mirror of
https://github.com/git/git.git
synced 2024-10-31 22:37:54 +01:00
fb06b5280e
Allow "git push" request to be signed, so that it can be verified and audited, using the GPG signature of the person who pushed, that the tips of branches at a public repository really point the commits the pusher wanted to, without having to "trust" the server. * jc/push-cert: (24 commits) receive-pack::hmac_sha1(): copy the entire SHA-1 hash out signed push: allow stale nonce in stateless mode signed push: teach smart-HTTP to pass "git push --signed" around signed push: fortify against replay attacks signed push: add "pushee" header to push certificate signed push: remove duplicated protocol info send-pack: send feature request on push-cert packet receive-pack: GPG-validate push certificates push: the beginning of "git push --signed" pack-protocol doc: typofix for PKT-LINE gpg-interface: move parse_signature() to where it should be gpg-interface: move parse_gpg_output() to where it should be send-pack: clarify that cmds_sent is a boolean send-pack: refactor inspecting and resetting status and sending commands send-pack: rename "new_refs" to "need_pack_data" receive-pack: factor out capability string generation send-pack: factor out capability string generation send-pack: always send capabilities send-pack: refactor decision to send update per ref send-pack: move REF_STATUS_REJECT_NODELETE logic a bit higher ...
223 lines
5.6 KiB
C
223 lines
5.6 KiB
C
#include "cache.h"
|
|
#include "run-command.h"
|
|
#include "strbuf.h"
|
|
#include "gpg-interface.h"
|
|
#include "sigchain.h"
|
|
|
|
static char *configured_signing_key;
|
|
static const char *gpg_program = "gpg";
|
|
|
|
#define PGP_SIGNATURE "-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----"
|
|
#define PGP_MESSAGE "-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----"
|
|
|
|
void signature_check_clear(struct signature_check *sigc)
|
|
{
|
|
free(sigc->payload);
|
|
free(sigc->gpg_output);
|
|
free(sigc->gpg_status);
|
|
free(sigc->signer);
|
|
free(sigc->key);
|
|
sigc->payload = NULL;
|
|
sigc->gpg_output = NULL;
|
|
sigc->gpg_status = NULL;
|
|
sigc->signer = NULL;
|
|
sigc->key = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static struct {
|
|
char result;
|
|
const char *check;
|
|
} sigcheck_gpg_status[] = {
|
|
{ 'G', "\n[GNUPG:] GOODSIG " },
|
|
{ 'B', "\n[GNUPG:] BADSIG " },
|
|
{ 'U', "\n[GNUPG:] TRUST_NEVER" },
|
|
{ 'U', "\n[GNUPG:] TRUST_UNDEFINED" },
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
void parse_gpg_output(struct signature_check *sigc)
|
|
{
|
|
const char *buf = sigc->gpg_status;
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
/* Iterate over all search strings */
|
|
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(sigcheck_gpg_status); i++) {
|
|
const char *found, *next;
|
|
|
|
if (!skip_prefix(buf, sigcheck_gpg_status[i].check + 1, &found)) {
|
|
found = strstr(buf, sigcheck_gpg_status[i].check);
|
|
if (!found)
|
|
continue;
|
|
found += strlen(sigcheck_gpg_status[i].check);
|
|
}
|
|
sigc->result = sigcheck_gpg_status[i].result;
|
|
/* The trust messages are not followed by key/signer information */
|
|
if (sigc->result != 'U') {
|
|
sigc->key = xmemdupz(found, 16);
|
|
found += 17;
|
|
next = strchrnul(found, '\n');
|
|
sigc->signer = xmemdupz(found, next - found);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Look at GPG signed content (e.g. a signed tag object), whose
|
|
* payload is followed by a detached signature on it. Return the
|
|
* offset where the embedded detached signature begins, or the end of
|
|
* the data when there is no such signature.
|
|
*/
|
|
size_t parse_signature(const char *buf, unsigned long size)
|
|
{
|
|
char *eol;
|
|
size_t len = 0;
|
|
while (len < size && !starts_with(buf + len, PGP_SIGNATURE) &&
|
|
!starts_with(buf + len, PGP_MESSAGE)) {
|
|
eol = memchr(buf + len, '\n', size - len);
|
|
len += eol ? eol - (buf + len) + 1 : size - len;
|
|
}
|
|
return len;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void set_signing_key(const char *key)
|
|
{
|
|
free(configured_signing_key);
|
|
configured_signing_key = xstrdup(key);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int git_gpg_config(const char *var, const char *value, void *cb)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!strcmp(var, "user.signingkey")) {
|
|
set_signing_key(value);
|
|
}
|
|
if (!strcmp(var, "gpg.program")) {
|
|
if (!value)
|
|
return config_error_nonbool(var);
|
|
gpg_program = xstrdup(value);
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const char *get_signing_key(void)
|
|
{
|
|
if (configured_signing_key)
|
|
return configured_signing_key;
|
|
return git_committer_info(IDENT_STRICT|IDENT_NO_DATE);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Create a detached signature for the contents of "buffer" and append
|
|
* it after "signature"; "buffer" and "signature" can be the same
|
|
* strbuf instance, which would cause the detached signature appended
|
|
* at the end.
|
|
*/
|
|
int sign_buffer(struct strbuf *buffer, struct strbuf *signature, const char *signing_key)
|
|
{
|
|
struct child_process gpg = CHILD_PROCESS_INIT;
|
|
const char *args[4];
|
|
ssize_t len;
|
|
size_t i, j, bottom;
|
|
|
|
gpg.argv = args;
|
|
gpg.in = -1;
|
|
gpg.out = -1;
|
|
args[0] = gpg_program;
|
|
args[1] = "-bsau";
|
|
args[2] = signing_key;
|
|
args[3] = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (start_command(&gpg))
|
|
return error(_("could not run gpg."));
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* When the username signingkey is bad, program could be terminated
|
|
* because gpg exits without reading and then write gets SIGPIPE.
|
|
*/
|
|
sigchain_push(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
|
|
|
|
if (write_in_full(gpg.in, buffer->buf, buffer->len) != buffer->len) {
|
|
close(gpg.in);
|
|
close(gpg.out);
|
|
finish_command(&gpg);
|
|
return error(_("gpg did not accept the data"));
|
|
}
|
|
close(gpg.in);
|
|
|
|
bottom = signature->len;
|
|
len = strbuf_read(signature, gpg.out, 1024);
|
|
close(gpg.out);
|
|
|
|
sigchain_pop(SIGPIPE);
|
|
|
|
if (finish_command(&gpg) || !len || len < 0)
|
|
return error(_("gpg failed to sign the data"));
|
|
|
|
/* Strip CR from the line endings, in case we are on Windows. */
|
|
for (i = j = bottom; i < signature->len; i++)
|
|
if (signature->buf[i] != '\r') {
|
|
if (i != j)
|
|
signature->buf[j] = signature->buf[i];
|
|
j++;
|
|
}
|
|
strbuf_setlen(signature, j);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Run "gpg" to see if the payload matches the detached signature.
|
|
* gpg_output, when set, receives the diagnostic output from GPG.
|
|
* gpg_status, when set, receives the status output from GPG.
|
|
*/
|
|
int verify_signed_buffer(const char *payload, size_t payload_size,
|
|
const char *signature, size_t signature_size,
|
|
struct strbuf *gpg_output, struct strbuf *gpg_status)
|
|
{
|
|
struct child_process gpg = CHILD_PROCESS_INIT;
|
|
const char *args_gpg[] = {NULL, "--status-fd=1", "--verify", "FILE", "-", NULL};
|
|
char path[PATH_MAX];
|
|
int fd, ret;
|
|
struct strbuf buf = STRBUF_INIT;
|
|
struct strbuf *pbuf = &buf;
|
|
|
|
args_gpg[0] = gpg_program;
|
|
fd = git_mkstemp(path, PATH_MAX, ".git_vtag_tmpXXXXXX");
|
|
if (fd < 0)
|
|
return error(_("could not create temporary file '%s': %s"),
|
|
path, strerror(errno));
|
|
if (write_in_full(fd, signature, signature_size) < 0)
|
|
return error(_("failed writing detached signature to '%s': %s"),
|
|
path, strerror(errno));
|
|
close(fd);
|
|
|
|
gpg.argv = args_gpg;
|
|
gpg.in = -1;
|
|
gpg.out = -1;
|
|
if (gpg_output)
|
|
gpg.err = -1;
|
|
args_gpg[3] = path;
|
|
if (start_command(&gpg)) {
|
|
unlink(path);
|
|
return error(_("could not run gpg."));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
write_in_full(gpg.in, payload, payload_size);
|
|
close(gpg.in);
|
|
|
|
if (gpg_output) {
|
|
strbuf_read(gpg_output, gpg.err, 0);
|
|
close(gpg.err);
|
|
}
|
|
if (gpg_status)
|
|
pbuf = gpg_status;
|
|
strbuf_read(pbuf, gpg.out, 0);
|
|
close(gpg.out);
|
|
|
|
ret = finish_command(&gpg);
|
|
|
|
unlink_or_warn(path);
|
|
|
|
ret |= !strstr(pbuf->buf, "\n[GNUPG:] GOODSIG ");
|
|
strbuf_release(&buf); /* no matter it was used or not */
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|