From b624a3e67f498cb41f704c9bd28e7d53076611c8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Linus Torvalds Date: Tue, 16 Aug 2016 13:10:24 -0700 Subject: [PATCH] gpg-interface: prefer "long" key format output when verifying pgp signatures Yes, gpg2 already uses the long format by default, but most distributions seem to still have "gpg" be the older 1.x version due to compatibility reasons. And older versions of gpg only show the 32-bit short ID, which is quite insecure. This doesn't actually matter for the _verification_ itself: if the verification passes, the pgp signature is good. But if you don't actually have the key yet, and want to fetch it, or you want to check exactly which key was used for verification and want to check it, we should specify the key with more precision. In fact, we should preferentially specify the whole key fingerprint, but gpg doesn't actually support that. Which is really quite sad. Showing the "long" format improves things to at least show 64 bits of the fingerprint. That's a lot better, even if it's not perfect. This change the log format for "git log --show-signature" from commit 2376d31787760af598db23bb3982a57419854e5c merged tag 'v2.9.3' gpg: Signature made Fri 12 Aug 2016 09:17:59 AM PDT using RSA key ID 96AFE6CB gpg: Good signature from "Junio C Hamano " gpg: aka "Junio C Hamano " gpg: aka "Junio C Hamano " Merge: 2807cd7b25af e0c1ceafc5be Author: Junio C Hamano Date: Fri Aug 12 10:02:18 2016 -0700 to commit 2376d31787760af598db23bb3982a57419854e5c merged tag 'v2.9.3' gpg: Signature made Fri 12 Aug 2016 09:17:59 AM PDT gpg: using RSA key B0B5E88696AFE6CB gpg: Good signature from "Junio C Hamano " gpg: aka "Junio C Hamano " gpg: aka "Junio C Hamano " Merge: 2807cd7b25af e0c1ceafc5be Author: Junio C Hamano Date: Fri Aug 12 10:02:18 2016 -0700 (note the longer key ID, but also the reflowing of the text) and also changes the format in the merge messages when merging a signed tag. If you already use gpg2 (either because it's installed by default, or because you have set your gpg_program configuration to point to gpg2), that already used the long format, you'll also see a change: it will now have the same formatting as gpg 1.x, and the verification string looks something like gpg: Signature made Sun 24 Jul 2016 12:24:02 PM PDT gpg: using RSA key 79BE3E4300411886 gpg: Good signature from "Linus Torvalds " [ultimate] where it used to be on one line: gpg: Signature made Sun 24 Jul 2016 12:24:02 PM PDT using RSA key ID 79BE3E4300411886 gpg: Good signature from "Linus Torvalds " [ultimate] so there is certainly a chance this could break some automated scripting. But the 32-bit key ID's really are broken. Also note that because of the differences between gpg-1.x and gpg-2.x, hopefully any scripted key ID parsing code (if such code exists) is already flexible enough to not care. This was triggered by the fact that the "evil32" project keys ended up leaking to the public key servers, so now there are 32-bit aliases for just about every open source developer that you can easily get by mistake if you use the 32-bit short ID format. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano --- gpg-interface.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/gpg-interface.c b/gpg-interface.c index 3dc2fe397e..f6d9d87270 100644 --- a/gpg-interface.c +++ b/gpg-interface.c @@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ int verify_signed_buffer(const char *payload, size_t payload_size, struct strbuf *gpg_output, struct strbuf *gpg_status) { struct child_process gpg = CHILD_PROCESS_INIT; - const char *args_gpg[] = {NULL, "--status-fd=1", "--verify", "FILE", "-", NULL}; + const char *args_gpg[] = {NULL, "--status-fd=1", "--keyid-format=long", "--verify", "FILE", "-", NULL}; char path[PATH_MAX]; int fd, ret; struct strbuf buf = STRBUF_INIT; @@ -231,7 +231,7 @@ int verify_signed_buffer(const char *payload, size_t payload_size, gpg.out = -1; if (gpg_output) gpg.err = -1; - args_gpg[3] = path; + args_gpg[4] = path; if (start_command(&gpg)) { unlink(path); return error(_("could not run gpg."));