using the same "keep recent chunks of history" scheme, then it would itself keep the tree, as well. So checking the alternate objects is not worth doing, and come with a significant performance impact. In both cases, we skip any recent objects that have already been marked SEEN (i.e., that we know are already reachable for prune, or included in the pack for a repack). So there is a slight waste of time in opening the alternate packs at all, only to notice that we have already considered each object. But much worse, the alternate repository may have a large number of objects that are not reachable from the local repository at all, and we end up adding them to the traversal. We can fix this by considering only local unseen objects. Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2015-03-27 12:32:41 +01:00
if (flags & FOR_EACH_OBJECT_LOCAL_ONLY)
return 0;
alt.cb = cb;
alt.data = data;
return foreach_alt_odb(loose_from_alt_odb, &alt);
}
static int for_each_object_in_pack(struct packed_git *p, each_packed_object_fn cb, void *data)
{
uint32_t i;
int r = 0;
for (i = 0; i < p->num_objects; i++) {
const unsigned char *sha1 = nth_packed_object_sha1(p, i);
if (!sha1)
return error("unable to get sha1 of object %u in %s",
i, p->pack_name);
r = cb(sha1, p, i, data);
if (r)
break;
}
return r;
}
reachable: only mark local objects as recent When pruning and repacking a repository that has an alternate object store configured, we may traverse a large number of objects in the alternate. This serves no purpose, and may be expensive to do. A longer explanation is below. Commits d3038d2 and abcb865 taught prune and pack-objects (respectively) to treat "recent" objects as tips for reachability, so that we keep whole chunks of history. They built on the object traversal in 660c889 (sha1_file: add for_each iterators for loose and packed objects, 2014-10-15), which covers both local and alternate objects. In both cases, covering alternate objects is unnecessary, as both commands can only drop objects from the local repository. In the case of prune, we traverse only the local object directory. And in the case of repacking, while we may or may not include local objects in our pack, we will never reach into the alternate with "repack -d". The "-l" option is only a question of whether we are migrating objects from the alternate into our repository, or leaving them untouched. It is possible that we may drop an object that is depended upon by another object in the alternate. For example, imagine two repositories, A and B, with A pointing to B as an alternate. Now imagine a commit that is in B which references a tree that is only in A. Traversing from recent objects in B might prevent A from dropping that tree. But this case isn't worth covering. Repo B should take responsibility for its own objects. It would never have had the commit in the first place if it did not also have the tree, and assuming it is using the same "keep recent chunks of history" scheme, then it would itself keep the tree, as well. So checking the alternate objects is not worth doing, and come with a significant performance impact. In both cases, we skip any recent objects that have already been marked SEEN (i.e., that we know are already reachable for prune, or included in the pack for a repack). So there is a slight waste of time in opening the alternate packs at all, only to notice that we have already considered each object. But much worse, the alternate repository may have a large number of objects that are not reachable from the local repository at all, and we end up adding them to the traversal. We can fix this by considering only local unseen objects. Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2015-03-27 12:32:41 +01:00
int for_each_packed_object(each_packed_object_fn cb, void *data, unsigned flags)
{
struct packed_git *p;
int r = 0;
int pack_errors = 0;
prepare_packed_git();
for (p = packed_git; p; p = p->next) {
reachable: only mark local objects as recent When pruning and repacking a repository that has an alternate object store configured, we may traverse a large number of objects in the alternate. This serves no purpose, and may be expensive to do. A longer explanation is below. Commits d3038d2 and abcb865 taught prune and pack-objects (respectively) to treat "recent" objects as tips for reachability, so that we keep whole chunks of history. They built on the object traversal in 660c889 (sha1_file: add for_each iterators for loose and packed objects, 2014-10-15), which covers both local and alternate objects. In both cases, covering alternate objects is unnecessary, as both commands can only drop objects from the local repository. In the case of prune, we traverse only the local object directory. And in the case of repacking, while we may or may not include local objects in our pack, we will never reach into the alternate with "repack -d". The "-l" option is only a question of whether we are migrating objects from the alternate into our repository, or leaving them untouched. It is possible that we may drop an object that is depended upon by another object in the alternate. For example, imagine two repositories, A and B, with A pointing to B as an alternate. Now imagine a commit that is in B which references a tree that is only in A. Traversing from recent objects in B might prevent A from dropping that tree. But this case isn't worth covering. Repo B should take responsibility for its own objects. It would never have had the commit in the first place if it did not also have the tree, and assuming it is using the same "keep recent chunks of history" scheme, then it would itself keep the tree, as well. So checking the alternate objects is not worth doing, and come with a significant performance impact. In both cases, we skip any recent objects that have already been marked SEEN (i.e., that we know are already reachable for prune, or included in the pack for a repack). So there is a slight waste of time in opening the alternate packs at all, only to notice that we have already considered each object. But much worse, the alternate repository may have a large number of objects that are not reachable from the local repository at all, and we end up adding them to the traversal. We can fix this by considering only local unseen objects. Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2015-03-27 12:32:41 +01:00
if ((flags & FOR_EACH_OBJECT_LOCAL_ONLY) && !p->pack_local)
continue;
if (open_pack_index(p)) {
pack_errors = 1;
continue;
}
r = for_each_object_in_pack(p, cb, data);
if (r)
break;
}
return r ? r : pack_errors;
}