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git/wrapper.c
Jonathan Nieder 4698c8feb1 config: allow inaccessible configuration under $HOME
The changes v1.7.12.1~2^2~4 (config: warn on inaccessible files,
2012-08-21) and v1.8.1.1~22^2~2 (config: treat user and xdg config
permission problems as errors, 2012-10-13) were intended to prevent
important configuration (think "[transfer] fsckobjects") from being
ignored when the configuration is unintentionally unreadable (for
example with EIO on a flaky filesystem, or with ENOMEM due to a DoS
attack).  Usually ~/.gitconfig and ~/.config/git are readable by the
current user, and if they aren't then it would be easy to fix those
permissions, so the damage from adding this check should have been
minimal.

Unfortunately the access() check often trips when git is being run as
a server.  A daemon (such as inetd or git-daemon) starts as "root",
creates a listening socket, and then drops privileges, meaning that
when git commands are invoked they cannot access $HOME and die with

 fatal: unable to access '/root/.config/git/config': Permission denied

Any patch to fix this would have one of three problems:

  1. We annoy sysadmins who need to take an extra step to handle HOME
     when dropping privileges (the current behavior, or any other
     proposal that they have to opt into).

  2. We annoy sysadmins who want to set HOME when dropping privileges,
     either by making what they want to do impossible, or making them
     set an extra variable or option to accomplish what used to work
     (e.g., a patch to git-daemon to set HOME when --user is passed).

  3. We loosen the check, so some cases which might be noteworthy are
     not caught.

This patch is of type (3).

Treat user and xdg configuration that are inaccessible due to
permissions (EACCES) as though no user configuration was provided at
all.

An alternative method would be to check if $HOME is readable, but that
would not help in cases where the user who dropped privileges had a
globally readable HOME with only .config or .gitconfig being private.

This does not change the behavior when /etc/gitconfig or .git/config
is unreadable (since those are more serious configuration errors),
nor when ~/.gitconfig or ~/.config/git is unreadable due to problems
other than permissions.

Signed-off-by: Jonathan Nieder <jrnieder@gmail.com>
Improved-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2013-04-15 07:26:50 -07:00

443 lines
9.3 KiB
C

/*
* Various trivial helper wrappers around standard functions
*/
#include "cache.h"
static void do_nothing(size_t size)
{
}
static void (*try_to_free_routine)(size_t size) = do_nothing;
static void memory_limit_check(size_t size)
{
static int limit = -1;
if (limit == -1) {
const char *env = getenv("GIT_ALLOC_LIMIT");
limit = env ? atoi(env) * 1024 : 0;
}
if (limit && size > limit)
die("attempting to allocate %"PRIuMAX" over limit %d",
(intmax_t)size, limit);
}
try_to_free_t set_try_to_free_routine(try_to_free_t routine)
{
try_to_free_t old = try_to_free_routine;
if (!routine)
routine = do_nothing;
try_to_free_routine = routine;
return old;
}
char *xstrdup(const char *str)
{
char *ret = strdup(str);
if (!ret) {
try_to_free_routine(strlen(str) + 1);
ret = strdup(str);
if (!ret)
die("Out of memory, strdup failed");
}
return ret;
}
void *xmalloc(size_t size)
{
void *ret;
memory_limit_check(size);
ret = malloc(size);
if (!ret && !size)
ret = malloc(1);
if (!ret) {
try_to_free_routine(size);
ret = malloc(size);
if (!ret && !size)
ret = malloc(1);
if (!ret)
die("Out of memory, malloc failed (tried to allocate %lu bytes)",
(unsigned long)size);
}
#ifdef XMALLOC_POISON
memset(ret, 0xA5, size);
#endif
return ret;
}
void *xmallocz(size_t size)
{
void *ret;
if (unsigned_add_overflows(size, 1))
die("Data too large to fit into virtual memory space.");
ret = xmalloc(size + 1);
((char*)ret)[size] = 0;
return ret;
}
/*
* xmemdupz() allocates (len + 1) bytes of memory, duplicates "len" bytes of
* "data" to the allocated memory, zero terminates the allocated memory,
* and returns a pointer to the allocated memory. If the allocation fails,
* the program dies.
*/
void *xmemdupz(const void *data, size_t len)
{
return memcpy(xmallocz(len), data, len);
}
char *xstrndup(const char *str, size_t len)
{
char *p = memchr(str, '\0', len);
return xmemdupz(str, p ? p - str : len);
}
void *xrealloc(void *ptr, size_t size)
{
void *ret;
memory_limit_check(size);
ret = realloc(ptr, size);
if (!ret && !size)
ret = realloc(ptr, 1);
if (!ret) {
try_to_free_routine(size);
ret = realloc(ptr, size);
if (!ret && !size)
ret = realloc(ptr, 1);
if (!ret)
die("Out of memory, realloc failed");
}
return ret;
}
void *xcalloc(size_t nmemb, size_t size)
{
void *ret;
memory_limit_check(size * nmemb);
ret = calloc(nmemb, size);
if (!ret && (!nmemb || !size))
ret = calloc(1, 1);
if (!ret) {
try_to_free_routine(nmemb * size);
ret = calloc(nmemb, size);
if (!ret && (!nmemb || !size))
ret = calloc(1, 1);
if (!ret)
die("Out of memory, calloc failed");
}
return ret;
}
/*
* xread() is the same a read(), but it automatically restarts read()
* operations with a recoverable error (EAGAIN and EINTR). xread()
* DOES NOT GUARANTEE that "len" bytes is read even if the data is available.
*/
ssize_t xread(int fd, void *buf, size_t len)
{
ssize_t nr;
while (1) {
nr = read(fd, buf, len);
if ((nr < 0) && (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR))
continue;
return nr;
}
}
/*
* xwrite() is the same a write(), but it automatically restarts write()
* operations with a recoverable error (EAGAIN and EINTR). xwrite() DOES NOT
* GUARANTEE that "len" bytes is written even if the operation is successful.
*/
ssize_t xwrite(int fd, const void *buf, size_t len)
{
ssize_t nr;
while (1) {
nr = write(fd, buf, len);
if ((nr < 0) && (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR))
continue;
return nr;
}
}
ssize_t read_in_full(int fd, void *buf, size_t count)
{
char *p = buf;
ssize_t total = 0;
while (count > 0) {
ssize_t loaded = xread(fd, p, count);
if (loaded < 0)
return -1;
if (loaded == 0)
return total;
count -= loaded;
p += loaded;
total += loaded;
}
return total;
}
ssize_t write_in_full(int fd, const void *buf, size_t count)
{
const char *p = buf;
ssize_t total = 0;
while (count > 0) {
ssize_t written = xwrite(fd, p, count);
if (written < 0)
return -1;
if (!written) {
errno = ENOSPC;
return -1;
}
count -= written;
p += written;
total += written;
}
return total;
}
int xdup(int fd)
{
int ret = dup(fd);
if (ret < 0)
die_errno("dup failed");
return ret;
}
FILE *xfdopen(int fd, const char *mode)
{
FILE *stream = fdopen(fd, mode);
if (stream == NULL)
die_errno("Out of memory? fdopen failed");
return stream;
}
int xmkstemp(char *template)
{
int fd;
char origtemplate[PATH_MAX];
strlcpy(origtemplate, template, sizeof(origtemplate));
fd = mkstemp(template);
if (fd < 0) {
int saved_errno = errno;
const char *nonrelative_template;
if (strlen(template) != strlen(origtemplate))
template = origtemplate;
nonrelative_template = absolute_path(template);
errno = saved_errno;
die_errno("Unable to create temporary file '%s'",
nonrelative_template);
}
return fd;
}
/* git_mkstemp() - create tmp file honoring TMPDIR variable */
int git_mkstemp(char *path, size_t len, const char *template)
{
const char *tmp;
size_t n;
tmp = getenv("TMPDIR");
if (!tmp)
tmp = "/tmp";
n = snprintf(path, len, "%s/%s", tmp, template);
if (len <= n) {
errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
return -1;
}
return mkstemp(path);
}
/* git_mkstemps() - create tmp file with suffix honoring TMPDIR variable. */
int git_mkstemps(char *path, size_t len, const char *template, int suffix_len)
{
const char *tmp;
size_t n;
tmp = getenv("TMPDIR");
if (!tmp)
tmp = "/tmp";
n = snprintf(path, len, "%s/%s", tmp, template);
if (len <= n) {
errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
return -1;
}
return mkstemps(path, suffix_len);
}
/* Adapted from libiberty's mkstemp.c. */
#undef TMP_MAX
#define TMP_MAX 16384
int git_mkstemps_mode(char *pattern, int suffix_len, int mode)
{
static const char letters[] =
"abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz"
"ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ"
"0123456789";
static const int num_letters = 62;
uint64_t value;
struct timeval tv;
char *template;
size_t len;
int fd, count;
len = strlen(pattern);
if (len < 6 + suffix_len) {
errno = EINVAL;
return -1;
}
if (strncmp(&pattern[len - 6 - suffix_len], "XXXXXX", 6)) {
errno = EINVAL;
return -1;
}
/*
* Replace pattern's XXXXXX characters with randomness.
* Try TMP_MAX different filenames.
*/
gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
value = ((size_t)(tv.tv_usec << 16)) ^ tv.tv_sec ^ getpid();
template = &pattern[len - 6 - suffix_len];
for (count = 0; count < TMP_MAX; ++count) {
uint64_t v = value;
/* Fill in the random bits. */
template[0] = letters[v % num_letters]; v /= num_letters;
template[1] = letters[v % num_letters]; v /= num_letters;
template[2] = letters[v % num_letters]; v /= num_letters;
template[3] = letters[v % num_letters]; v /= num_letters;
template[4] = letters[v % num_letters]; v /= num_letters;
template[5] = letters[v % num_letters]; v /= num_letters;
fd = open(pattern, O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_RDWR, mode);
if (fd > 0)
return fd;
/*
* Fatal error (EPERM, ENOSPC etc).
* It doesn't make sense to loop.
*/
if (errno != EEXIST)
break;
/*
* This is a random value. It is only necessary that
* the next TMP_MAX values generated by adding 7777 to
* VALUE are different with (module 2^32).
*/
value += 7777;
}
/* We return the null string if we can't find a unique file name. */
pattern[0] = '\0';
return -1;
}
int git_mkstemp_mode(char *pattern, int mode)
{
/* mkstemp is just mkstemps with no suffix */
return git_mkstemps_mode(pattern, 0, mode);
}
int gitmkstemps(char *pattern, int suffix_len)
{
return git_mkstemps_mode(pattern, suffix_len, 0600);
}
int xmkstemp_mode(char *template, int mode)
{
int fd;
char origtemplate[PATH_MAX];
strlcpy(origtemplate, template, sizeof(origtemplate));
fd = git_mkstemp_mode(template, mode);
if (fd < 0) {
int saved_errno = errno;
const char *nonrelative_template;
if (!template[0])
template = origtemplate;
nonrelative_template = absolute_path(template);
errno = saved_errno;
die_errno("Unable to create temporary file '%s'",
nonrelative_template);
}
return fd;
}
static int warn_if_unremovable(const char *op, const char *file, int rc)
{
if (rc < 0) {
int err = errno;
if (ENOENT != err) {
warning("unable to %s %s: %s",
op, file, strerror(errno));
errno = err;
}
}
return rc;
}
int unlink_or_warn(const char *file)
{
return warn_if_unremovable("unlink", file, unlink(file));
}
int rmdir_or_warn(const char *file)
{
return warn_if_unremovable("rmdir", file, rmdir(file));
}
int remove_or_warn(unsigned int mode, const char *file)
{
return S_ISGITLINK(mode) ? rmdir_or_warn(file) : unlink_or_warn(file);
}
void warn_on_inaccessible(const char *path)
{
warning(_("unable to access '%s': %s"), path, strerror(errno));
}
static int access_error_is_ok(int err, unsigned flag)
{
return err == ENOENT || err == ENOTDIR ||
((flag & ACCESS_EACCES_OK) && err == EACCES);
}
int access_or_warn(const char *path, int mode, unsigned flag)
{
int ret = access(path, mode);
if (ret && !access_error_is_ok(errno, flag))
warn_on_inaccessible(path);
return ret;
}
int access_or_die(const char *path, int mode, unsigned flag)
{
int ret = access(path, mode);
if (ret && !access_error_is_ok(errno, flag))
die_errno(_("unable to access '%s'"), path);
return ret;
}
struct passwd *xgetpwuid_self(void)
{
struct passwd *pw;
errno = 0;
pw = getpwuid(getuid());
if (!pw)
die(_("unable to look up current user in the passwd file: %s"),
errno ? strerror(errno) : _("no such user"));
return pw;
}